Sakya, or Buddhist Origins

C.A.F Rhys Davids
Mrs. Rhys Davids

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INTRODUCTORY

This book is intended to be a help to those who would approach the study of a great religion with a very long history in the intensive way known as at first hand. As such it is not a supplement, but a complement to my other manual, *Gotama the Man*. In that work I sought to help the otherwise busy man and woman who have too little leisure or inclination to take up the history of that religion seriously, the study of its records, the study of their language. It is to those who have the inclination and are carving out the leisure to consider that history more closely and, it may be, to further what is known of it that I turn here and now. And to such I would at the outset say this :

You have the will to take up the study of what is called Buddhism, and more especially, just now at least, the study of the Buddhism to be got from what is known as Pali literature. You, in taking up this book, are asking to be told something about the beginnings of the one and the other : what was Buddhism at first ? How did it come to be what it now is ? is it very like what at first it was ?

To your first question I would say : Put away, for your origins, the word " Buddhism " and think of your subject as " Sakya ". This will at once place you for perspective at a truer point. You are taken away from a quite modern term—convenient, it is true, for inclusive import—and are deposited in the history of the first three or more centuries of the life of this religion. Emphasis for you shifts at once. You are now concerned to learn less about " Buddha " and " Buddhism ", more about him whom India has ever known as Sakya-muni, and about his men who, as their records admit, were spoken of as the Sakya-sons, or men of the Sakyas. It is only when Sakya was lingering on in India as a moribund cult, as a decadent quasi-philosophy, that Indian writers mentioned it as " what the Bauddhas say ".

In the next place, you will have been directed, for the carrying out your purpose, for the finding replies to your questions, to devote possibly your first inquiries to a study of the collection of books—all, as books and not as manuscripts only, made accessible to you in this last half-century by the labours of a handful of scholars and by the gifts of a handful of donors[1]—the collection entitled the Pali Canon of the Three Piṭakas. Of these three, the first two, containing

[1] The work of the Pali Text Society, founded in 1881 by Rhys Davids.

respectively a mass of monastic rules and comments thereon (with a few scraps of narrative), and an immense number of recorded sayings in verse and prose (with a book of commentary and one of folklore) are earlier than the third. This is internally admitted and is demonstrable. You will further be referred to two or three extra-Canonical books and to a number of commentaries on the Canonical books. For these last a much later fixed wording, and writing down in such, is claimed, although as spoken comment they may be as old as much in the canon itself.

Hence for a reply to your first question you will mainly concentrate on the first two Piṭakas, the while you keep a watchful eye on the Commentaries. If herein you are first directed to the scraps of narrative in the second Piṭaka and to a few more adduced in the first Piṭaka (mainly to vindicate the main sanctions of a community of the Rule and the making of some particular rule), you will probably not, at this time of day, be first struck, as I was half a century ago, by this: that the appearance of a devoted Helper of Man, with an inspired mandate, becomes no longer for you a phenomenon that is unique. Your day is different; it has learnt more. For you comes possibly a different first impression; one that belongs more to your second and third question. You may, as a child of your day, get the impression that what you read in the records is other than what a World-Helper will have said to the world—that is, to the men and women about him there and then. If not, what will he really have said there and then, and how will he have said it there and then?

If this comes over you, you are *at the right standpoint* to take up the historical study, the one and only right study, of "Buddhism". And if this be not your impression, it is what I seek to give you in this book. What he, called "Buddha", is made to say; what it is likely he will have willed to say; what it is unlikely he will have willed to say; what it is impossible he can ever have said and yet is made to say: here is sound outlook; here is the attitude of the man or woman bent on a quest of high worth. Your quest is one of high worth. It concerns so much more, in your own growth, than the eliciting truth from a dead past. It is a quest in what is true in your own nature, your own life, when you seek, as now you are seeking, wherein lay, in the long-ago delivered message of this Man to the Man in everyone about him, what he will really have said, what he tried to say, what a want of new words hindered him from saying, which was of new meaning, new light; what these old records you are now sifting may in course of time have made him out as not saying, as saying differently.

You ask: How am I to distinguish? How can I possibly know?

My son, you have not entered upon a light matter of just gleaning the contents of a mass of old books, and then saying you know from them what were the origins of Buddhism. That would be as if you were to reconstruct a Roman basilica from the materials prepared for a late Gothic church; or, from the elaborate Glastonbury Abbey of the twelfth century, a model of the little "vetusta ecclesia" wherein St. Joseph and his Keltic converts foregathered fraternally. Yours it is to follow our archæologists and to dig for the original Troy beneath more than one superimposed city. For that which was Sakya is not that which you find displayed in category and formula, in sermon and reiterated refrain in the Piṭakas. I would go so far as to say in utmost seriousness, that could you now put into the hands of, say, Sāriputta any portion of Vinaya or Sutta, he would tell you it was hard for him to recognize in it anything that he taught as the right-hand man of Gotama! Yet you have no reason therefore to despair of getting at something of original purport beneath these many palimpsests. Nay, your position as serious student becomes so much more interesting. Yours it is, not to follow in a newly made "by-pass road", but to aid in the road-making. You are coming to this study just when the labours of a generation and more of pioneers have cut a clearing for the Road of the True through the jungle of our ignorance about Sakya and its birth. The Road has now to be made.

To leave figure, this is the position: Pali literature has just won a claim to be considered as, so far, containing, among much that is later, the most archaic records we yet have available for reconstructing Buddhist origins. The quest is now gone further east, to seek whether in Chinese and other literature we may possibly find translations made by men who bore eastward earlier versions of Sakya than the version which we have derived from Ceylon, recast into the form of literary Prakrit called Pali by the missionary monk centres of Ceylon. I have given reasons at the end of this book to show that this hope is not ill founded. Nor is this the only quest of the future into other sources of Sakya. Not as yet has even a beginning been made to sift the contents of the oldest known Sinhalese literature written in Sinhalese, yet quoting doctrine of "the Men of Old" as often in Sanskrit as in Pali: doctrine, that is to say, which was first taught in India more likely in Prakrit than in either of these tongues.

But meanwhile you and others who have as yet not turned eastward or southward have all your work cut out for you to winnow, in the Pali Piṭakas, the older grain from all the later chaff. For even

scholars as yet take the emphases and values in the Piṭakas pretty much as they are given by the monastic editors, rating as fundamental, as of most worth, just what is so rated by the relatively late statements emanating from the altered ideals of the monk.

"The monk!"—here it is that I would have you see what comes between you and the real gospel of Sakya. That gospel brought to Everyman a new word of a "More" in his nature, in his life and destiny. The monks who became its vehicle worthily kept the ideal of the More of which a man is capable to the front. You will recognize this in *their* theory of the saint or "arahan". But you will also recognize that their saint is not ideal Everyman, but ideal monk. This shows you that, in the monastic compositions called Piṭakas, you are not considering scriptures for all men and all women. You have in them the interests put forward of certain men and women who have selected a certain kind of life detached from earthly life taken as a whole, and who have become a world within a world, with aims and ideals suited to that inner world. This is not to withhold appreciation of a man's coming out of a groove of average living, in the will to live up to more than average values. But when a man so willing enters into a group who have chosen the same way as he out of that groove, he does but get down into another inner groove. To that extent he has become a groove-man in the Less; he is no more an out-of-the-groove man in the wider world of the Whole. Out of his, her life such an one has cut all human relations—father, mother, husband, wife, child—save those of friend and of teacher and pupil. He has chosen to become in a selected range an expert. But the expert is properly such in some proficiency of body or mind or both. As *very man*, using mind and body, but not being either, he needs life as a whole in which to develop. His outlook on life is narrowed and oblique. And historically considered, the Piṭakas show you the birth and growth of Sakya in the swaddling clothes of a monastic nursing, such as was coming into vogue at the time. You get the gospel brought by the Man to Man twisted and re-valued and otherwise emphasized to suit a monastic set of ideals.

Another octopus which gripped the young Sakya, mightily diverting it from its birth-words, was the vogue known as Sānkhya, still new and spreading when Sakya was born, of considering the mind as distinguishable from the very man. You will not go rightly to work on Sakya till you realize all that this meant for India of that day. You are so much in a similar vogue yourself, that at first it will not strike you. There were other time-spirit influences at work, but these two were the strongest.

With these influences, into which this book inquires, you will need especially to heed carefully the worthiest religious ideals of India at the time when Sakya came (as later did Jesus elsewhere) "not to destroy" those ideals "but to fulfil" them, bringing into them a New Word, where they fell short, or were falling into misuse. And do not mix these ideals with those of the later growth of monk-values.

Further, see that you keep ever in view the peculiar difficulties attending the faithful transmission of any formulated teaching down many centuries in a bookless world. You have here and now great difficulty in adequately realizing this. Do not be misled by any supposed constancy in other bookless channels in Indian literary traditions. Study the *openings for change*, together with the *growing* motives for making changes.

So working and so watching, you may help to make ready against the day, when disclosures from the Further East and from Southern Asia will test the values of the monastic Piṭakas to rank as giving us genuine Sakya; you may find that genuine Sakya more in what the Piṭakas *betray* and have *suffered to survive*, than in what they affirm as chief and fundamental; you will come to realize, that, short of the best thing in life: the welcoming in of a New gospel—and we are not yet ready for that—you are taking part in what is perhaps the next best thing: the discovery, the reconstruction, the rehabilitation of that which, at its birth, was a new and a true word from very man to very man, true always and everywhere.

Such has it been to me, who as wren on eagles' backs have flown, I think, a little higher than my pioneer bearers. To no pioneer is it given perhaps to see in perspective to where he is breaking through. And in what he has so far said over his work, I see conclusions more or less premature, conclusions based on too slight an historical and intensive weighing of materials which, after all, it is only now becoming possible to make. Let us like Elijah pray that we may perish if we are no better than our fathers! If in these pages I have not gone much into these conclusions, it is because I would not take up your time with worrying over bones in the food I have been helped by feeding on. It has seemed less impertinent to put before you such positive contribution as I believe you will here find. If here or there in it I may be proved to have been forestalled without admitting it, this was done in ignorance. The field of "books about Buddhism" is strewn with pioneer and immature conclusions. And the profound confidence of certain recent writers, who shall be nameless, of such books that they have won to final truth has often made me gasp. Only

they who have tried to study historically have known, that they were groping, that they were not out of the jungle. The future will see groping also (and rightly) in this book, and in those which I have published since, let me say, 1923.[1] But let me be judged by these later works, and not by the yet more immature gropings of my earlier work. It has taken a long time and no little pioneer work to get only so far. The thing most worth while is not easy to win.

In the following chapters I have incorporated much from certain articles in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, and the *Calcutta Review*, published during the last three years. For permission to do this, I would here to Council and Editors respectively tender my thanks.

[1] Especially *Gotama the Man*, *Kindred Sayings on Buddhism*, and *The Milanda Questions.*

PART I

I

THE BIRTH OF A NEW RELIGION

When we come to study a religion, it is the birth of it that most interests us. The legends about just that show where the interest in it has lain. When we consider that birth, as we say, historically, there arises for us the further interest, namely, in the religion coming to birth where and when it does. And if it be a religion with a very long history, it becomes a very complicated task to get at the truth, not only as to this, but also as to the original nature of the religion itself as a mandate, and as to the man or men who first gave utterance to that mandate.

Our interest in the religion itself is really due to its having been, at its birth, as mandate for the Many, a New Word. It does not follow that its sole value lay in its being, to that extent, new. Its real value lies in its message, a message of vital interest to every man and woman, having come to be virtually accepted by succeeding ages of civilization as something true and of value for all the world at all times, and as such to have been wrought up into the essentials of that civilization. "Wrought up into" with limitations. These will be due, in part, to the way in which the views held by the long series of transmitters of the teaching have been changing. "Hereby hangs a tale," and a long one: the tale of that religion's history. But at its birth, and there and then the religion will have been new, for till then man, the Many, had not been ready for such a message.

In the Christian religion, with a beginning less remote from us, and with records written nearer in time to its birth than those of the religion with which we are here concerned, we can better see its message as something waited for, listened to, and taken up, in a way that is beyond all bounds of the usual and the probable, and spread among the Many with a truly wonderful vitality. It opened up a "more" in the life of each man. This was, that to ward, not only his fellow-Jew, but his fellow-man, fraternally, as his "neighbour", was a part of the worthy life here, and was *the test of his worthiness* when judged hereafter in another world. This is not usually pointed to as the message of Christianity, but rather as its result. I would

contend that it is the teaching of the very message, and that the warding of man by man, chiefly in the body, to a less extent in the mind, has ever been all down its history the very worthy "long trail" of a religion which has many less worthy traces left by its course. This, and not faith in a sacrifice, it is that is taught as a message in the Gospels. That Jesus mandated man in the Many as the children of a loving Father I am not for a moment disputing. But it is equally true that when he showed man as brought to the tribunal of the worlds, he did not show him as asked: Did you believe in my sacrifice? but, Have you done this and that for your brothers?[1]

In the Sakya religion, which came to be called Buddhism, with a beginning more remote from us, and with records written very much more remotely in time from that beginning than those of Christendom, we may, it is true, there also see its message as something waited for and eagerly taken up and spread, but we find even more difficulty in discerning what the message to Everyman really was. From the records both early and late it might well be concluded that it taught, as to man's nature, that diagnosis of Ill known as "the four truths", or a trinity of attributes known as "the three marks", and as to man's life, that the best life on earth was that of casting off worldly ties and living mainly in seclusion. And these are still the notions held about it by many, not only in lands called in religion Buddhist, but even among such as are drawn to that cult from other lands and other religions.

But it happens that, here also, we can apply a parallel test, to bring out the very marrow of the message as touching the very man, to that which Christian teaching offers. For in the Buddhist records we also find the man brought in the hereafter, that is, on his leaving the earth, to the judgment-bar, to be passed as worthy, or not passed. And the question put to him is not: Did you believe in the truth of the truths, of the marks? Or, Did you believe that to leave the world was the best life? but, Did you see our messengers on earth, bidding you again and again to lead the worthy life? Here surely if anywhere the very touchstone of the message would be recorded. Here we see the newness of the new word as touching the very man in his testimony to his faith: not merely that a man should lead a worthy life: such a message would not then have been a New Word, even to the Many. The New Word was, in its bearing on conduct, the supreme importance of the worthy life, not so much to the short life of body and mind on earth but to the whole life of the very man

[1] Matthew's Gospel, xxv.

as wayfarer in the worlds. It was more important than belief in either the efficacy of rites or the select seclusion of an artificial mode of life. And the New Word was more than that.

The message of the later of these two religions was not needing that of the older. It was known then by the Many that the worthy life was of deepest importance hereafter. Nor did the older message convey the New Word of the later religion. The earth was not ready for it. It is true that its Messenger was very alive to help his fellows. Yet even that is not made out clearly in the records, when the way he took to do so is told. He is troubled at sight of the "messengers": old age, disease, death, but his trouble is so expressed that it might well be understood he was thinking of his own escape. There is no clear word in the story, "gest" (*apadāna*), or legend of the older scriptures, that in brooding over the ills of the world, and a way out, it is not his own fate only which is troubling him; that it was the Many he was concerned about. There are those even to-day who see in his trouble self-interest only, even when the record runs: "Alas! the world is fallen on trouble . . . Where on earth will a way out be shown?"[1] We cannot reasonably doubt that he did mean "way out for the world". He would not have lived in men's memory as "he-of-compassion-for-all-beings" had his earth-life not made it very clear that he did mean this. Nevertheless, the warding of all men by each man was then very far from being in men's minds and values, and hence, in men's wording. And thus we have to *read into* the story of his troubled thought the meaning "care for all men", and not for himself only.

Now the New Word with which this great "son of the Sakyas" opened up a "more" in the nature, and also in the life, of man was, I repeat, the importance of the moral life, or conduct, not in this world only but in the worlds, or in life as a whole. This was a new valuation, a new emphasis. Good conduct was then relatively speaking an amenity in earth life, and weighed lightly in transmundane values when compared with the accomplishment and efficacy of the Ritual. And the men who were charged with the Ritual were they who held the field in the regard and attention of the Many. But the New Word saw "the way out" as different.

It saw it as only in the man himself. No external methods as such can help. The man must find the way. In himself must each seek salvation. But let the reader not understand this in the way we now understand it. The "man" in our day is no longer the "man" of the day when Sakya began, any more than he was the

[1] *Digha-Nikāya*, ii, 30 f.

"man" of the day when Sakya was becoming what we call Buddhism. In the earlier day the "man" meant he who had "within", latent yet astir, the very Divine, the Highest, the Most. This Self it was, and no external deity, on whom man was thrown back, to whom man was referred, to follow whom was the way out. It is of the first importance that this be realized; the ignoring of it, the substitution for it of the later Buddhist limited view of the man, the self, and *of our own limited view of the man, the self*, is ever vitiating modern treatment of Buddhist teaching.

Man, as and by the Self, must find the "way": here we have the "sailing orders" in Sakya. This is, for me, vital in the teaching of the Man of the Sakyas, whose disciples were called after him Sakya-sons and his teaching "Sakya" for centuries. Men had long been herded along prescribed ways, with rite and sacrifice, with fixed gest and chanted mantra, if so be they might thereby elude mishap, both here and also in the next step awaiting the end of life on earth. It was a new thing for the Many to be told that in each man and woman was a vital spring whence could be evolved an ever greater fitness to meet and mould the To Be. It had been hinted at in Vedic teaching, but no more.[1] How did Sakya word that "spring"?

What have we surviving of Sakya teaching? Hereon, if my book prove unsatisfactory in brevity, the reader knows that I have not set out to deal with what we may call the external history of Buddhism. It would take me far beyond its more intensive scope. But I would at least have my reader make bowing acquaintance with the sources from which I have deemed it most worth while (and why) to draw. And I would also remind him of how very much, in the perspective of the history of our times, those sources are themselves to us a "New Word", one of the wonderful phases of the "More" that have so opened up our earth-horizon during a little over a century. Readers who have sampled books of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, dealing with Southern Asia, will know how few and fragmentary were the glimpses of "Buddha" and "Buddhism" shown to Europeans. Interesting examples are to be found in Mr. E. J. Thomas's *The Buddha in Legend and in History*,[2] to which may be added the curious references to both the Buddha and also to "Promb" (Brahman), supreme impersonal "Deity"

[1] Cf. *Śatapatha-Brahmaṇa*, vi, 2, 2, 27 (*SBE*, xli, p. 181): "Hence they say, Man is born into the world made (by him)."

[2] Page xiv.

(Tipedah = Devatā), in Alexander Hamilton's travels in Siam and Cambodia, now being edited by Sir William Foster. But the beginning of the nineteenth century reveals the dawning of new interest, of livelier inquiry. This is very natural when we remember that we won Ceylon from the Dutch at the end of the eighteenth century, retaining possession at the Treaty of Amiens, 1802. To the excellent historical references of the Oxford Dictionary we owe the ability to see how, at that time, the subjects "Buddha, Buddhism, Buddhist" were coming under discussion in the periodical *Asiatic Research* and in books. And the newness is intensified by the varied spellings, such as Bhoodha, Boudhou, Bhooddhist, Boudhist, Bhuddist, Bhudist, Buddhite, Buddhic, with the Sanskrit form, Bauddhas.

Such inquiries had been carried on practically, if not entirely, without access to anything that we should now call Canonical writings. The interesting tale of how these first poured into the hands of European libraries, first through Tibetan versions by the labours of Csoma de Kőrös, a Hungarian, then in Sanskrit Mahayānist compositions through the generous agency of Brian H. Hodgson from Nepal, and lastly in a completed, closed Pali (text) Canon through the labours of Upham, Turnour, and Robert C. Childers from Ceylon is already told elsewhere. It is needless and not in the scope of this inquiry to repeat the story, absorbing in interest though it be. I leave it repeating only, in inverse order, the reasons why it has been just touched upon:—

The general reader may incline to the conclusion that everything about Buddhism has been said, and said often enough. I would remind him that the problem of Christian origins has been, for us of Europe, "always with us," and that there was a mountain of books about Christianity in existence before a serious effort to solve the problem of its origins in the historical study of its records was begun. Speaking approximately, it took thirteen centuries before such an effort began less than one century ago. Modern conditions make it less likely that the corresponding effort over the problem of Buddhist origins will be delayed so long. But because there is already a mountain of books—a very little mountain comparatively—about Buddhism, it does not follow that that effort has got very far, much less that it has got as far as it will get. Only an ignorant person would say—as was recently said to me by a London firm of book-purveyors—that all the books that were needed on Buddhism had been written. On the contrary: the effort to disentangle the real sources from the later values, values which became orthodox and authoritative, is relatively new and untried. This little work will

not get very far, and is at best a call to the world to take note of what remains to be done. But to think it has been done is that little knowledge which is indeed, in the cause of truth, a dangerous thing.

And if I call upon readers to make a "bowing acquaintance" with Pali literature only as my field of excavations, it is not to maintain that there are no other fields presently available or to be available for digging. It is, in the first place, that I would deal with that about which I have first-hand knowledge; in the second place, because, when we compare Pali books and one other source, Buddhist Sanskrit books, we cannot be in doubt that, among the former, we have writings which are, as compared with all that I have seen of the latter, records of what had already long existed as *uttered sayings*, while in the latter we have *written compositions*, works far less archaic, works of a later date. Into this I have gone elsewhere, and may go a little into it here. But the style is not the only historical guide. Sayings in the Pali books are cited as authoritative by Buddhist Sanskrit works, and if the world of scholars is not yet in a position to come to finished conclusions in this matter of relative antiquity, the present position is well worded by Mr. E. J. Thomas when he writes, that what has become recently available in other Buddhist literatures emphasizes "the relative importance and antiquity of the Pali against the late and degenerate forms that have survived in Nepal and Tibet. It is no longer possible to pit the (Sanskrit) Lalita-Vistara against the Pali as a source of history, and to base theories on documents that can be proved to be accretions and inventions of later centuries".

As to the contents of the Pali scriptures, I have here tried the reader's patience to a minimum, by giving a statement of them only in an Appendix, and that just for convenience of reference. He will find a thematic list of them both in Rhys Davids's *Manual of Buddhism* (S.P.C.K.) and in Mr. Thomas's book, *The Buddha in Legend and History*, pp. 257 ff.

Those Pali scriptures have one special feature distinguishing them from all other "bibles" known to us, and which should never be lost to view. They are the compilations of men whom we should now call monks. Now it may be, that the Christian scriptures were in time preserved and propagated by clerics who, to all purposes, were as much separated from the external world as were the monks of the Sangha. But we cannot say that it was an Order of such clerics who first committed to writing the memorized sayings out of which the first three or even the fourth of the gospels were compiled. They are sayings addressed to—as we now say—

Everyman, and bearing no sign that they were the utterances of clerics. The Pali books differ from them of course in many ways, but mainly in just this:—It is claimed that they are compiled by Buddhist clerics, that is, by monks, and they are, in their present form, *almost wholly addressed to monks*. This is not realized by those who are not conversant with these books. And because of this want of acquaintance with this distinctive feature, it is not realized that the books are concerned, not so much with the world of Everyman as with a world within that world: a world of men (and of some women) who had renounced life in the world as parents, sons, brothers, citizens, workers, who *as such* had renounced the attempt to live worthy lives, and who, having made a violent purging of all that from their lives, were adapting themselves to other interests, other occupations, other ideals.

It does not follow, from this altered and narrowed range, that the Pali books do not contain much that is of high religious and moral value, not only for the monk, but also for Everyman. But it does follow that, as teaching for Everyman's needs and aspirations, they make a narrowed appeal, they word a mandate less fitted for the world than if they were addressed, in every case or in most cases, to the man in the world's life. And it does follow from this that in their present written composition they are *no true expression* of a real world-gospel, a message that is to Everyman, to the very Man in all men.

How then, it may be asked, is it that, in these Pali books, we are asked to see the oldest surviving mandate of what was and is indubitably a world-religion? To this the answer is: Well, it is the best documentary survival that we yet have; but being such a mandate as they are, we must not accept its wording of this *in just the form it has come to take*. We must use our reconstructive imagination. This is to use neither constructive (creative) imagination or fancy, as we shall surely be accused of using. We have to make of these Pali scriptures an intelligible whole. Such a whole many now try to make by interpreting much in an over-modern way, reading ideas of our own time, such for instance as solidarity and altruism and fraternity, into these old-time scriptures. And hence comes much of the appeal Buddhism makes here and there to men and women of lapsed creed, or of no creed.

This is not the way to take if we really care for truth. The way I would ask the reader to take is the historical way. This means, broadly speaking, that we should consider these scriptures in the light of the fact that man is ever changing, ever becoming

other, ever shifting his values even where he is not changing his skies, more where he has changed his skies.

In the lifetime of the coming-to-be of the Pali scriptures there was time, and opportunity, for many changes. Even if we place the formulating of the oldest Sayings, long precedent to any series corresponding to a "book", as early as 500 B.C., more than three centuries, more likely four, or even five, centuries elapsed before the Pali Canon can safely be said to have been finally closed. And it is agreed that it was about as long a time as that, namely, about 80 B.C., before, in the new vogue of writing, and not only memorizing records, they were committed, at least in one country, to the form of written documents. Our only evidence, as yet, when and where this was done is a statement in Ceylon literature[1] that it took place to meet a possible emergency in that island. It is more likely that the canonical records were written there in imitation of an earlier commitment to writing in India, made about the time of the "Fourth Council" under king Kaniṣka, but our scanty evidence inclines scholars to place the date of that after the date alleged in the Ceylon epics.

After this long interval, with all that it actually brought of changes internal and external, it is not wilful scepticism to say that when we accept "Buddhism" as we find it held in worth in the Pali scriptures, we are *not near to its origins*. It is because it is generally supposed that those scriptures put the really original teaching in the chief place, that we are not very near to a true idea of it. There is but little left in them of the way in which the Founder of Sakya and his first men taught. We are not worthy reconstructors if we do not face this difficulty.

We are often reminded of the remarkable power of memorizing past and even present in India. This is only natural in a country where good writing materials were late in being found, so that the reign and power of the spoken word was, so to speak, artificially prolonged. But we may help out the Pali scriptures, as true mandate, with this subterfuge too much. It is questionable whether we should look, among Sakyan repeaters, for such highly developed memorizing as was ancient and traditional among not all, but certain of the Brahmans. And even among these there is no absolute certainty that their mantras never varied. We have for that matter evidence that revision of these from time to time was an ancient institution. Never to vary is only possible for automata. A repeating cleric is, relatively, an automaton. But the more he is worth as a *teacher*, the more will he tend to vary from the automatic.

[1] *Dīpavaṃsa*, xx, 20, 21. *Mahāvaṃsa*, xxxiii, 100, 101.

To word his own convictions he will change a memorized record here in emphasis, there in order of wording, there again even in wording. And his following will come to imitate him herein. Hence, long before there were scribes to scratch in with their styles the mistakes we now meet with in manuscripts, it is not only possible, it is very probable, that Sakyan repeatings underwent change in versions carried on at different places, at different times. It is well to rate the Pali scriptures for what they are; it is better not to rate them for what they are not and cannot be.

And that which they are not, that which, from the circumstances of their coming into being, they cannot be, is a truthful adequate presentation of Sakya, the gospel taught by Gotama the Sakyan and his first fellow-workers. Where, then, and how are we to find, if find we may, that very gospel? I do not think we need despair, as a few are inclined to do. The task of the modern archæologist in this ancient site and that has seemed at first no less formidable, and yet by patient dogged digging he has come upon sites and their spoil more truly showing the city of his quest than the remains nearer the surface. We too must dig. We too may find more meagre remains underneath, as he does. It would ill accord, did we not, with what is disclosed in other historical religions; and Sakya is among existing religions very old, while the oldest documents for our digging are relatively new.

But we must ever dig as the most sagacious archæologist digs, and as the wiser scientific researcher observes: and that is by the light of a hypothesis. "Tell me what to look for!"—was it not Faraday who used to say this? I am aware that a hypothesis is faith in process of being tested, not faith held as proven, or as above proof. But, till shown unworkable, a hypothesis is a guide held most worthy by the man of science. By the investigator in our field I find it is not used enough, perhaps because our observed particular instances are so few. To work consistently with this opinion I would ask the reader to bear with me while I set out my own hypothesis. No less than the worker in natural science, research in world-religions should be questing in these for a natural, or cosmic law, or uniformity. So wonderful a phenomenon is the birth and growth and later life of a world-religion, succeeding under apparently the most untoward circumstances where most similar attempts would fail, nay, have failed, that either each has been, in its own field of success, held to be unique, a law unto itself, or the partisan chronicles of them have been discredited. But a wider view recognizes on the one hand that we are dealing with things which,

if wonderful, are not unique, and on the other, with things which, whatever we may discredit in their origins, are, in their development and present status, very world-facts.

And I would repeat here, as very pertinent to the subject, that few contributions of scholastic Buddhism are so worthy of our note as the discernment, not only of a fivefold cosmic order (*niyama*), but as fifth therein of a gospel-order, or order of the Better, the May-be, the Should, or Ought to be (*dhammaniyama*). The view was more possible to Buddhist sectaries than to those of other religions, in that for Buddhism the Saviour is himself not a unique phenomenon, but one in an august succession. The wording I gave eighteen years ago to this great conception [1] was traversed for me later by an account sent me of the wording of it accepted in the Burmese Buddhism of to-day. But this explanation makes the scholastic explanation of the exegesist Buddhaghosa himself quite pointless, and for myself I hold it erroneous and of no worth, not even worth adducing here.

Now here is the hypothesis with which I try to work. I restate [2] it here and somewhat fully. Let us consider (1) the gospel or New Word itself; (2) the response when and where and how made to such of gospels as have grown and persisted; (3) the messenger or man of the mandate.

(1) Wherever and whenever "gospels" were uttered and spread, we note in them certain great common features. In the first place, they are each and all addressed to the "man", not to anything external about him, to what is of the nature of an adjunct or a factor, or an instrument, but—by implication, if not explicitly—to what we might call the "man-in-man", the very self of him. Next, they are concerned with man's life, and its great significance for the man himself, now and hereafter. Lastly, they speak, in terms of high worth and faith and hope, of man's nature, namely, of what he may become, of that which, in virtue of his nature, however he lives now, he has it in him to become. What is that? It is variously worded: to become Deity, to become perfect, to put an end to ill, to become entirely happy.

I think—perhaps it is part of the hypothesis—that one word might claim to include all these, when we come, as come we may, to give it due worth: the word "well". Man, say the great religions, imperfect, minor, infant, as, in his earth-stages, he more or less always is, has it in his nature to become *utterly well*. Poor hackneyed

[1] *Buddhism* (Home University Library), p. 119.

[2] Cf. *Kindred Sayings on Buddhism*, Calcutta, 1930.

little monosyllable that it is, not suffered in my language to figure as the great noun it is in many European languages,[1] few may be ready to see the depth, the breadth, the height in the range, the scope of it. Yet its negative equivalent, the "end of ill" (*dukkhass' antam*) has stirred the earnest Buddhist imagination for ages. And again, it is a bigger ultimate conception than that of happiness, pleasure, bliss. To be well, utterly well, is not only a state to be enjoyed or contemplated as a consequence of actions or good fortune: it is a state of supreme attainment after much becoming. It may be not so much a state, as itself a hyperbecoming in a glory of bringing to pass, of making to become. Happiness, or its equivalents, may be accompaniments, but they are that also in much that is not well. They are like the perfume, the colour of the flower. The "Well" belongs to the very growth of the plant. This is because the "well" —if the reader will overlook the unfamiliar use, and bethink him of "le bien", "das Wohl", "il bene", and so on—like the Platonic "good", is a term of the very man, or soul, or spirit, and not of his instruments, body and mind. These two grow from infancy to adulthood, no less than does spirit. Soon body enters on decay, and to some extent mind also, that is, in so far, as it is the body's servant, and has its scope limited in outlook by the body's lifespan. But growth of the very man is not so limited, not so rounded off, not so ephemeral, nor need there be decay. Its beginning we do not know, nor its end. But the index of its growth is not the more or less of happiness, but the Better, the more well. The Well belongs less to the little present world of things enjoyed, more to the world of one who would become fit to enjoy. The world of the Well is the world of Dharma—of which more presently—in the true fundamental meaning of that word.

(2) It is not easy for us, to whose world no recent gospel-mandate of any proven power to grow, to sway men, and to persist has come, and who have very fragmentary records of the days when such a mandate was just come, to be wise about the response which met the bringer of such and the message as such. Even were there no such fragments, some explanation of the phenomenon of his and of its success would be needed. As it is we seem to see this: the message made a singular appeal, a strong appeal, the appeal of a supply to a demand; the response to something waited for. They who were waiting were not in every case the very worthy, the very wise. But they were in a way feeling the need of someone to give

[1] *Le bien, il bene, das Wohl*, etc. Aristotle once uses τὸ εὖ, probably as forced a word as is my "the well". I sin in great company.

expression and guidance, of a kind yet unworded for the Many, about the "man" and the life of him. In the man who thus expresses and guides they find one who appeals to the very man in them, not to anything external about each, not to any actual worthiness in each, but to that in each where there is very need of him. Something there will have been in the message to this and that man about his changing for the better that flashes like an electric throb from man to man; something concerning the very nature of the man in his long wayfaring toward That who is also of his very nature, his nature in very perfection as he is only perfection's germ. I believe that in no other way can we account for the extraordinary growing and expanding power shown at the inception of each great gospel-movement. It is true that the written testimonies are the work of votaries. But I repeat that, independently of the way in which these made record, the patent fact remains, that there was both astonishing growth and expansion. And this will have been because the movement met some felt need, felt more especially there where the response to that need was first brought, but beginning to be felt elsewhere too. Something in the message, something put in a new light will have appealed to the growing, the becoming man. For of no religion can it be said that it was the work of message and messenger alone.

Man in this includes woman. Woman, in the very self of her is "man". (Sex runs deep in mind as well as body, deep in character, for character, though it is the imprint on mind and body of the man, is an outcome in, and hence affected by, body and mind. But sex is not of the very man.) And woman has ever been the friend of religion, although the converse is less true, if, by religion we mean the framework of religions, churches. She is admittedly so, and the cause has usually been sought in her intellectual inferiority. Perhaps it were truer to say, it is because she values the "man" above the mind, the minder above the minding. She rates as supreme the things that belong to the very man, the self, the spirit, that is, the things that make for the Better, for growth in the very man. She, too, will at such a given epoch be seeking after and responding to the New of the kind with which we are concerned. But it will be a seeking and a responding in her own way. And that will not be quite men's way.

That she will seek and will respond is for her a more natural thing than for him; it is nearer to her woman's life to be doing so. As mother, she is ever contemplating and caring for the "new" and the "more". Her child is a new creature, not identical with anyone else, not wholly like anyone else. In him she is witnessing growth, becoming; she is caring for a "more" in him, that is, for a better. It is the mother potential and actual who will better respond to the message of a new which is a more; and so it was in India. She responded in a more intimate, a deeper way than most men: she welcomed the new in the way not of men, but of the "man". This may be seen from such records as survive, both in the Upanishads and in the Piṭakas. There is also evidence of similar response in women of the Jains which, though it is chiefly in Pali Commentaries, has yet the appearance of being very old tradition, when, that is, it is found in Nikāyan Commentary. Such a tradition is in the Majjhima Commentary as to the founding of the Jain community at Vesālī by a little group of women.[1]

(3) Something in the messenger too will have made special appeal; something that made him one with his message, so that it came to be said of him: his message is he, he is his message. I am not going here into the deep matter of his being specially mandated, i.e. "inspired". Let the fragrance of mankind's tribute to that be here sufficient:

> ". . . Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini!"
> "Yen' eva maggena gato Vipassī . . . ten' añjasena agamāsi Gotamo."[2]

Let it be enough for purposes of my hypothesis to affirm that he owed the heed which from the first some paid him, the worth in which some held him—the number of such growing quickly—to this: he as just very man, and not otherwise, spoke to the very man in each man, bringing a message about that very man, about his "good", or "well", now and to come, about his growth toward it, about each man's own work as willing and choosing in that growth, that changing for the better. No doubt he will have been personally attractive; even Sokrates was clearly that, and who will say truly, that Sokrates taught no gospel, made lasting in scripture? But there will have been more in the man of the message than what we usually understand by attractiveness, unless indeed under the word we mean the total drawing power of him. Something that I believe all bringers of a new gospel, or even of a lasting reform in a religion, will have had in common, despite differences in time, in place, in race, language, birth, and breeding. Many words to this or that man they may not have said, but the will and the word and way of

[1] *Papañca-Sūdanī*, p. 268 (P.T.S. ed.).

[2] "The very way by which Vipassī went . . .
By that same road (now) hath gone Gotama." (*Theragāthā*, ver. 488–90.)

them will have gone straight past externals to the very man, as if a living flame, a live wire had been communicating. In their one aim, and in the way of putting that aim into action, I see in such helpers of men, not totally detached individuals, but a type, the vehicles of a cosmic law, a great Fraternity such as Te Deums have been at pains to word.

Let it not be supposed that I see, in such Helpers, any one who is more than man. I only plead that in order to be and become what he was, we must heed and measure him for the very man he will have been, and not credit him with saying that which cannot have come from him. This, as we shall see, is a vital factor in my hypothesis; one that should do much to guide our digging.

Briefly summed up (1), (2), and (3) amount to this: In a world-religion we have a special relation of two terms and the bond between them: the mandated, the mandater, and the mandate. Man does not respond to an appeal which is not to his inmost self. (Man here includes woman.) When he does respond, he has, perhaps unawares, been seeking it. The worder is one to whom the "man" in men pays instant heed. In the whole relation: man the taught, the teaching on man, the man teaching, it is the very man, not just body, not just mind, not just the dual complex, that is in question.

And I would maintain that it is of great importance to have these interrelated factors as a working hypothesis when we are sifting old scriptures. For instance, in the last factor, the man teaching: here the growing tradition has been to see in him more than the man, and then to credit him with any- and every-thing he is recorded to have said. The very human man, as speaking to "the man", is lost to view. Then in the linking factor, the teaching-on-man: this is also twisted and covered over by tendencies in teaching which are of secondary importance, or which are later, or which are both. Let me not be taken as supposing that twisting and covering are the work either of wilful impiety, or of carelessness. Nor that changes were made without adequate motive. Non-automatic (i.e. human) repetition of sayings through many generations, in many regions had resulted in diversity of versions. When authoritative revision took place, one of such versions had to be made "authentic". Very naturally the version most consonant with the (changed) views of the day of revision would be selected. Lastly, the first term of the relation, man the taught, is not always rightly considered. He is too much treated of as just multitude, mass, men. There is in the Sakya Sayings a fine simile about this. They to whom the teacher comes are likened to lotuses growing beneath, on, or above the

water's surface; even so are the many not all alike. And there will be some with eyes but little dust-dimmed: "there are they who will understand." These are of the many or of them who are also concerned about the many; these it is who have "set going the wheel" of a new movement. With this setting going it is usual to credit the messenger alone. But a great movement, such as is a world-religion, is no one-man matter. Between helper and multitude there is a mighty bond, welded by that Who calls in the one to the other. And that is the manhood in man, rightly understood: the "man-in-man" who is also the More-than-man.

I have herewith explained the hypothesis or theory, which is, I venture to think, that which should guide our reconstructing the almost lost features of the original message in a world-religion. Reconstructors will not fail to have it cast at them, that they, in sifting old scriptures, are selecting and rejecting according to caprice and predilection. And they may deserve the casting, if they make it not clear that they are working according to nothing of the sort, but by a theory really worthy of their high emprise. When, guided by such a theory, they say, "This saying is true"; "That saying cannot be true", it is because they believe tha , in the original message, in the messenger, in the conditions of the uttering by him of it, they have the working of a universal law or uniformity, in the mandating of man in a "more" concerning his nature, his life, his destiny. And this, not in a capricious way, but as gradually revealing more as man becomes ready for more. Thus guiding ourselves, we shall not look, for true origins, to any mere protest against, or revulsion from some older, other established mandate. We shall not look in the messenger for a man who set himself in direct opposition to, or subversion of the established doctrines, but rather for one who led the New, yet was not too far ahead of his day in leading. We shall seek for one who will not have "come to destroy . . . but to fulfil". And I believe we shall find our origins in a new and positive addition to the ideals of the Many, ideas which the man among the Many will come, through the message, to hold in a worth never before held. Thereby the man will grow. And in the conditions of the impetus to that fresh growth, we shall look for something which we may illustrate in the physical world by the electrified oxygen and nitrogen elements of the air when thundery conditions are favouring growth. We shall also look for a man or men giving voice or other expression to the new in a way, not necessarily eloquent, but a way that "draws a man with cords as of love". [1]

[1] "I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love."—Hosea, xi.

II

THE WORLD AWAITING SAKYA.

I will begin with the first factor in the triad of the hypothesis the man to be mandated, and try to reconstruct the world, the particular section of mankind, to which the original message came. This has several times been attempted, but not altogether as I find it might be. Writers have been guided, it may be, overmuch by the Pali records. And reacting in their reading to the sense of something later and much other than certain Brahman records[1]—the earlier Upanishads—they have come to, I think, a mistaken conclusion. They have not said : These Pali records are mainly pictures of conditions much later than the day of Sakya beginnings, and we are more likely to find a truer picture in those earlier Upanishads of those beginnings. No, they have said, these Pali records represent more or less the day of Sakya beginnings ; therefore those earlier Upanishads are very pre-Buddhistic. I think that this is scarcely a true perspective. I think that we should see in the Piṭakas much of the usage, seen in Renaissance paintings, of depicting older happenings in the raiment and the customs of the painter's own day. I think it may be a truer way to take Brahman works *assumed* to be pre-Buddhistic, and with them to compare certain ideas, which we find emerging in the Pali records, but which do not fit well with the most of what we there find. I mean such ideas as "the Way", the "self", the "man" as very real, "*prajñā*," the life beyond, the very man as "becoming". So proceeding we may find, that whereas in Sakya there are affinities with those Brahman works, it is rather the cult which we call "Buddhism" and not "Sakya" which is akin to the Pali works known as Piṭakas.

For if Sakya was indeed a New Word, only anticipated in the emphasis it laid on how a man lived as more of religious importance than ritual, by the Jain movement, we need not therefore look to find it put forward in a time of religious chaos, where no established cult was left standing. Some evidence of this we might see surviving in the Pali and other books. But the contrary is true. We have to picture a world where certain ideals or concepts about man were generally held, where certain institutions were well and strongly

[1] Cf. for instance Oldenberg, *Lehre der Upanishaden*, etc., p. 282 f.

established. I am referring especially to man's nature as being the immanently divine, and to the social acceptance of Brahman and Kshatriya (or noble). And the problem for us is the relation of the Founder and his men to those ideals and concepts, and their attitude to those institutions. In what way were they concerned "not to destroy but to fulfil" those religious ideas and ideals? In what way were they, as both of Brahmans and Kshatriyas themselves, concerned to bring a More into the concepts and life of their fellows?

There was in the first place the Brahman world. This was then much more important than when the Buddhist Sangha or "church" became influential. It stood very high in men's esteem. The Brahman stood for the learning of the time, for the holiness of the time, and for the lore in the unseen, as teacher, as mantra-bearer, as celebrant, as mediator. Herein he was unlike other men ; he was a man of privilege and monopoly. He could utter words that others might and could not ; he could work, he could claim, he could give what others could not ; he could assign values in the things of high religious import as others could not.

And there is another aspect of him to which writers scarcely do justice, an aspect which may be equally applied to the noble or Kshatriya. Both he and the Brahman were rated at that time as higher, finer specimens of manhood in the social standard of the day. Not just because they were rated in the mass as belonging to a certain "colour" (*vaṇṇa*), i.e. social class or caste. The caste-system, in any proper or exact use of the term, did not exist—to quote Rhys Davids—in the age in question.[1] It was a day more like our own of yesterday, without *sharply* defined class barriers, with an uncertain demarcation of four classes of society, but with a fairly clear idea of what we describe as *noblesse oblige*. I mean that more was expected from the manhood of one who was Kshatriya or Brahman than from one who was not. The class was, not so much an external matter, as a guarantee, that a member of the first two classes would be likely to conform to a worthier standard of what we call "breeding" than one who did not. Kshatriya and Brahman were, whatever else they were, the "gentleman" of the day, expected to obey what in the Pali books—to speak only of them—was termed his own dhamma : that is, what or how he should behave. I am not overlooking that, in the context where this is emphasized, a "dhamma" is also assigned to each of the other classes, trader and serf ; but equally I would not have it overlooked that the assignment here is rather (like the "dhamma" itself) of what should be or might be, than of *what really had weight* in current standards.

[1] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i, Introd. to Sta. iii, esp. p. 101.

This was, not so much men in the lump, as the man, the individual. In worth it is the man that India has looked to, and not so much the men. We may see this emergent in the context just quoted and others,[1] thus : "This verse was well sung, Vāseṭṭha, . . . I too say :—

> The Khattiya is the best among this folk
>   Who put their trust in lineage;
> But one in wisdom and in virtue clothed
>   Is best of all 'mong devas and 'mong men."

It is here the man who is the held in worth ; not nobles, not the worthy men, but the individual, the very man. It is only when Gotama is criticizing the current cases of laxity in maintaining the Brahman "dhamma" that he speaks again and again of "Brahmans" in the plural.

I am not wishing to emphasize these special contexts, as in themselves very evidential. They are at best but reflections of a very positive feature in the conditions of Sakyan origins, to which sufficient justice is not done. A comity such as the Indo-Aryan, which in its religious ideals rated so high the worth of the man, the person, cannot be too much heeded by us, who are in the throes of trying to get away from the man and to "think racially". Nor could such a theory as the Arahan, the ideal man-in-worth, of monastic Sakya have evolved save under conditions in which the highest worth in the "man" was, or had been current.

If I stress the influence and prestige of the Brahman institution at this time, it is not to maintain that the members of it were as a whole in a condition of high moral or spiritual health. It is very possible that, in the West of Northern India, where as I read Brahman prestige was higher than in the Eastern valley of the Ganges, there was, at the time in question, less of decadence and of a lowered standard than there appears to have been in the latter region. Nor even, for the state of Brahmanism here, can we safely follow what we read in the Pali books. But it is fairly safe to infer, that where new movements in religious reform first showed themselves, to wit, in that eastern region, it is there that the state of Brahmanism was less commending itself to the serious will of earnest men. And hence we can give the more credence to such strictures on the average moral conduct among Brahmans, as often leaving much to be desired, of which the Tevijja Suttanta speaks (Dīgha Nikāya, xiii), as well as on the "muttering" (*japanā*) of mantras for fees alluded to in the Sagāthā Vagga (Saŋyutta Nikāya).

[1] Cf. op. cit., iii, p. 94.

It does not follow that a low moral and spiritual standard prevailed among all. Many were doubtless slack and unworthy, but probably the majority, even in the East, were worthy according to their light. And there will have been, as in any ecclesiastical community now, at once both stricter and more lax conduct in clerical and in secular work. There was, for instance, a certain feeling against cultivation of the soil by Brahmans, nevertheless many Brahmans are shown tilling their farms and estates,[1] without apparent opprobrium. Much more was permitted than was thought worthy. In such professions there are always and everywhere these shades of opinion and grades of worth.

A more adequate description of the Brahmanism of this time and of the probable degree in which it was and yet was not a great force, barring in any way the inception of new movements, is to be found in the late Hermann Oldenberg's *Buddha* (especially the last, the 6th, edition)[2] and *The Upanishads and the Beginnings of Buddhism*. Specially worthy is the emphasis in the former work on the error it is to see in Brahmanism and Sakya two forces in mutual opposition. We have on the one hand to avoid seeing, in the former, anything resembling the judicial hierarchy of the Catholic Church a few centuries back, enforcing its will by secular authority, and we have on the other hand to see in the first Sakyan teachers a high appreciation of what was truly worthy in the Brahman. The ideally good man was and remained in the Sayings of Sakya "a Brahman",[3] the word holding its own even when the term Arahan, or as we might say "saint", had come into its loftier signification. There were Brahmans who disdained the upstart New ; there were Brahmans who appreciated it and its exponents. But there was everywhere civic and ecclesiastical tolerance.

To one phase, however, which, I incline to believe, was apparent among the more enlightened Brahmans of the day, I do not find attention given, and that is the extent to which some Brahman teachers *were themselves responding to the call of the New*, and introducing ideas new to the orthodox teaching of the day into the instruction they gave professionally, ideas which were professionally repeated and handed on (in the absence of writing) in their schools. It has not come to my notice that, in the Vedântic estimates of to-day concerning the Upanishad literature, this or that book is held in greater reverence than others. It is generally accepted that all

[1] E.g. *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, i, 171.
[2] Only the first edition is translated into English.
[3] Especially *Dhammapada* and *Sutta Nipāta*, *passim*.

are held in high worth; nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that, as in the case of a man, an added reverence may attach, in any one of the books, to its greater age. That the Upanishads are of different age is no new problem, but an established conclusion for many years past. The varying nature of their contents, varying in outlook, in emphasis, in ideals, leaves no doubt on the matter. But there is room for further internal comparison of one part of the same Upanishad with other parts. As a result we may find that each of the older Upanishads is a little history in itself. And a lack of adequate internal analysis in such studies as I find has made my own problems harder.

For of any one Upanishad, however venerable be now its time-status, there was a day when its utterances, or at least some of its utterances, were new ideas. I say, some at least, since this also is patent in the contents, especially of those reckoned oldest: an apparent interfusion of new with older matter. Nowhere perhaps is the editorial hand more sensibly felt, nowhere is the work of "gloss" so evident as in the greater Upanishads [1] which are deemed older if not oldest. Now it is only reasonable to imagine (reconstructively imagine) that, when these utterances had not before been put forward, the utterer on the one hand was a teacher in touch and in sympathy with the new ideas of the spirit of his age, and on the other that, as a "new man", he would not be looked upon with full uncritical approval by his fellow-teachers, in so far as, in the greater segregation of district branches in an ancient community, they would be aware of what he was teaching. He will doubtless have had a convinced and loyal band of pupils, youths, it may be, also ready for and feeling after the new. And he will have had his repeaters, as now we have publishers, Brahmans of professionally trained memory, whereby, as pupils went and pupils came, the utterances were maintained, and survived the careers of both pupils and finally of the teacher himself.

Meanwhile the utterances will have become known more or less widely, and in so far as they worded those new truths which come, as has been contended, to man when he is ready for them and feeling out after them, they will have found acceptance among other teachers, and been incorporated into the body of Upanishadic lore. They will not necessarily have been kept as a separate item; they may have come to form accretions in an older framework, in which we see upheld the older absorbed interest in ritual, mantra, celebrant.

[1] By these I mean Chhāndogya and Bṛhadāranyaka, coupled with Kauṣītaki, Aitareya, Taittirīya, and one or two others.

Nor will this be the end. Other accretions will have come testifying to a newer, even more absorbing interest which had crept up and over Indian thought: the finding in the study of man not so much, or not only the engrossing contemplation of the "man" as opposed to body, but the contemplation of the man in the ways and modes of mind. In parts of the Upanishads reckoned oldest, we meet with the mind (*manas*) referred to as an important unitary, undiscussed factor, parallel with speech and breath, etc. In other parts of these Upanishads the interest in the mind has undergone a notable development, as readers will have recognized. And this analytical "new word", when it had not only been approved and its sayings incorporated in the older framework, became at a yet later date, and in still younger Upanishads, cited by name as a commendable and even necessary training in the Brahman lore, namely, as Sānkhya.

I have mentioned the historical fact of change in Upanishad utterance and emphases as having been at one time both new and unapproved, and only becoming accepted gradually, not only because due attention has scarcely been given to it, not only because it may help us in determining the really original in Sakya, but also because I would show that the history of the Pali Piṭaka evolution, as I conceive it, is not unique, but reflects an analogous history in the evolution of the Upanishads.

But what then may have been that new word in the greater Upanishads, which I see as overlying the oldest matter of rite and mantra cult, the less old cult of the man as Deity, and as, in its turn, overlaid by the mind-analyses of early Sānkhya leavening? I consider it is to be found in the discourses of the teacher who has the (probably) assumed name of Yājñavalkya in the Bṛhadārañyaka Upanishad. Here it is not so much the ultimate oneness of the man with the Highest or Brahman that is introduced. This was, when "Yājñavalkya" taught, an accepted belief, a very vital doctrine. It is in the insistence on the consummation of the man's life and nature as being, not a matter of great wisdom or insight to be attained *here*, but the outcome of stages-in-becoming figured as a Way (*marga* or *yāna*) through worlds of rebirth till full maturity or realization is won.

This will have been, I venture to think, a new word at some time in India's religious history. Not in the use of the figure—*yāna* is, if I mistake not, a Vedic figure—but in its earnest and solemn emphasis, and its application to the conception of man's betterment and ultimate consummation as Man, this being none other than

Deity, and to this climax being realizable, not proximately to earth-life or lives, but after another world-stage or stages:—

> Scarce visible and old there lies a Way
> That touches me, e'en me, was found by me.
> Thereon the wise whose is the Brahma-lore
> Fare onward to the world of light, and thence
> O'erpassing that are utterly released.
>
> *Bṛhad. Upan.*, iv, 4, 8.

The kinship in these lines with the central figure in the Sakyan message is fairly obvious, and into both we need much searching of thought to see, as writers mostly do not see, all that is implied in it. To that we shall recur. That the one utterance suggested the other I do not believe, in whichever order they are taken. That the same source inspired both utterers is very conceivable, but who is able to go into that? But that the two represent the religious aspiration of the same place and time in the voice of two (or more) gifted men—here is a quite plausible hypothesis. The more so, in that this new word comes to be obscured in each corpus of sayings, Brahman and Sakyan, by the same later preoccupation, to wit, the inquiry into mind as the "man's" way of self-expression, and as possibly the ultimate expression of the "man" himself!

I said "all that is implied in" the figure of the Way. In its use by this Brahman-of-the-new-word is an implication, a significance as great as in its use by Gotama-of-the-new-word, and one just as much passed over. It is not the figure as such that is important; it is the thing meant by the Way. And that is man's nature as not static, as not "being", but as a becoming, a "werden", a coming to be, a progress in the "More". That man, as being, was ultimately the supreme Ātman, was the prevalent creed among the thoughtfully pious Brahmans, when that new word of the Upanishad was uttered. It was a pre-Sakyan view, and it was that which among them held the field.

But here, implied in this Brahman's "Way" (*marga*), and patent in the pre-occupation of the older Upanishads with the word *bhu*, to become, is a new note, even one that implicates the very idea of Deity Itself.[1] Namely in this: that the very exercise of divine creative power is now deliberately worded as "desire-to-become": "It desired being One to become More." Now since the man was Deity in microcosm, desiring-to-become was also essentially the man's natural self-expression. Becoming was no longer a mere matter of body,

[1] I have found 300 passages in these Upanishads using the word as finite verb. It does not appear to me to have received adequate attention.

of mind, of external phenomena; it was of the very man. In it we see a passing on beyond the static concept of man as being. The Divine Itself is a becoming, a growth in the More in the very man, till he, fully attaining, and become Most, can exercise that creative becoming, which can no more be rightly described as growth, but may more fitly be described as Play.[1]

I am not saying that this mighty new word was incorporated into the religious ideal of India as it merited to be. It was a mandate to the very man or self. And had the warning of another man of the new thought, Kauṣītaki of the Upanishad so named, been rightly heeded, the true conception might have been upheld. He it was who warned his students not to consider the ways of man's mind without considering the man, the minder.[2] But the growing influence of the new analysis of mind, wherein mind was rated as ways in which man acted, and, so to speak, had always acted, was adverse to the consideration of how he might *come to act*, i.e. think, feel, etc. So the new idea died out, even as it was worsened in Sakya, and to-day the Indian's conception of the Divine is, once more and still, not "becoming" but "being" (*sat*). He has a cramped idea of becoming; and his defective grasp of will is a contributory cause. Had he worded this, in his crude psychology, as the most fundamental self-expression, he had not lost sight of becoming. Hardly may we blame him, however, for has not our own psychology been equally blind, and with less excuse, both as to the "man" and the will to become?

It is the more strange, that the idea of becoming, as essentially the nature of man, the microcosm, should not have retained its hold on the mind of India, when the new teaching, put forward perhaps at this very time in all the three Upanishads (Bṛhad., Chhāndo., Kauṣ.), concerning the man in dreamless sleep is considered. He was then held to have the opportunity of, as it were going home, becoming Himself, with all that was alien discarded. It is not easy for us, with our materialistic ideas about sleep, so utterly unworthy of our great heritage, to ascribe fit worth to this theory. We have left ourselves orphans herein. Moreover, our mediaeval tradition of attaching supramundane values to height and distance is hindersome. For the Brahman teacher of this day, to go home to the Highest Who he really was amounted to an intensified sense of *inwardness*, expressed as a going into the heart. The Most High was at the same time the Most Within. But there was transition, that is,

[1] Cf. Ramānuja (*fl.* A.D. 1100); "highest Brahman . . . who in play produces, sustains and reabsorbs the universe. . . ."
[2] *Kauṣ. Up.*, iii, 8.

there was a becoming That (in deep sleep) in a more entire sense. THAT is waiting for him who is of Itself, for him for whom it was shown to be natural to revert to his fountain-head, natural to become, to re-become That. Nevertheless, so lost was the precious insight into the need and fact of becoming, of which we just get these glimpses, that the wording best known to us, by which the belief in identity of nature was confessed, is that which survives in the Kauṣītaki Upanishad: "That thou art"; not "That thou becomest". That the word for becoming *was there* (*bhu, bhava*) is perhaps no mean guarantee that the idea found utterance: "It did not develop (*sambhava-*) . . ." we do get that much. But anyway the vision of the man, realizing his divine nature as an unfolding-in-becoming wilted away, either through the cause suggested above, or otherwise. Yet the vision, albeit quite beyond adequate conception, of Deity as "desiring to become", and as "becoming", persisted, and became scripture. And this is the more singular, since it is actually as That Who is, not as That Who has become, that the idea of the self has been upheld ever since.

I have ventured to maintain that the new ideas concerning the very man (that is, the "soul") which heralded the rise of Sakya may be found in the paramount religion, in Brahman culture, itself. But they were not confined to that. It is generally admitted that the movement known now as Jainism led the movement of the Sakyans by about a generation, and had then their headquarters at Vesālī. It is true of both movements that absolute novelty of teaching was, or rather came, later to be denied. Both claimed to only revivals; both came in time to claim what would now be called a Messianic succession. But we need not be at pains to discover in either case a prior origin to the origin we seek. It sprang from the felt need of having an ancient tree of tradition to set up against the relatively true antiquity of Brahman prestige. I see something analogous in the early editing of Jewish followers of Jesus, tracing for him a descent (through Joseph) from all that would give weight to Hebrew genealogy, although from the Christian point of view it was irrelevant. It was an attempt to give weight *of race* to a man who was in no need of it.

The Jains were probably calling themselves Nātaputras, a name which is parallel with Sakyaputtas or -puttiyas, of the Pali books, for the followers of Gotama the Sakyan. Their leader Vardhamāna was of the Nāta family. The name under which they appear in the Pali books, Niganṭhas, the undraped, with probably an included reference to their dissent, or nonconformity with any recognized cult, may well have been given them by others almost in derision. We may see an analogy in the word Quaker which now evokes nothing of the sort. I do not know when the more honorific term Jainas—men of the Conqueror—Jina, was introduced, but, in the Pali books, whereas "jina" is a poetical term applied to the Sakya leader, the Nātaputras are there invariably called Niganṭhas. Their teaching concerning the "man" was, in this important respect, that which was adopted by the Sakyan teachers: the value of man's will working on the deeds of the past as bringing about happiness or sorrow in the after-life. It was not, as such, a new word; the new thing about it was that, in accepting it, they stressed the possibility and importance of altering by deliberate deeds the consequences of deeds. A man's past was, in its present and future effects, not a dead matter, but could be affected in these by such willed action. This they called karma. They did not take it in its literal meaning as action as a whole. The word meant also business or procedure of a certain kind, as when the Brahman applied it to sacrificial business, and the Sakyan monk, later, to matters of lodging and clothing.

It is curious that, in the important Upāli Sutta of the Majjhima, where Gotama is shown in discussion with a Jain, the latter uses the word *daṇḍa*, chastisement, for karma (as thought, word, and deed), and is corrected by the former, who uses karma. The conversation may have been worded in the first instance to repeaters by the Jain, Upāli himself, who became a disciple of Gotama after the conversation, and it is conceivable that he was careful to give his new teacher the credit of the right word. But it remains a curious thing.

To repeat, the Jains used the word karma in speaking of the procedure by which the consequences of a man's deeds might be annulled, so that his future would not be worried by them. This procedure was a variety of austerities, mainly (but not only) fasting, so familiar to India under the elastic word *tapas*, or heat. The heat was not necessarily connected with those forms of austerity consisting in self-exposure to heat from fire or sun; it was symbolically meant in the sense of a wearing or consuming away ill deeds in the past; and more: it meant effort of energy, will, concentration, conceived as "fiery", as ardent fervour. Sakya came to adopt a finer word for this glowing will: *tejas*, which also means heat. But it was never associated with austerities or "penance"; it symbolized a greater thing, the ardour of growth, the keener life, the more sensitive will. In *tejas* also was purifying; but it was a positive, and therefore a nobler idea. In the man who was "awake"

(*buddha*) the glow of the better burnt out the glow of the worse.[1] And the flame of it drew to the man help from the unseen, as when we read that Sakka's throne waxed hot with the moral glow of a good deed, and he would hasten to earth to help.[2] The aspirant to the Better cries:

> O when shall I have power to draw the blade
> Of insight, potent ardour of the seers . . . (*paññāmayaṃ ugga-tejaṃ satthaṃ isīnaṃ*).[3]

For the Brahman of the time we are considering, *tejas* necessary to win insight, or otherwise achieve, was merged in the need of practising *tapas*, which probably consisted in fasting and concentrated musing. So closely was achievement conditioned by *tapas*, that old Upanishads describe the All-Father Prajāpati as practising *tapas* before exercising creation.[4] And much more was the pupil bidden to practise it if he would win insight.[5] It was not the ignoble way of the fakir, to impose on the wonder and generosity and wish-to-win-merit of his fellows. It was a serious valuation, in the need of the individual "soul" to place his welfare on a sounder basis in his world-wayfaring. Karma, as of the Jainas, karma as willed procedure with a religious aim, will certainly have greatly interested the founders of Sakya, and herein the Suttas give us doubtless true glimpses, albeit coloured by sectarian feeling.

The other leading idea which Jain and Buddhist books have in common is *ahiṃsā* "not-harming", wherein the "man" (soul) is seen as in every form of life, and hence as giving value to all life. It is a mandate for the greater welfare of the "man", and is thus a teaching of the "More" in man. But I do not hold it was in the original Jain teaching, else we should have probably found it raised in the Pali books when Jain and Sakyan met in talk. We do not find it; perhaps agreement about it made discussion unnecessary. And the term only finds its way into a cut-and-dried Buddhist category of quite indefinite inception in the Pali scriptures. Warding of life is in the Suttas; warding of life unseen in water is there too, though very seldom mentioned,[6] and the strainer (*parissavana*) appears in the Vinaya Rules, as having at some time become

[1] *Dhammapada*, ver. 387; cf. the Commentary here. *Paṭisambhidā*, i, 103.
[2] *Jātaka*, iii, 53, etc.
[3] *Theragāthā*, ver. 1095.
[4] *Taittirīya Up.*, 2, 6; *Bṛhad. Up.*, 1, 2, 5.
[5] *Taittirīya*, 3, 1.
[6] E.g. *Majjhima*, i, 78.

part of the monk's equipment,[1] not as safeguarding his own health, but as the very inadequate warding of not-to-be-swallowed life. But this will have come in, whenever it did come, not through Jain influence, but as a form of that moral scrupulosity which is so prominent in the values of the upgrowing monasticism.

I come to another set of conditions into which Sakya was born, by which the Jain movement, for some reason unknown, was *relatively* uninfluenced, but which strongly affected the Brahmanism of the day, and yet more strongly the youthful Sakya—influenced it so strongly that distinguished Indologists such as Professor Jacobi have "derived" Buddhist "philosophy" from it,[2] and which certainly went far in giving birth in Sakya to the worsening of the concept of the "man" as real, when thought of apart from the mind. I have alluded to this movement above as having gradually come into Brahman teaching, first as a new and absorbing interest, seen in the great Upanishads often termed pre-Buddhistic, later as a definite, named system of values.

Kapila, the founder of a teaching—not yet a system—known later as Sāṅkhya, was teaching perhaps about a generation previous to the time I am considering, but nothing definite is known of him. He was a non-Brahmanic secular "sage", and not, I think it is safe to conclude, one who had a religious mandate, else the after-men, in whose hands his teaching grew into the system known as Sāṅkhya, would have quasi-deified him in some way, so great was his influence. I do not think it amiss to call him the founder of Indian psychology. Till his day the "man" or self was both thought and thinker, word and speaker, feeling and feeler. He was never, it is true, will and willer, as distinctly worded from thought and thinker—a dangerous defect. Now Kapila, it seems, brought in the "new word" of distinguishing the "man", not only from his body, but also from his mind. It is more than improbable that he *merged* the "man" in mind. He will have wished the rather to exalt the divinity, the uniqueness of the "man" by more utterly disentangling him from all modes of earthly self-expression, the immaterial as well as the material. And as an effort to compute in a new way this important aspect of a distinguishable self-expressing, the better therewith to distinguish the high worth of the self, his teaching became taken up and discussed as Sāṅkhya, that is, for the

[1] E.g. *Vinaya*, Mhv. vi, 15, 9; cf. *Jātaka*, No. 31, introduction.
[2] "Der Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṅkhya-Yoga," *Nachr. d. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, Göttingen, 1896.

word includes them all, computing, naming, numbering. It has been defined, as the last only, but this is to narrow the meaning overmuch, as Pali readers will know.[1]

That Kapila's teaching was at this time much agitating Brahman pundits is very plainly seen in the Upanishads to which reference has been made. New discussions on ways of mind and their relative values abound. There is no idea in them of identifying the "man" with mind. Always the self (*ātman*) has the last word. But there is a note of agitation sounded as to the tendency of the new vogue, to which I have referred. It is not usual to regard this as a warning, but if we are watching for the new features as not only come, but as *coming* into the Upanishads, we may discern it as so meant. We may be the more sure, because the man who warns was not likely to have seen danger, had he not, with many teachers and pupils, felt the strong influence of the new study. Kapila's contribution, if I justly give it, to Indian culture was very notable, for there can no great advance be made in an intelligent estimate of the "man", unless we have come to distinguish him, as *sui generis*, from his instruments. This is not to take the way of modern psychology, which tries to build him up out of his instruments. Brahmans of the new ideas took a more intelligent view. Jains may have held the new teaching at a greater distance. But Sakya was profoundly influenced by it, as we shall see. It is very possible that among the early disciples were students of Sānkhya, and the Founder himself may well have known and approved of this ancient attempt at mental analysis as clarifying, for the better understanding, that inner world of the self-expressing "man", which was so necessary to the right valuing of him.

The original aim of Sānkhya, I repeat, was more likely to have been the giving greater distinction to the concept of the "man" than the less. The more his ways of self-expression were disentangled from himself, the more supramundane would the self-expresser tend to become. Thus the man's awareness of himself as "I" was analysed as being a function, not of the very man, but of his mind, called "I-making" (*ahaŋkāra*). It was not fit to see in such an attitude an activity of the self, who was held as being a passive quasi-onlooker. (We find the term strayed over into Sakyan sayings.)

[1] Cf. *Dhammasangaṇi*, § 1307, where it is equated with "name". Cf. also the use of *paṭi-saṅkhāna*, as defined, e.g. in *Anguttara*, i, 52, and the idiom *sankhaŋ gacchati* and *sankhāta*.

Cf. also Oldenberg, *Lehre der Upan.*, 208, Dahlmann, etc. Oldenberg concentrates too much on the "numbering" only.

But the new conversance with all available words expressing the mental ways of the minder, the new appreciation of them considered apart from the minder, coupled with the current ideal of the Highest as the man himself, led to a rewording of the conception of Deity in terms of mind. Man's highest self-expression came to be held to be "mind" at its most exalted, its most effectual power, withal at its most sensitive intensity. Thus, if the reader will look at one of those earlier Upanishads, the Aitareyya, he will read of Deity conceived wholly in terms of mind: mind in sense, in purpose, in understanding, in wisdom. Especially are the last two emphasized in the word for which we have no good parallel, *prajñā*: more-wisdom, more-knowledge, coming-to-know. Man, in it, is wording the more which he seeks in quest of the Most. That eloquent summary *is the accretion*, maybe, to an older work. The utterer was groping, as we too grope, when we say God is love, light, love, goodness, power, will. That such ideals have value is obvious. The danger in them lay in the attribute tending to obscure the fact believed in, man, the *purusha*, as immanent Deity. And this is precisely what we find in even the early history of Sakya. Sakya found *prajñā* as a term for Deity in man. It retained, gradually came to use it (*paññā*) as we should, as just a way of mind. But with a difference, a difference in which the older glory of the term peeps out, as we shall see.

We have now to consider other conditions under which Sakya took birth. One of these, an older way in the man, but not to be called cult, was the very opposite to the newer vogue of mind-analysis, the way of the man in Yoga—that is, devotion, or strenuous study of a special kind. This, I cannot say why, had come at this time to be called Dhyāna (Pali: *jhāna*)—a word which means brooding, or musing. It is often, but wrongly, rendered "meditation". This means active thinking, and that is the reverse of Jhāna. Meditation requires, if it be worthy, the whole synergy of the thinking man. Jhāna is a deliberate putting off (*pahāna*) of applied thinking (*vitakka*) and of sustained, or discursive thought (*vichāra*). The resulting final mental residuum is bare "mindfulness" (*sati*), with emotional neutrality (*upekkhā*). But this is inadequate for describing the habitual attitude of ourselves toward concentration, and hence the error in the word "meditation", in which the modern Buddhist follows us, ignorant of what the ancient Buddhist tradition was much concerned to teach.

When Sakya took birth, Jhāna was the individual, deliberate

effort to put off, or recede from one world in order to gain access to another. This was not necessarily by way of trance, let alone deep sleep; it was, so to speak, letting moon and starlight replace sunlight; it was to give room to those dual faculties we all perhaps have in a more or less entirely stunted state, which at that time appear to have been called by such names as sight and hearing of devas,[1] but which we should now call clairvoyance and clairaudience. Into Jhāna, as it was cultivated in original Sakya, and as it worsened within that same cult, I shall go presently. Here it is the profoundly significant change of Yoga into Jhāna before that time which I would emphasize as one of the conditions we are considering.

The original object of Yoga was in a deliberately induced recession from earthly awareness[2] to confront That Who was the Most-in-the-Man, the greatest Self, of whom the man was the little self. This was held to lead to a growth of the "More" in the man. The sacramental process is perhaps best described in the Mahābhārata, though I cannot vouch for the redaction that we have being as old as the time in question. "How can a man find deliverance without a lord (to guide him)? . . . let the yogin bearing Me within sit solely devoted to Me. . . . Let him behold the Self (Ātman) in the yogin's self . . . (let him say) This Ātman here is my true Kinsman; I can no other than be with Him; won even to evenness and unity with Him, then only become I He Who I really am."[3] We see here that in Yoga the Yogin, the "man", is in full view from first to last, and there is no doubt about What is sought. It is the man, and not his mind only, that is before us, the man breaking his bars and bonds, waxing in strength and fearlessness (I quote the epic), winning to absorption in, to vision of, the Man in him, Who is one with himself.

But round about the beginning of the sixth century B.C. there will have come a change over the Indian time-spirit from that which we see more or truly reflected in these lines, and which is to be found in the greater Upanishads. It is a wistful yearning for knowledge of the Beyond, a will to know of the worlds in man's wayfaring. "Son of the Gotamas, is there an ending in the world in which you put me? Or is there any Way?" And "This thing whereon they doubt, O Warder (Death), what there is in the great passing on: tell us that".[4] And many a word of this sort. Much had thus come that stretched out as a long long Way between the seeker of earth and the consummate realization of himself, in wonderful

[1] *Dibba-cakkhu, dibba-sota-dhātu.*
[2] "Thinks as little as a bit of wood" (*Mhbh.*).
[3] Mokṣadharma, Adh. 309. [4] *Kauṣ. Up.*

moments here and now, at the sacrament of self-introversion in Yoga. And the knowledge that lay between: this for some might be acquired in an *adjustment* of the Yoga attitude. This world was still to be eliminated in the musing, but it was a world of space, not the spaceless, that was to be substituted. It was not an ecstatic, a mystic communion, much less a union that was to be attained in and as the musing; it was a state of attention, more akin to that of the boy Samuel in the Hebrew scriptures: "Speak, lord, for thy servant heareth!" It was *an attitude for coming to know.* The world of North India had thus been getting ready for the new mandate and the mandater, if our hypothesis be right.

And more: there had been coming into the words "deva, devaputta, devatā" (god, god's son, deity) a changed, a modified meaning, which was for India not so great a step as it would be for other, at least for Western, peoples. Men were coming to think of those beings, less as powerful, if interested aliens, and more as fellowmen who had been men and might again be men. To arise from death on earth and live in their worlds was called not "union with" (as it has been defectively rendered) but "in the companionship of" (*sahāyatā*; Pali *sahavyatā*).[1] This has not yet been as clearly recognized as it should be, and the words *deva*, etc., in later Vedic and Pali works are still rendered too indiscriminately by "gods". Since our vocabulary is too poor to give us a fit word, *deva, devatā* are best left untranslated. We cannot speak of "god" in just the friendly way in which we find the oldest Pali books alluding to *devas*, etc., the seeing and conversing with them, the learning from them, the teaching them. It is true that even here a *deva* was nominally not *manussa*, or man-of-earth. But he was anything but an alien; even as governing the next world, his earthly antecedents might be known[2]; and when it was a deva who had not long left earth, he might by the clairvoyant be discerned as a visitor, recognized by name, and in speech be conversed with.[3] We come in these days of Sakya origins far more out of the region of the wraith, the phantom, than we ourselves were in mediaeval Europe, nay, than we still are. We still seem to be now and then in a ghost world in the Pali books, but actually we are scarcely ever so, the fact being that translators, used to such notions, translate by the word ghost when the term is not fit.

There is nothing to which we can point in records as showing the actual breaking down of the Yoga purpose in Dhyāna to the

[1] E.g. *Dīgha*, i, Tevijja Suttanta. [2] Cf. *Jātaka*, No. 31, Kulāvaka.
[3] *Dīgha*, ii, 204; iii, 15; *Saṃyutta*, i, 55.

early Jhāna purpose in Sakya. As I have said already, it is very rare to find transition in progress in early documents. They give us only what they look upon as accomplished, whether it be to our seeming progress or regress. And if they refer to other views, they cannot be trusted to give them truly. The Pali books never, I believe, apply the (unmodified) word Yoga to Jhāna practice, but we can see in the earliest of them that Jhāna was much practised, and also that no explanation of it as of something introduced by Sakya is ever called for. It was there and it was understood.

I have spoken of early records as giving us the "become", the accepted, the established, the valued. They are not, as now are books, to a great extent, the views of some one man or woman put forward as new, or in a new way, to win over the approval and acceptance of readers. They are, in so far as they are Indian, very different; they are written memoranda substituted for oral memoranda of utterances, which have already existed, first as spoken, then as potential re-utterances in a succession of speakers. And the bodies of such potential utterances as composing all the "literature", all the scripture, all the books that then existed, constitute one of the circumstances attending the birth of Sakya which it is of great moment to have before us. There is nothing new in what is here said. But this to us unknown, unexperienced, bookless world tends, in the view usually presented of our subject, to fall too much into the background.[1] As usual, it is our reconstructive imagination that is hardly yet awakened. In some circumstances in which we are placed, deliberately it may be, or involuntarily, we too are in a relatively bookless world. But even then it will not be such wholly; it will not be such long. Nor while it lasts can we come out of our bookish tradition and upbringing.

We need here to imagine ourselves in a very different world. We have to place ourselves in a world of speakers, and not in one of silent marks on paper, which to-morrow will tell us just what they do to-day. It is the world of the tongue and the gesture, the cadence and the emphasis. And it is not a very wise world as to what is true. It is more the world of the will to move, to impress, to persuade. It is more akin to the world of the actor, the pleader, the preacher, the apologist; it is less akin to the world of scientific exposition, or of history as distinct from its mother, the "-story".

[1] Thus an artist has lately composed, for the Paris Theosophical Society, a picture apparently of "the Buddha" speaking and being "reported" by attendant writers!

In such an old world of the Word, men will accept and applaud both word and speaker the more readily, if by word he give what is already acclaimed as very worthy. The new is not so easy to make acceptable. It is not recognized; it is alien; it is the unwonted. We of to-day do not greatly seek acceptance of the new by the spoken word. Uttered it may well be to select audiences, but we lose no time in endorsing it with developments in print. Print is our staple means of bringing out the new idea. In a time and place where no books were, the welcome of a new mandate depended much more than now on not only the speaker himself, but *on them to whom he spoke*. Putting the speaker, till the next chapter, on one side, it is when, in a world which is absolutely or relatively bookless, there comes over that world a wave of interest in "the new" concerning the "man", that a new religion arises.

We are not here and now in such an age. We have no experience of the social or human atmosphere of it. But we read of it, of a spirit of curiosity about the New, when the new meant not just the unknown in general, but what the English reader would call God and the soul. All will recognize the allusion to St. Paul's noting the Athenian preoccupation with this at such a time.[1] This curiosity was not entirely a new appearance among Greeks, but it had then apparently become an obsession. Nor was the Israelite a stranger always to such curiosity; but it was only when the new mandate was at hand that this "new" was being much looked for. And there is enough left perhaps in such clues as we have to betray a similar curiosity in North India before the birth of Sakya. For we have eloquent witness to it in the action of the Messenger himself, taking the very unwonted step for an Indian nobleman of setting out on a quest, as it is worded of him speaking on his death-bed:

> Thirty less one of age, Subhadda, I
> Went forth a seeker after something Good,
>
> . . . . .
>
> A pilgrim in the onward-way and Right.[2]

And a similar unrest of inquiry is on record in the Commentarial tradition of another nobleman of North India at the same time; the rajah Kappina. For us of European traditions the riding forth of the noble on a quest is familiar, but we do not find the Indian noble so doing in a similar tradition. We have the Jātaka quest of king Kusa after his lady, but it is as a very exceptional procedure.

[1] Acts xvii, 21: "for all Athenians and strangers . . . spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing (*kainoteron*)."
[2] *Digha*, ii, 151.

The Christian knight went on a worthy quest: the aid of those who needed him. Kappina's interest was said to be in the new in knowledge. The purpose of the Sakyan prince was the combined purpose of the new in knowledge in order to bring help to men. That which is perhaps the first Sutta ever put together, the first in the first Nikāya, testifies to much current inquiry about the nature here and hereafter of the "man" or "soul". And anxious inquiry by this and that bereaved Everyman as to the fate of the recently departed is also testified to in the Suttanta of the Founder's decease and elsewhere.[1] To satisfy this felt need of more of the knowledge of which we are here treating, new light on life as a whole, on "God and the soul", man even now would, if he willed to learn, learn not only by the written word; he would listen as did Elijah, nay, he would now so learn in more ways than he was learning only yesterday. But in that day to listen was the only way. We, when once we will to hear, to learn, can satisfy our curiosity in many ways; we need not be at such pains to seek. When once more comes the day of a new mandate in that line of knowledge, curiosity may not be so imperious as to take the form it took at Athens. But in that day the one way by which man could learn "some new thing" in things most worth while to know made him need a stronger wave of desire to hear, a curiosity which had to assert itself in a marked degree.

I tried in the previous chapter to show, that a hypothesis, which can account for the phenomena attending and preparing the birth of a new world-religion, must include an abnormal condition of this kind in the particular "world" in which the birth is healthy. I may not find credence with the modern reader. He lives it is true in a day of eagerness to enlarge knowledge. But it is not knowledge having the objective of which this book speaks. It has not as object that whom the Indian calls the man, and we call soul or spirit. Its object is man as mind in body, and as what is called "character" as an outcome of that. Its object is the "visible" world and men's life in that; it is not the worlds of the man's life as a whole. We are therefore not the men living on earth during or just before the birth of a world-religion. Hence men are sceptical in regarding such abnormal conditions either as true at any time save once or twice in the past, or indeed as having ever been actual events. Imagination jibs.

Or again, it may be said, do you then place credence in the assertion of the little minority blended of east and west, who are to-day

[1] Especially in the Janavasabha Suttanta in the same collection: *Digha.*

claiming that a new mandate on the "man" and his life as a whole is already at hand? Frankly, I would say "No!" We have yet to hear any matured expression from the man elect on any central theme. So far no *new word* has been heard by the great public. Men have been bidden to set and hold themselves free—so I have heard. This is a good preparation, but it is nothing more. It is but a negative ideal. No, we are not ready. Hence the new mandate for us is not at hand. It is well to be eager for the new as to matter and as to mind. But the new, I repeat, for which we are not ready, is new light not on these, but on the very "man". And just this, that the reader may say: "What then is the very man, if not these?" does but show that the nobler curiosity has not arisen in us.

The word "free" brings me to one more feature in the reconstruction of the pre-Sakyan conditions. The charge to be and keep free in that recent utterance comes fitly from a son of India. Freedom or its equivalents, liberty, emancipation, release, deliverance, has for ages been a religious ideal of India. In no other land has the religious quest been so largely bound up with the notion of the riddance from bond or tie. We see this in such names for religieux as Achélaka, Nigantha, Ājīvaka, and in such equivalents for "salvation" as *mukti*, *mokṣa*, *vimutti*. This is not, however, an earliest Aryan trait. It does not appear in the Vedas. The word (*vimutti*, etc.) abounds in the Piṭakas, but they are no fit index to ideas abroad when Sakya was born. Concordances, dictionaries reveal the idea *emerging* in Indian records. The age of Aryan invasion was probably too recent, an age when solidarity and not liberty was the prime consideration. When the Aryan became firmly established in India the tendency in him to independence, which so markedly developed the concept of the "man" or self as unitary, evolved into the idea of personal freedom, or the surmounting of ties as essential to any higher religious life. This done he described himself as the *śramaṇa* (Pali *samaṇa*)), the man at peace.

The word in its first intention means the tryer, toiler; in its second intention it means one who has tried, toiled, and has reaped the result. We need not go far for parallels, even if we cannot equate the very word. To "worth" is to be judging, rating, but the noun "worth" is the decision, the estimate. The word *samaṇa* is frequently met with in the Pali books, and there it indicates high worth. Thus as a class, *samaṇas* together with brahmans, in the compound *samaṇa-brāhmaṇā*, compose what we might term the religious world. It is thus that Greek chroniclers of the third

century B.C. wrote, when they described the North Indian world of "philosophers" as consisting of sophists (presumably Brahmans) and *sarmanai*, or *samanaîoi*,[1] placing them in inverse order from that used by the Sakyans. Further, there are references here and there in the Piṭakas to the duties, the advantages, the privileges of a *samaṇa* and of his status or *sāmañña*. Further, the leader is himself spoken of, or addressed in the third person by non-Sakyans as the "*samaṇa* Gotama". But more often than not, an individual *samaṇa* is referred to as an "almsman" or *bhikkhu* (*bhikshu*; *bhikkhā* = broken meats), and for some reason the latter word has come to oust the former. *Sāmaṇera* (*-eraka*) was and remained the term for novice.

We may take it that the *samaṇa*, as one who had broken with world-ties and "gone forth", as the Pali books word it, "from housedom into the houseless," was a social feature preceding the birth of Sakya. It was not a new feature, but it was very possibly still a young feature. The *samaṇa* was already not merely tolerated, but was respected, by the many, with of course exceptions. But his prestige was spreading. There would seem to be a testimony to this in the Sāmaññaphala-Suttanta, second of the Dīgha, and one of the only two apparently existing as an oral compilation at the First Council. King Ajātasattu, asking "if it paid", as we should say, to be a *samaṇa*, is reminded that were even a slave of his household to leave the world as *samaṇa*, he would be treated as a very noble or brahman by the king himself. The first reference to the word *samaṇa* is in the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upanishad (4, 3, 22), where in deep sleep the man who is awake to his divine identity casts off all the ideas he and his environment have formed as to earthly relations. "Then is ascetic not ascetic, śramaṇa not śramaṇa." There is but "the man". In none of the Upanishads may a second allusion be found, save only an imitation of the given passage in the later Brahma-Upanishad.

This is of importance in the picture we are trying to form of pre-Sakyan conditions. With the recent growth of the *idea* "release" from world-ties, *words* for it, both nouns and verbs, were being coined, and the *human embodiment* of the worded idea was becoming a feature in the picture. But we need in our picture to use, in artist language, lower values for this feature than is usually the case. Were we to be guided by the Pali books alone, and by a superficial reading of them at that, we should use high values for the world of the monk. I shall try to show presently what I mean, in the case of those books. But we can hardly doubt that, had the

[1] See McCrindle, quoting Megasthenes, *Ancient India*, 98, 101 f.

time and place been largely characterized by "recluses", we should inevitably have seen these bulking less meagrely than is the case in the books held to precede, if only by a little, the birth of Sakya. The brahman would regard as customary the retirement of his elderly men, and women too, it might be, to the āśrama retreat, when, the years of vigour ended, their duties in and towards the world had been observed. But for him that retirement as a worthy course in the young, as *śramaṇa*, was a new thing, and the novelty of it, as a subject of surprised comment, has survived in many passages in the Suttas of Sakya.[1] Not all *śramaṇas* were of the Sakyas. The movement, we saw, had begun to invade, together with the ascetic proper (*tapasvin*), the brahman world. And had the invasion progressed there as it did with the Sakyans, as it evidently did not with Brahmans, references to the *śramaṇa* would not be absent.

If now it be asked, why did the movement in "release" through "recluseship" begin, and begin just when it did, the answer has been, not to account for it causally, but to point to a wave of pessimism spreading then or earlier over India. But this is no explanation and can satisfy no one long. It is true enough that life and the world as "ill" was an idea which we find somehow grown up, but this was, I suspect, the recluse's main apology or framed reason for his procedure, rather than the true cause of it, and we must go further back to explain the *śramaṇa*.

I have referred to the Aryan characteristic of independence. To launch out in the tremendous adventure of a community-trek to new lands argues a strong common development of "will" in independent self-expression. And will, in the most general terms, is self-expression exerting itself. In the Indo-Aryan, will took its special development, once solidarity became less vital, of not social or political, but personal, individual independence. It found, in time, its supreme expression in the theory of oneness with Deity conceived as Highest Self or Man. But it did not find expression in a corresponding, a complementary theory of oneness with his fellows. On the contrary, the Highest was conceived as not to be found among "men". To realize That better, the ties with these had to be broken. The "Man" had to be self-expressed in the man alone. Higher worth in the man was a matter of the individual alone. Be it remembered that "self" was then never used in the plural.

We do not know when it was that the gospel of immanent Deity, of the Highest as being potential in the very nature of each man and woman, in the nature of the "man-in-man", was uttered in India.

[1] See e.g. the Raṭṭhapāla Sutta, Majjhima, No. 82.

It was long after the earliest Vedas were compiled. It had become accepted when Kapila arose and taught what came later to be called Sānkhya. But it must have been at its inception a new outbreathing of a wonderfully inspiring kind. It may come trippingly over the lips of pundit and pupil nowadays, but when considered in a quiet hour it is even more tremendous for us than perhaps at its birth, so have we grown, or so ought we to have grown in the concept of Deity. And it must have, in any case, been a word of tremendous weight then. Then it will have come about, that here and there a man, willing to realize the new word that the man was, had in him, as man, the More, nay, the Most, felt it needful to "come apart", in a way he had not felt so needful before, and ponder this thing about the "man" away from "men". It was too wonderful a thing to be well made clear amid the values of the world, the aims, the unquiet, the warring, the playing, the work, the troubles, the futilities of worldly life. It was a matter needing quiet; it was a matter calling for realization by each man for himself.

I am not saying that it was needful to give the whole of life to compass this aim. But there was a real truth in the question being one that, as new, needed seclusion and concentration for a time, and times. It was a "God-intoxicated" idea, and to such Divine madness men have ever been prone. Why wonder, then, that to some it seemed as nothing to sacrifice all to brood upon it. Such a life—it is perpetuated in a curious old phrase of the Pali records: "with mind become that of the wild (*miga-bhūtena cetasā*)"—might conceivably not have first taken root in a cold country. It needed a climate where a man could maintain himself without taking life, since this was incompatible with fostering the ideal of man in the Most, or at his Best. He would need to be where he could maintain himself on wild roots and fruits, and not perish for lack of shelter or clothing. But I incline to believe that it was in the reaction to the impact of this world-mandate, uttered it may be by the semi-mythical, but once real man Yājñavalkya (not the Upanishad teacher or teachers named after him), "THOU (the man) art THAT," that the pioneer recluses, the first *śramaṇas*, led the way to life in the alone in India. They "went forth" far more thoroughly than did the alms-fed almsman or *bhikshu* of later days. There was in their day no question of receiving support from the "laity". They were the forest-recluses, not the almsmen who haunted the doorstep in the village. They lived on roots and fruits.

Now of these men the formula begins sometimes in a way which suggests a genuine old saying about not a dogma, but "the man":

"He tormenting neither the self, nor another, lives as to the seen uncoveting, finished, become cool, experiencing happiness, *with the self become God (Brahma-bhūto)*."[1] It is true that, when the Commentaries were put into fixed form, the last phrase is explained with all the historical significance gone, as "the self become best". It is true, no less, that this, read in its highest possible meaning, is not an explaining away. The immanent Deity to be realized *was* the Best, the Highest, the Most into whom the man could ultimately blossom. But it had ceased to mean this (as we now say) transcendental idea for Buddhaghosa and his little Ceylon world. For me it is a precious fragment of that ancient world of religious ideas lingering on in the Piṭakas.[2]

I do not think we need to be much exercized over the extent to which the concept of Deity as immanent in man's nature was, in the West Indian religious world relatively to that of the East of India, an esoteric teaching. The dual distinction was doubtless drawn by teachers on this and that point; we find Gotama using the terms once in *repudiating* such teaching for himself.[3] But nowhere does there appear any hard and fast line between teaching as so divided; nothing remotely near, in the matter under consideration, to the Greek mysteries. All deep religious truth is esoteric to the average worldly man and woman everywhere and at any time; all religion may need to take on, for such, a relatively esoteric shape. In the Suttas erudition is claimed for and by certain brahmans, but nothing—and here I follow Oldenberg—that can fairly be rendered by mysteries. If the high religious conception of Man, as identical with the World-Self in his nature, is not questioned in a nonconformist way, in Sutta interviews with brahmans, I infer that it was, at the birth of Sakya, the view held very generally by thoughtfully religious persons, not gainsaid in any marked way. The controversial positions in the appendix of the very first Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya and elsewhere, are for me all of later emergence. And when at that earlier date a teacher like Vardhamāna or Gotama began a mission with a new word of needed reform, there was no need to support the current central conception of immanent Deity in an assertive way. We may compare the case of Luther or of Wesley, each with a new word, but neither deeming it needful to maintain the concept of the Fatherhood of God.

[1] *Majjhima*, Sta. No. 51 and others; *Anguttara*, ii, 250. The term is repeatedly applied also to Gotama.

[2] Oldenberg drew attention to it in the last edition of *Buddha* in a footnote only.

[3] *Dīgha*, ii, 100: "I have taught making no inner, no outer . . ."

But when, as we see in the Piṭakas, the *samaṇa* had become less of a recluse, and nearly always an almsman or *bhikshu*, the fresh wonder and glory of the inspiring indwelling Holy Thing had died away. He was no longer valuing the world-life as too unquiet and difficult for self-realization; he was estimating it as, in itself and hopelessly, "ill" (*dukkha*). This is a different attitude, a later attitude, which is not clearly understood as such. And very gradually there had grown up a great respect in the majority for men who, not waiting for their later years, as with brahmans, but at any age, cast aside all that the world valued, and so the *samaṇa* had no longer to undergo privations, cut off from the neighbourhood of his lay patrons.

It is hard to trace this growth; early books, I repeat, are not inquiries into movements, but "sayings" about things moved. Nevertheless whereas, in the Suttas and Vinaya, the support of the laity in the maintenance of the *samaṇa* has become an institution, and the only uncertainty as to getting support lay in the varying popularity of this or that company of them, we can see that, especially among brahman householders, there was not seldom adverse comment on these men of the bowl, who looked to be supported for standing aloof from the productive work of their fellows, and with whom social status counted for nothing. This will be illustrated in a later chapter.

I come back to where the Indo-Aryan stood, with solidarity become less imperative, with the lone-recluse movement launched, when the new Sānkhyan values touched him, not long before the birth of Sakya. He had been living his life as man-having-body, in, or aloof from the world, without being consciously curious how he was related to that body or to that world by way of what we call mind. But now he began to heed the minding itself, and ideas or mental expressions in themselves. Among these were his relations to both body and external world, as coming, in a way, between him and the supreme "man" Who and Whose he was. And then it will have been, that those relations, that is, ***the ideas of them***, emerged as so many ties, bonds, fetters.[1] Then stood up his Aryan independence, his will to freedom, saying "Break!". Had the new interest in mind, in ideas, not weakened his grasp of his very nature as "man", he would not have, as man, fallen under the bondage of the idea. It is the child in man to see ideas as the very man. Had he seen himself as very man, maker, worther, user of his ideas, but not as very man subservient to them, he would not have seen anything in world or body as tie or bond over himself.

[1] *Gantha, yoga, sanga, saṃyojana.*

Hence it may appear that, between the birth and growth of Sānkhya-mind-values and the *spread* of the Indian monk-world, there is a causal connection which is not yet acknowledged as, I believe, it deserves to be. Sānkhya, not only in its much later systematized form, but also in its pre-systematic influence, has been considered perhaps too much as an already broken down attitude, and not sufficiently as the solvent that was in process of effecting the breaking down. As a solvent or leaven, it was at this time already having a potent effect on outlook and values in what was then at once religion and philosophy. The contemplation of mind as such was for the first time pre-occupying the thoughtful, and was felt as of new and immense interest. The discussions on its phases in the greater Upanishads are alone explicable in this light. It is the dawning of the consciousness of man as self-expressed in, and as mind.

It is not sufficiently realized what a strange, new development was here going on, however much we may find crudeness in the results. We forget how we have ourselves gone through a somewhat analogous period—similar yet different—in the development of a so-called psychological or mentalized outlook on the "man" or soul, out of and away from the older philosophico-religious outlook.

Here too, then, the reconstructive imagination needs quickening. Here most of all, namely, that with the new stimulus to introspective alertness, the *idea* about the man—his nature, his life—was beginning to bulk more importantly than the man who framed it; the "idea" overshadowed the "framer of the idea"; the man, framer, valuer, user, was beginning to lose the self first, in such an idea as the tied one, bonds, fetters, and next over against this, in the idea "release", the freed one, the escaped, the gone forth. This is well shown in the favourite definition of "Buddhism" in German writers as a religion of release or "Erlösung". The Upanishadic cult of the self or man had broken down into a cult of an idea about the man. Man as valuing his essential nature had been cloaked by man as valuing his instrument the mind, and himself in it.

Such is, to the best of my belief and word-craft, a rough sketch of the conditions in which the message of the men of Sakya came to be uttered. In so far as it adds to what is accepted the critic may or may not approve. However that be, the general reader will possibly see it as more alive, if I tell it afresh as from the lips of a teacher of that day, giving us what is for him a still living memory, if severed by many a rebirth. How gladly would he not listen did he hold that

such a telling brought with it, to one told, the sense of the possible and the true! Shall we listen?

I was a Brahman teacher who lived at Rājagaha. I had not many pupils, for Brahmans were not held there in the worth they had further west, but they were devoted to my teaching, for I was like them in this, that I was not only teaching the things that were old. They liked to hear me talk of the mind. This was very new, for till my day the man had been spoken of as in the body, but not as in a way in the mind. Man's ways in mind had been introduced some fifty years or so earlier by the man known as Kapila of Mathurā, and it was becoming a vogue in our more east-lying region, albeit the older teachers held aloof from it. They foresaw danger in it, and they were right; it led men away from the self or very man to see mind as man, as came to pass in Sakya. One of our teachers, Kaushītaki, who was much interested in this new way himself, uttered the danger in words known to you in writing, beginning: "Not speech should one desire to understand; one should desire to know the speaker," and ending "Not mind should one desire to understand; one should know the thinker." He saw to what it might lead. I was greatly taken by it none the less, and what has been written of my wordings is full of it. The newer world has never taken these teachings for what they really were, namely, a new word by inquirers into the new. They have been taken to be the teaching all Brahmans were agreed upon. They were not, and I was not much commended in my interest in them. I was that later, when the vogue of mind-analysis became usual and no more an innovation; then my utterances were held quite orthodox.

At the same time the man was ever for me the man, and in no way was he mind. Mind was a way of him, and for us mind was unfolding as a world of ways, a system; in no way was it, for us, the man. No one then thought so; it would have been a very madness in the teacher to have taught that. Yet it came later to be virtually what Sakya taught; it is virtually what is taught to-day among *you*.

Now in converse with other men, the new things would take utterance, and not only among Brahmans. Among the many attent to the new were men who were "men of the Jina"; the world called them, partly in derision, Nirgranthas, Niganṭhas: the Untied. They were disciples of the teacher who had lately died, Vardhamāna. They were much teaching willed courses of action, as able, in retrospective effect, to bring about happy consequences for the doer in after-lives. Result of action was of course not a new teaching. The new thing was, not to acquiesce in the result, but to alter it in effort through acts which they called karma. Not karma or action as a whole, but a special course of action. We, you will know, used karma in such a special way in connection with ritual, as if you were to say procedure or business. I was very interested in their belief, and in the *tapas* procedure by which they tried to escape from this tie, upon their future, of the past, the old. I myself had tried by fasting and brooding to win to more light on the very nature of man, but without success. I only grew weaker. I was seeking the more in me, but was doing it in the wrong way. I was not listening for the help that might come. *Tapas* was so far new, that these men set a high and special worth upon it, for the end I am telling you. But it did not appear to me worthy of being imitated. I thought it was a very carnal view to think to cure what the *man* had done by ill-treating his present *flesh*. It was as if one should visit one's wrath on an instrument because of the misdeeds of the user. But there was a sincerity about the men which I respected, and I asked them one day: Why do you not attend the ritual with us? They replied: You are taking the wrong way to cure evil. You try to cure what you have done with one thing by what you now do with other things. The offerings have not offended: why burn them?

I was deeply impressed by his reply; I had no answer to make. They did not make of me a convert, but I began to see in our ritual something that was irrational, and I was never a sound Brahman after that. I was not much with the Nirgranthas; they were more at Vesālī than at Rājagaha, and their austerities gave me a distaste for their opinions. But I did highly appreciate their will in the new ways, I mean the way in which they planned their lives on a new method which was not that of the majority, nor of the things accepted.

I come to other men of new thought. I am thinking of the Sakyas: they were then called so by most, or else Muṇḍakas, shavelings, namely, as to their faces, not their heads. They were a very worthy set of men, who had considered and tried *tapas*, and had rated it as not wise. They were more concerned to teach the importance of the moral life in its effect on a man's life hereafter, in another world. It was not a new teaching in itself, among the minority, but in the high worth in which they held it, it was new. I wondered why they were holding themselves aloof for just such an emphasis, for it did not seem to justify them to keep away from the ritual for that. And they were not disparaging us; they honoured the Brahman; they were in no way attacking us.

Remember, that whereas you of here and now may consider the sacrifice as cruel, this was not so with us there and then. The beast slain was believed to be reborn much more happily for the choice of it as the sacrificial victim.

One day I was listening to the teaching of one of the Sakyas. It was a man in the dress adopted by all *śramaṇas*, or *bhikshus*, as they were called. There were coming to be a good many of them about; and they all wore the same kind of yellowish raiment, no distinctive feature being made for any following or "order". They all lived by alms. It had not always been so; it was among the new movements. I was not looking upon it with approval, for I held that if a man wished to leave the world—it was called going forth—the only fit time was when he had fulfilled the duties of house-father, teacher, and other work in the world, but not till then. We did not look for a man to shrink from these duties while in the prime of life.

I was much fascinated by this man. He was in the prime of life, and he had a very lovely expression. He was speaking about *artha*, the "good", that which is well for man. And he was speaking of the very man as one in the "way", the way of the worlds. He was speaking of the way as the right thought, word, and deed, of the man in the worlds in very worth. It was a world-utterance, a word for Everyman. And I was thinking: Here is a very simple utterance; all can understand it; he speaks not of any ritual; he is speaking of man's daily life. We are not uttering it so earnestly in the mantras. We have it, but we are less urgent in it. We do not make real its importance as he does; we do not bring out the true man-worth. Very worthy is the way he shows the man as self-mandating. We do not do that as we should. We tell the man too much what to do. It is he who must bid himself what he must do. We make too little of this.

When he had ended I spoke to him. We all spoke Prakrit then as man to man, not the early Sanskrit of the mantras. He was very pleasant when spoken to. I found he was Brahman. He no more wore any marks about him to show he was one. He said he belonged to the Sakyas; that their leader was one Gotama of the Sakyas of Kosala. They were speaking to men about the "way of the worlds", meaning thereby the whole of life. They were looking upon life as the one Way, in which every stage was very important in a man's becoming ever worthier.

There was the deepest earnestness in his teaching; he was saying what he himself utterly believed, and for this I was greatly taken by him. I wanted to see him again, but I never did. I heard he had passed on not long after, and that he was the chief of the Sakyas after the leader.

I tried to meet the leader; I did one day, and I was impressed by a similar earnestness in him. Every word was from the heart. It was not his choice in wording that charmed me; he was not eloquent, but it was as if he was speaking to each man, not to men. I was very drawn to him, and felt as if his own high worth lent a higher worth to every man. When he had finished, it was as if the world was made the holier. I was deeply moved; I could not go. Then he saw me and he said: I am *puruṣa*; I am the *puruṣa* in you; we have in each of us the very *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa* bids us attain the more: the *puruṣa* heeds the way in the worlds; the *puruṣa* looks to the Most in the more. I said: You are the very worthy man in your teaching; I am honouring you; I would learn more of you. He said: Come! I will tell you. I went with him. I felt a deep regard for him and would have joined his Order. But he said: You have pupils who would miss your teaching. I would have you stay with them and help them. You will take up what I have been saying in your teaching. I wish you not to leave them.

There was something else come to pass in my day: not anything in itself new, but an old thing regarded and used under a new aspect. It had been Yoga; it was now called Dhyāna. It was a way by which the man with us sought to become the more than the average man. The more, gained in Yoga, was the intercourse of the man with the self, the very man "within" regarded as the Highest. And this gain revived later on. But just then the men who were in the new ideas were using absorption or musing to induce access to, converse with, men of other worlds. And inasmuch as this involved a special sort of seeing and hearing, it was an effort to be something more, in sense, than the average man. I had it a little; I could hear in the inner kind of way; I could not see. And the words that I heard were very wise, and were concerning the new things, in the more that was in man. The practice was become very prevalent, and men's eyes were being opened to the reality of the worlds. And it was man as being of the worlds that we taught. Thus it was that man was now turning from the Man within to men in the unseen.

Such were some of the ways in that day in which many among us were seeking after that New which should mean the More for and in each man, in and with men. It was this that I was seeking,

and giving word to in my teaching. It was that man should become what he was not before. This faith and aim is not usually attributed to the men of the mantras. And in truth it was only the few among us who so believed and taught. But your people see in the Upanishads what was approved by all at any given time, and do not take into account that things there written may, when new, have been new utterances of the few, and not approved when uttered. And when some of us said that the ātman (man) and the Ātman (Deity) were the very same, we did not mean that the man was Very Brahman now; we meant "same in nature". To be That, he had to become, and that becoming was for each the way through the worlds, of which you show that we spoke. That was true for us then; it is true for me now.

III

THE MESSAGE OF THE SAKYAN

We now come to the foreground in the picture: the mandate and the messenger. I shall deal mainly with the mandate; with the messenger I have dealt in the book, *Gotama the Man*, to which this is a complement. Here again I shall try to fit the message worthily, that is truly, into the picture of the men who were mandated, linking up these men with the will and work of the messenger, so that the fact and truth of their interdependence may stand out.

The man, who, in the days when in India books were not, made a public utterance, had to make it impressive in a special way. Much depended on its being impressive as utterance. And this it only became in India when he "mantra'ed" it, turned it into a "rune", delivered it as an intoned or semi-chanted utterance. It then ceased to be a "talk". It was not necessarily metric speech or Gāthā, but it was other than conversational prose. In the Pali books, as in the Upanishads, we have samples of both: now it is the talk; now it is the mantra either in prose or in verse: the public general utterance, calculated to appeal in matter and in form to the many. The talk-word may it is true also be more or less in stilted form, but that is due to the "accident" of its fate as orally transmitted. There are other ways in words, which have become "Scriptures", for achieving weighty impressiveness; in the Hebrew books we have: "Thus saith the LORD"; in the Rules of the Pali Vinaya we have each rule made to begin with: "I (the Bhagavā) allow you, monks . . . ." And the Indian mantras have their own words of exordium. But the way of the speaker will have been, in voice at least, a mighty factor in the impressiveness of his message.

In the first two utterances ascribed to the Founder of Sakya, called in the tradition "the Setting in Motion the Wheel of Dhamma" and "the Not-Man-features", we have two mantras worded in the authoritative way described. This is that; this is not that. It is true that in the middle of the second utterance we have the categorical ousted for a moment by the catechetical: "What think you as to that?" But this way, which may well have been a favourite method with the Founder, so often does it occur, may be said to have become inherent in the new wording of the Sakya Mantras. Now it is possible that these two utterances

were originally delivered as mantras, and not as talks—that is, so far as any part of them was an utterance by him. It is true, that they are said to have been addressed to a mere handful of listeners, the so-called "Five-set recluses". But these were men waiting for a decision as to how in word to approach the Many for the good of the Many. And the talks may have taken, from the first, the mantra form which best went down with the Many. On the other hand, under the special circumstances, all the "Five" being friends and fellow-students, who had doubtless discussed a best new mandate together, it is very possible that the utterances were first in the form of "talks", but were subsequently, perhaps long subsequently, altered to mantra-form when not only their growing worth required it, but also when changes in ideals and emphases called for a good deal of editing.

What do I conclude, from these impressions, as to those two first utterances of the Sakyan mandate? I conclude this: In a gospel, or world-religion-message, I look for a word on the "man" (soul), a word which tells of a something more which *is he*, which *may be his*, which *he may become*. This "more" is not coming to him as manna from heaven; it is a more that he must will to win. It calls for more-will in him to win a "more-well", a something better. Now such a message is hinted at in these utterances, but no more. It is impossible to call them well worded. And I judge that, as the mandate of a great world-religion, they are very wrecks, and that in them we have but a fragment, in each case, of what was really spoken when they were first uttered. For it was a great soul that is said to have uttered them, and such an one would not have spoken like that. He may very well not have been an eloquent speaker. He had new matter, but he had not new words. Yet even without them, he would have spoken more worthily.

Why then should such an unworthy patchwork, with the small but precious remnants in them, yet held still in unquestioning reverence, be all that is left of the first public teaching of such a man?

It may be due to several reasons. There is the fact that it was not committed to writing for quite a long time. There is the probability, that it was not committed to fixed oral version for many years, during which men had come to regard the mandate with different ideals and emphasis. There is the fact that the speaker was new to public speaking. There is the fact that the mandate was one that needed new words, words to clothe ideas, or at least emphases which were suitable for and needed by the Many, but which had not come for them into present highest values. All these will have tended to

mar the first wording of the utterance. We must look closely, allowing for much, if we would see anything in it of the nature of a New Word. But it is there. This is how it *now* begins.

"Monks! these two extremes by one who has gone forth are not to be followed. Which two? Both this that is the cleaving addiction to pleasures of sense in sense-desires, low, pagan, of the many-folk, unworthy, not belonging to *Artha*, and this that is the addiction to what is fatiguing to the self, painful, unworthy, not belonging to Artha. Now, monks, both these two extremes not having taken up, a midway course has by the man so wayfaring been well understood, making vision, making knowledge, leading on to peace, to wisdom, to enlightenment, to nirvana. But what, monks, is that midway course? Just this worthy way. That is to say, right view, right purpose, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right *smṛti*, right concentration. Now this very midway course, well understood by the man so gone, making vision, making knowledge, leads on to peace, to wisdom, to enlightenment, to nirvana. But now, monks, this is the 'ill' (*noun*) worthy truth[1]: birth is ill (*adjective*), old age is ill, disease is ill, dying is ill, union with the not-dear is ill, separation from the dear is ill, the wish that one gets not, that too is ill, in brief, the five grasping *khandhas* are ill. But now, monks, this is the 'arising of ill' worthy truth: this craving which is again-becoming-ish, accompanied by what is sensual and (wish-for-)the-happy, enjoying now here, now here. That is to say, craving for pleasure (of sense), craving for becoming, craving for many becomings.[2] But now, monks, this is the 'ending of ill' worthy truth; that which is of that same craving the utter fading out and ending, the giving up, the letting go, the release from, the not being cloven-to. But now, monks, this is the 'course going to the ending of ill' worthy truth: just this worthy eightfold way. That is to say . . . right view . . . (*as above*)."

I have given the mantra in curious English, but in as close keeping with the original as it was possible. How it goes on I give in an Appendix. I consider that the portion given is *in substance* probably older than the rest; I consider also that the treatment of "ill" bears the marks of later editing under a changed emphasis about "ill", and is not, in that emphasis, in keeping with the mantra about the choice of ways. There we have a way enjoined making for "well". Ill is incidental. It was first pointed out thirty-four

[1] Or fact, *sacca*, i.e. *sakya*. 'Painful' and 'ill' are both *dukkha*.

[2] I disagree with the Commentaries which see here "not becoming" in *vi-bhava*.

years ago by Kern, that in the formulation of the four truths we have the four cardinal articles of Indian medical science, applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine.[1] This connection with medical diagnosis he sees virtually admitted in two passages of the Lalita Vistara, the well-known Buddhist-Sanskrit poem on the Founder. The fourfold "truths," *not* in the Sūtra, but in the "talk about it": the Yoga-bhāśya of a mediaeval date,[2] are life itself (*saŋsāra*), cause of it, health, treatment. Kern only points to the striking coincidence, drawing no inference, there at least, as to coincidence in date of compilation

Nor do I. The interval is too long. And the healer's way of procedure is after all a formulated procedure of everyman's way of seeking to win to a better state from a worse. For me the conviction that the four Ill-mantras are a late monastic gloss, rewording it may be an older reference to the quest of health (*artha*) in the original mantra, lies in the changed emphasis. Had there been that later emphasis on ill when the Founder spoke his mantra, he would have begun, as do the truths, with ill. It is not Indian way to formulate with the chief item, as climax, at the end; it is put first. Moreover, when it is a case of ailment barring our way, the thing first and foremost in our mind is the ailment; the "not well" has to be met and overcome. Health is our ultimate object, but we are bending over its absence. But in a gospel of a world-religion it is just the ultimate health that is to the fore. Ill in it is incidental.

To revert to our message of health: first, I would point out that in it I find two main implications. If we leave them out the message is relatively meaningless. The first is that it is *a call to man's will.* Were it not so, it were useless to have spoken to men of a way, a course, or progress. The way is the course chosen by the man in willing. Way is not just wayfaring. It is *chosen* way, plan, method. Yet it is more, as we can gather from the books. Man's life as a whole, involving more worlds, more lifespans than one, is inseparable from Indian religious ideals, and was being stressed at the time, as the Upanishad showed us. The words *yāna*, *magga* meant this. And the word *saŋsaraṇa* (wayfaring or proceeding onward) was coming to mean it also. So we have here a way within a way: the long, long "upward way"[3] and the right wayfaring in it. I come to the other implication presently.

"Way" then was (*a*) how to walk, (*b*) in the way of the worlds; (*a*) without (*b*) is just advice as to culture and conduct; it is not the call of a world-religion. Now the "how" meant a choosing. And the choosing meant will. It is not alone on the way chosen that emphasis is laid; it is also on the choosing. This has been too much overlooked. We tend to take a teaching too much as a thing prescribed. A teaching is something willed by teacher to willer, who must accept and make it his own will before it can be of any use. This is the more easily overlooked, because the words are so inadequate for what the message meant. We have here to estimate both the man who willed and the man he was willing. It was a great word he was willing to utter, but the language at his command, judging by this fragment, was not great. It was a great will he was putting forth, but not so the way in which he expressed it. I find the *figure* of the "way" very fine and true. It came, as the full text will remind the reader, to be developed in ways of good thought, word, and conduct, to the number of eight, or ten, usually eight. Another rival development not inserted here, is into the worldway considered as four stages of progress. This brings out better the way, or progress in the way as of the worlds. But in both, the main implication, as I see it in the Utterance, is lost sight of: that of the man, as he wayfares, *choosing* or *not choosing* a way "belonging to Artha". Only by putting aside those details, eight or other, only by contemplating the one fact of the way shall we get at the real mandate, the vital mandate for the wayfarer; the faring aright to his goal. And that, not so much because he is sent, herded, but because he says "I will". Any teacher can give good advice. It needs the world-helper to point to what the man has within him and link that up with the whither of him.

But the figure of the Way, as we have it here, was not expressed in such a way as to cut out the possibility of mistake. We see nothing about choosing or will. There was, it is true, no really fit word like will for a man there and then to use. But there were good makeshifts, words for "stirring up effort" (*viriyaŋ ārabhati*), a phrase much used in the Suttas, words for desire (*chanda*), intent or purpose (*sankappa*). Any of these, had they figured, as *I* do not see them figuring in the original mantra, would have helped, if not so well as our words *will* and *choosing*, to clear up the real purport of the utterance.

But, it will be said, are not effort and purpose worded in the very statement of the Way: "This very worthy eightfold Way, to wit, right view . . . purpose . . . effort. . . . "? This is true, in the First Utterance as it has come down to us. The "eightfold" list is

[1] *Indian Buddhism,* 1896, p. 46 f.
[2] Cf. J. H. Woods, *Yogasūtras of Patañjali*, p. 135.
[3] Edwin Arnold's phrase (*Light of Asia*).

stated at once, and again in the reappearance of the Way as a fourth "truth" And I do not expect to carry readers with me in writing my conviction, that the elaboration into eight limbs" is later, and is part of the elaboration of the truths and following refrains. I willingly concede, that it was found both necessary and fit to expand the message of the Way as implying a need for the Wayfarer to use purpose and make effort, so much so that certain terms about the wayfarer became closely associated with exposition of it. But, once we concentrate on these ideas about the man in the Way, we obscure the great figure itself, and what it ultimately stands for: the man's nature and life in course of becoming, a course calling for will in choice. So much obscured is it, that I have never yet seen a book on Buddhism which is not more occupied about these "right" ideas attaching to the Way, than about the Way itself as Way, as figure, as symbol. Way was, even more than Wheel, the very symbol of Sakya, as have been to Christians the Cross, the Lamb.[1] But it is the symbol and what it symbolizes that is ever being lost to view over attention to those eight details.

Had those eight—I may also say, had the ten, had the four limbs which we also meet with—been held from the first as of equal importance with the symbol itself, we should be likely to find them stressed in the very few surviving sayings where the Founder teaches some man with the use of the figure. But in those, alas! so few extant passages, the eight are not mentioned at all.

Again, he was hampered it may be by want of such a word as we have in "choice". This brings me to the second main implication. This is that the utterance is a call to the "man" as his own inward monitor. In willing to choose the "right" or "fit" life in word, thought, and deed, by what standard herein shall he direct himself? The developed factors, four, eight, or tenfold, of the Way give no guidance. But there was that within him which said: "This is the better, that is the worse way." We do not find this clearly worded in earlier Indian literature. What the man should do, or not do is there, but it is given to him in codes of procedure. He is not himself left to be the chooser, or made aware that he is chooser. Look at the word for choice and chooser: it was used, not in our general way, but in a very limited way, namely, as meaning a privileged choice, a boon (*vara*), or the special case of a maiden choosing her husband. Even here, when she did choose, her action is worded as "taking this man", not as choosing.[2]

[1] The Wheel too is symbol of the Way, figure within figure, but it was wrongly applied, as revolution without progress.

[2] E.g. *Jātaka*, No. 31; cf. my *Stories of the Buddha*, pp. 6, 42, 182.

This narrow use is the less strange in view of India's failure to develop the same word, *vara* (our *val*), as "will". The two, will, choice, are almost of necessity present or absent together. With the one there will be the other. Man is needy when he lacks these words, for the lack indicates that he is not yet aware of the need to use will, nay, of the will he has to use. If he had been aware, if he had valued that of which he was aware, he would have found the word.

These implications I have as yet found passed over by those who have written on Buddhism and its beginnings. The textual value in the books has prevailed too much. They are taken as wording what was said, not of telling the little that had been remembered, in a wording much altered from what it had been. There is after all not a single original teaching in any religion which has remained unaltered. And in saying "altered", I take the word in its dual European sense of changed and worsened.[1] But in this utterance, if we see in it a call to everyman to will to choose for himself the way which That Who is somehow within bids, wills him to take, why then surely for that time, for that place, yea, for always and everywhere, it is a message of highest truth and meaning.

The men who are first won over to aid in such a call are no ordinary men. But, and in part as such, they will each wish to carry on that message in his own way. And that way will not always be coincident with that of the messenger. They will be giving varying emphasis to it. It is perhaps noteworthy here[2] that, of the first "Sakyans", one only has remained singled out in the records as having been commended by his leader as turning the wheel, i.e. carrying on the word, as he himself did. (The saying has been oddly misrepresented as carrying on in succession to himself, but this he, as one predeceasing his Master, could not do.) They will be slightly altering the wording each in his own way. They will be full of goodwill, but they will not be seeing just as the messenger does. When we consider this we need no longer wonder that a first utterance, a manifesto, as this has ever by Buddhists been held to be, should have become altered, altered in both meanings.

An utterance so regarded will never be worded by earnest men in a way they deem other than very worthy, and intelligible, if—and much depends on this—if the utterance is the expression of what they in their day are holding as vital, as central teaching. But it may well be, that what they are so holding is no longer the vital,

[1] *Altéré*.

[2] See Chapter VII for the episode in detail.

central teaching in the original utterance of an earlier day. They have come to hold something else. The utterance may still be preserved as a treasured relic, a venerated mantra. We ourselves have such in the Hebrew Ten Commandments, the Magna Charta. But neither are these for us the vital, central teaching they originally were, even though, so far as we know, they have not as scripts been edited. They are virtually fossils. They are not the live wires they were. We deem we have now something that is more in line with our present religious or political standards. So also the men in whose hands were the Sakyan records had come to place another teaching as more vital, more central than the will and the choosing of the Better, figured in the Way. This was the teaching about Dukkha: the ills of life and of the worlds.

Now there will very probably have been, in the original utterance, a simple direct talk on Ill, not put in the forefront as a fourfold mantra, as we see it in the records, but appended to the positive Way-statement, to show how right wayfaring was (in itself) a gradual decreasing of the manifold modes of "ill". For after all it was the ills of life: old age, disease, death, which apparently moved the Founder to take the drastic step (for one in his position) to leave his home to study a remedy. But he had got past the former brooding over ill, the cry: "Alas! the world has fallen on ill!" He had found in man's nature a radiating effort, an onward striving, which he could not word, but which he figured by Wayfaring, whereby in the long run ill could be overpast, and the utterly-well of Artha reached. And this it was which he put first and foremost, Artha and the Way thereto; not Ill. As the years rolled on and his teaching became ever more and more borne by the vehicle of a monastic machine, it became necessary to put in the strongest *mandamus* for the justification of that system. This was the hopeless Ill of the world and of life. And since it had been going too far to insert this *mandamus* at the head of the mantra, we get it stuck on at the end: a non-organic whole, as Deussen truly called it. The Indian, or at any rate the Sakyan, method in wording is not, I repeat, that of leading up to climax. The chief matter is placed first. There can be little hesitation in calling the chief idea in the appendage, that is, the four truths, Dukkha and not the Way. But analogously, in the Utterance as a whole, with its probably original opening left in place, the chief idea is the Way, the Way belonging to, leading to Artha. Had the Founder intended to have taken, as Buddhists now do (at least those of the Hīnayana persuasion) his stand on Dukkha, he would have begun with it.

But why, some may say, make this rally round the Way as being in truth the chief idea in the will and word of the Utterer?

I fall back on my hypothesis of the Message in a world-religion, and its Messenger. We are herein dealing with a man who mandates a new word to the "man" about his nature and his destiny, which is what I would call a "More" therein, an enlargement of outlook, a telling of power to evolve more from life than he has done, always taking life in the whole, never in one world-span of it only, a call to use more will to become more well. Now to see in a theory of "ill" the great reality in life, to see it as the main value, dictating to a man what shall be his relations to the world of his fellowmen, to the worlds of all beings: this is to see something that is not of the original gospel, not of the original inspiration of the Messenger, but a gospel of the Less. If my hypothesis is to stand, we must see, in the real essence of the first utterance, not a gospel about the supreme importance of ill; we must see on the contrary a new word about "well", and the "more" in man's nature, making for that "well".

I shall, I know, be told: But the truths are after all a theory how to become well. I admit they are saved as to their face by admitting the Way to that as the fourth and last mantra of "truth". But my point is this: that in this fourfold formula the Way is no longer the chief subject, and Ill very surely is. The formula is obviously not "about" the Way; it is obviously a formula "about" Ill. What men hold very important in life, that will they put into words; that will they make the chief subject of their words. And accordingly, for the men who, on to this uttered "talk", grafted, or rather stuck the mantra about Ill, Ill *had become* for them, as it was not for the Utterer of the Talk, the chief subject to be mandated.[1]

Hence it is that the true subject of the Utterance has got covered over, and we have to dig for it. We must put that into it which will have been there, if the message ever had the "More-value" of a world-gospel. It is a woeful thing that this has to be done. I would we had not to put in, or leave out, a single word. As it stands, it is manifestly corrupt, leading those who take it at its face-value into error. One of these errors is this: Whereas a world-religion is essentially a message to everyman—else is it no world-religion—the editors, who were contemplating Ill as the chief matter, have made the utterance to be concerned only with the "man who has gone forth" (the recluse, because of the Ill of the world); and hence we find one writer seeing the utterance as dealing with laxity, or strictness in the life *only* of the recluse,[2] and another seeing in it

[1] See also Chapter XXI. [2] De la Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*.

a "popular-poetical" conception of a world-forsaking recluse's escape from Ill.[1]

Is it really true vision which sees in the Utterance such pitiful abortions as these? Is it indeed only a message for monks? Was it no message of help to the laity also, to the Many the Compassionate One of world-fame came forth to help? Were we, in a world religion, dealing with externals of body and mind, time and place, I should not venture to reword the Message as I see it. But we are dealing with a word from Very Man to Very Man, reverberating across time and space to the same in ourselves. And in this sense I can hear a missioner speaking that message to the heart of men somewhat like this:—

I am telling you of the better way in which a man should walk in life. Most men choose to walk either in the way of self-indulgence and worldliness or in the way of being the slaves of rules. I am willing you to take a different way. It lies between the two. It is like the former because it calls upon you to walk according to your will. It is like the latter because it calls upon you to have some principle according to which you will to walk. You have yourselves the knowledge that when two ways lie before you, one is what you would call better than the other. That is, the one is the way which, if followed, will lead to your doing and so becoming, better than if you follow the other. It is not always quite clear but a man usually knows. Now if this better way be followed as long as you live on earth, the result will be better for you when you leave the earth. And this is true for all the rest of your life. You will by such choosing come in the future to the very goal of life. You will then know what it is to be utterly well, even though now you have no clear idea how or what that will be. Now you are often not well. You are often unwell in body and in mind; you are unwell in your very self. As very man, as the spirit you are, you are not well; you are very imperfect, you are truly as a babe. You suffer in many ways. You want not to suffer. Use that want to become better. Use your will to choose the way to become better. Let it be your firm belief that you can become better. Do not turn away from the will to the better. Word the better to yourself. Hold the better to be indeed better. See yourself in a long, long way of life, long enough for you to grow to what you do not dream of. You see but a very little of the way. As you keep on choosing the better, you will be seeing ever more and more of it. You will be wayfaring in the way to the utterly well.

[1] Heiler, *Die Buddhistische Versenkung*.

I am not saying that the above is a correct reinstatement of lost words and phrases. Who could pretend to make that? I only claim that, clothed in simple English fit for a gospel for Everyman, it reproduces something of the essential meaning of the fragmentary utterance out of which grew a mighty world-religion. It presents the utterance in the one and only way in which, given those first "talked" fragments, it can possibly have been a gospel message from Very Man to Very Man, and not from a sectarian among men to a section among men, a monk to monks.

Does the question here again arise: Why was it that, during so long a life of mission work as the Founder's, and with a Community and an influence becoming extended, no better wording of the first mandate was drawn up with at least his sanction? It is not easy for us to get at the truth here. We need first to recollect that Sakya is the only world-religion in which we get even the patched-up wreck of a first mandate at all. Religions do not begin with the making of records, nor in the decades of strictly missionary work does the need of charter-statements show itself. More especially in a bookless world. It is true, that in the companion volume to this and in this also, it is put forward that fixed wordings were begun in the Founder's old age. But the reader is there also vividly reminded, that by that time Gotama was in the midst of a relatively new and growing monk-vogue, vigorously wording its own monastic views of life. In his old age it was too much for him to control, and after his passing, these would hold sway unchecked. But affectionate reverence for him would be likewise then growing apace, and it would be then, that memories of how he began to teach, as well as fresher memories of how he ended his career would call for revival, for restatement, and in the latter case for compilation of wording.

It may again be asked, would a mandate of such high significance have been originally uttered as a "talk"?

Here most fortunately, as many of us know, we have in the record the circumstances under which the talk took place. We have there, as it were, a man returning home from a journey with a treasure he has won. He had left the friends with whom he had been experimenting in *tapas*, the better to think things out. He came back to them (or perhaps he had to seek them out in Benares whither they had gone in his absence), with things thought out, to lay before them his message for mission work. It is only reasonable to suppose that, before leaving them, he had talked much with them, and they with him of a line of teaching best calculated to help the many. For there was no question here of founding a School for philosophic

study, or a return to *tapas*. We have also most fortunately the record (as we have in the Christian gospels) that once the group became enough in numbers, it was missionizing, and not academic debate, that they set about. This tends to be forgotten over very much development, in a much later, established Buddhism, in what we now call philosophy. Now the friends will have known the trend of Gotama's mind, and the alternatives in the new ideas of the day over which he had been hesitating. Hence it is not impossible that, when he came back with a solution and a decision, he did not express himself in the explicit way about the springs of action, in the man mandating himself in the Way, that he would have used before strangers, before pupils, before a public audience. They will have understood, when he told them as "talk", with much left implicit, what he felt strongly moved to try, in such words as he could find, to tell his fellow-men.

My belief then as to the original form of the first two utterances is, that, deducting the added glosses, they are mantras, following on talks between the teacher-band, and were so worded by them or by the Leader, to serve as outlines, as schemata, to be expanded in the mission to the Many.

There is this one more thing to be said about the Utterer, judged by that Utterance. It is reasonable to hold that he did not reel off in well-worded sentences what his will was trying to say. When we are charging our will with a new word, we are making articulate, in matter and word, something to which we are not accustomed. We have no preconceived precedent in the values. We are *valuing in the making*. We are giving value to the yet unvalued. Gotama was bringing new values into India and making them articulate. We shall not understand Sakyan origins if we fail to see this. It was a question of putting something into new words where words most needed were not. *Now* we may reel off a clear restatement of what in my judgment he was trying to say, and sorely should we be, as heirs of the ages, to blame, if we could not do so. But we shall not regard his message truly if we continue blind to his difficulties. A New Word, we hear him saying, is never worthily worded.

He might have left worthier fragments, had he been an accomplished speaker. He was that in legend only. He cannot be said to have shown the orator's gift. Nowhere in the Suttas is there an eloquent speech of which we can say, These were truly his very words. Wherever they rise to eloquence, the sentences have been refashioned in those prose refrains which are a special feature of the Suttas, and which herein betray, probably as an aid

to memorizing, the later hand of the editor. It is not the way of one who is giving a new teaching. Such does not flow out in easy periods, in the way of a purposely drawn-up wording. That may be the way of the preacher, of a pundit. It is not the way of a man afire with a new word he is willed to utter, stammering it may be over the unworded ideas he is inspired withal.

If we are content to see in the Sakyamuni the pundit, then does the following quotation worthily picture him: "Artificial as this arrangement (in Sutta method) sounds when analyzed, it is a natural procedure for one who wished to impress on his hearers a series of philosophic propositions without the aid of writing, and I can imagine that these rhythmical formulae, uttered in that grave and pleasant voice which the Buddha is said to have possessed, seemed to the leisurely yet eager groups who sat round him under some wayside banyan or in the monastery park, to be not tedious iteration but a gradual revelation of truth growing clearer with each repetition."[1]

It is because I see in him the latter kind of teacher and not the pundit, that before me, as I read those words, there rose a different vision of one who saw, who heard . . . and said, "Woe is me! for I am undone; I am a man of unclean lips . . . Then flew the seraph . . . and laid upon my mouth a live coal from the altar . . . I heard the voice saying, Whom shall I send? Who will go for us? Then said I, Here am I; send me. And It said, Go and tell . . ."[2]

I do not for a moment reject the belief that here was a man who could and did during many years of ministry with gentle voice impart good counsel. But when it comes down to reiterating refrains, there I find that the passionate ardour surmounting the stumbling utterance of the Hebrew prophet fits better. It fits better with the lines ascribed to him in the Sutta:—

> I lay no wood, brahman, for fires on altars;
> Only within burneth the fire I kindle.
> Ever my fire burns; ever tense and ardent
> Worthily I work out the life that's holy.[3]

"Afire," *tejasā*: so he was, when from solitude he came back to his friends and spoke what had been willed he should try to utter; radiant he looked with the new word of the new will.[4] And it is with this in mind that I have sought to re-kindle the dead embers of the few words of that utterance which have survived.

[1] C. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, i, 286. [2] Isaiah, ch. vi.
[3] *Samyutta-Nikāya*, i, 169:
Ajjhattam eva jalayāmi jotiŋ
Niccaggini . . .
[4] *Vinaya*, I, i, 6, 7.

IV

DHARMA (DHAMMA) IN SAKYA

I have said, that in the First Utterance of the Sakyan mandate, I find two implications, implications so vital that without them the message is relatively worthless. As recorded, it can in no way fail to have interest historically considered. It is undoubtedly an ancient record; as ushering in a new religious movement with a formal pronouncement, it is unique; and as the ostensible mandate, in its added mantra, of the monk, it is a good apologia for his motive of a diagnosis of world-woe. But as a call to the Many, shedding new light on man's nature and man's way in the worlds, it is, I repeat, without those two implications lifeless, irrational. These are (1) that man must himself will the Better, the Best, and choose to follow after it; (2) that he is aided herein by an inward monition, which is at once himself and more than himself. I propose to seek further for the original Sakya by way of these two vitally important values. And I will begin with the latter.

There is a word which we do not find in that utterance, but which none the less became of the first importance in the whole history of Buddhism. I have worded it in the restatement thus: "It is not always quite clear, but a man usually knows." Now this awareness as to which of two or more courses is the better or best is, for the history of man, as we all know, a very real and vital phenomenon. It has been diversely named; I need only refer to the "daimôn" of Sokrates, to the "I find a law" of St. Paul, to the "conscience" of our own day. In India the word was *dharma* (Pali: *dhamma*). In its truest sense it expresses this inward monitor. It has a long history, and has been used with various shades of meaning. But as singular and substantive, ever with a "solemn, holy meaning". These may be studied, admirably set forth, in the monograph from which I quote, *Pali Dhamma*, by Magdalen and Wilhelm Geiger.[1] Especially to be noted, in connection with our First Utterance, is the nearness, "in pre-Buddhist times"—I would add, contemporaneously with the birth of Sakya—of the word *dharma* to *Brahman* (the Supreme, Divine), and, again, the equivalence in Vedic thought of *dharma* with *ṛta*, that impersonal concept of the

[1] *Abhandlungen d. Bay. Ak. d. Wiss.*, München, 1921.

Fit, the Right, to which, like the Greek "Necessity", the very gods were subject. This meaning is never absent, whatever be the aspect taken of *dharma*, whatever is the emphasis used with it at different stages of Buddhist history. We even find it reverberating in a Commentary in a unique wording: *dhammo karaṇakātabbo ti*, "*dhamma* is the ought to be done of a doing."

The, to us, singular absence in the First Utterance of any reference to a supra-mundane mandate has often been commented on. And many a modern has swallowed, has accepted the monkish values, because he appreciates, in the message, that which seems to be a wonderful anticipation of the rationalism of his day.

This is because he reads without seeing in the Utterance what it will have meant to the average worthy man or woman of *its* day. He has taken, and rightly taken, the utterance, in spite of its having been elaborated into a "monk-mantra", as the very world-"sermon" the Buddhist world has ever taken it to have been, as the message of a man whose vast compassion included, not men on earth only, but "all devas", "all beings"; as the mandate which unseen inmates of the worlds came thronging to hear. In so doing, he has unwittingly substituted for "one who has gone forth", the reading "man". And he has been right in so doing. But, for him, "man" will have meant no more than it does in other religious mandates. It will have meant the external person, complex of body and mind, who "has", or "has not, a soul". This was not the meaning for the thoughtful, the religious Indian of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. When for him a call came, in which he appeared as, by implication, both the bidden and the Bidder, it would not therefore have appeared to him as what is now called Rationalistic or Atheistic. And why? Because, for him, the "man" *included in his nature* the "More than man".

I am not, of course, referring to the word in the Utterance "tathâgata". This title, "he who has thus-come, or -gone," constantly applied in the Suttas to the Founder, but now and then to any good man, may or may not have been in the original utterance. I incline to think it was not; but if it was, it cannot possibly have referred to the speaker. He was not yet acclaimed as one to whom any honorific titles were due, and to have assumed such a title at the outset would be but part of the pious after-editing, which makes him assume a pompousness which would have ill become him then—especially before a few friends—and indeed at any time. But even if "tathāgata", may not have been in the original word-outline, it may well have been used by the first Sakyas in the

teaching of the Way to mean the Wayfarer, the man who thus fares in the way to the Better. It will have been a much later value in the term which practically reserved it for a "Buddha", or for "Buddhas".[1] Similar has been the fate of *su-gata*, 'well-farer'.

For that matter, whereas such a word as Wayfarer was supremely wanted when the little original outline was taken over as The Teaching by the founders, there can scarcely be said to have been such a word. We may look long in the Piṭakas, even in the Jātakas, yet never find such a word. I have only run such a word to earth in two Commentaries, that on the Dhammapada and that on the Dhammasangaṇi, and in the treatise (5th cent. A.D.) *Visuddhi-Magga*. We there at length find[2] *maggika* (way-er), *paṭipanna*, or *-annaka* (fared, fared-er) and *gamaka* (goer). And therewith the very pertinent remark in the second: "Given a faring-course (*paṭipadā*) there must be a (way-)farer." I cannot help thinking we may have here another difficulty with which the New Word had to contend, another word needed, yet not to hand. The Utterance is referring to a middle way which the man who takes it, i.e. has willed, has chosen to take, will have "understood", namely as the Better Way. But the words "*tathāgatena abhisambuddhā*", "understood by one-so-gone", have been distorted, with the waning importance of the Way, and the growing Buddha-cult, to mean "understood by the Buddha".

Now in the Sakyan message the man was thus "becoming in the Way",[3] the man thus going was he who walked according to *dhamma*, *dhammena*; according, that is, to that hidden Divinity, Who, in virtue of his manhood, he was. There is nothing more solemnly deliberate in acts ascribed to Gotama, than his confessing worship of *dhamma*, as That under Whom he vowed to live. Very dehumanized has he become in the stilted prose and verse of the little Sutta "Gāravan" (honouring),[4] very far is it from the very man in the attitude he is made to assume about himself, yet it is most unlikely there is no basis of truth in the confession. Buddhology would not have invented it. And it appears as a step taken before he began his mission work. Why do Buddhists so ignore it?

To say: "This is to put the Brahmanic Theism, or Ātmanism into Buddhism, which was its religious opposite," is to talk at cross purposes. We are not dealing with what has come, late in time,

[1] The student of the Piṭakas will find it useful to consult the article "Tathāgata", by R., now Lord, Chalmers, *JRAS*. 1898, 391 ff.

[2] On Dhp. v. 24, and *Atthasālinī*, p. 164; *Vis. Magga*, 513.

[3] On this idiom, see Chapter VI.

[4] *Saṃyutta*, i, 139.

to be called Buddhism; we are dealing with that New Word which soon came to be called the *dhamma* of the Sakyans. And when it was spoken, the whole religious world of North India was then seeing in every man, not a "man who somehow has a soul", but man who *is* THAT; a self (ĀTMAN) who is the world-self (ĀTMAN). We cannot too carefully keep this in view: that to take the man as most of us here and now see him, and see that man in the time and place of the beginnings of Sakya is to be incapable of understanding its gospel. I shall return to this in another chapter.

Again, *dhamma* is often translated, especially by men of Buddhist countries, by "law". If by this is meant that inward monition which St. Paul called the "law" (*nomos*), wherewith he fought against his lower nature, the rendering is not amiss. But there is a tendency to read into it the newer idea of natural uniformity (popularly called laws of science). This, if brought in to explain Sakyan concepts, is out of place. There was then no such scientific culture as to enable a teacher to say that the Better for man has been shown to be the conforming to a law of this kind. It is to read the new, the later, into the old. Even the wiser few did not so think, or at least so speak; much less would there have been in such teaching any possible appeal for the Many. On the other hand, there would be an appeal, not only for the wise few, but also for the thoughtful Many, in a teaching addressing a call to the man-as-such, because the man-as-such was more than he is for us; he was More-than-man *in the very fact of being man*.

I am not saying this would be a true saying for India earlier or again later. We are concerned with the valley of the Ganges at a certain epoch. And with much uncertainty as to precise dates, we can see this much, that at this epoch the older cult of great gods had waned; the newer cult of great gods (with a difference), especially the Vishnu and Siva cults, had not yet shown a theistic renaissance. "The gods" sat lightly in man's firmament.[1] Their real, their earlier weight had been transferred to the Impersonal and the Within.

There has been too much tendency to see in the birth-time of Sakya a period of decadence in belief in the Divine, a waning in faith in unseen world-governance. I hold this to be a mistake. There was, there had been Götterdämmerung, twilight of gods; there was no waning of faith in a Divine Principle. Externalized faith had been made to "enter in". The Upanishads of the epoch are full of it. Deity was come to be held as an impersonal (neuter) "Brahman"; as a somewhat analogous to the breath (*ātman* and

[1] So sat they in Plato's, in Aristotle's firmament.

prāṇa)[1] in one's self. The inner world of the man had assumed a rich import of highest significance; a word had taken birth for it: *adhyātman*, not used before, but to be so much used in the Pali records as *ajjhattaŋ* and *ajjhattika*: self-referring; within the man dwelt the very Principle of world-governance Itself. "Know you, O Kapya, that Inner Controller (who makes to go[2]), who from within controls this world and the other world and all things . . . *this*[3] is self, inner controller, immortal."

It was into this new world of "God made immanent" that Gotama's message came: into a world of the man made so rich, so much More, that in the glory of the idea the dazzled self-communer would easily forget the very babe he was in growth toward that More-in-him-in-idea; forget the need of transforming that More into the living of life; forget the need of insight into that More in each fellowman; forget the long way of becoming that stretched before both the one and the other through the worlds. Let no man say: Into such a world of new insight into the Divine what need was there for a new gospel? The new insight, had India understood it, was the very vantage-point on which the new gospel might have become a marvellous world-word in man's advance.[4] On the other hand, let no man say: Here was a religious mandate shorn of the Divine; a wonderful anticipation! when at that time the very word "man" breathed the Divine nature; when the very word for what the man should do (*dhamma*) had become tantamount to Divine guidance, and to speak of holy living was to speak of the God-conduct (*Brahma-chariya*).

To resume: In any scheme or summary put forward, at that day, of a religious kind capable of appealing to the majority, the very word "man" as its subject, his nature and life as its object, would call up associated ideas of immanent deity and of divine monition or *dhamma* to an extent to which we here and now are very much less responsive. To that extent we are very orphans.

If it be said: But there is no mention in the Utterance of the word "man", I would remind the reader again that we are dealing with an ancient husk, with a plastered superstructure. We have seen reason to find two plastered items in the very places where the word "man" is called for: the place for the wayfarer on the Way, and the place filled in by "recluse", which in a world-gospel (let alone the context) is unfit. The recluse (unless the mere monastic explanation on which one writer, as I said, has fallen back, is adopted), *had*

[1] *Taitt. Up.*, 2, 3, etc.
[2] *Antara-yāmin. Bṛhad. Up.*, iii, 7, 2.
[3] *Eṣa ta.*
[4] See below, Chapter VI.

already chosen the one of the two extremes deprecated; and the place filled in by "tathāgata", which, as understood, was on that occasion impossible. Here we need some such phrase as "the man usually knows".[1] And why? Because in him as man That is working by *dhamma* (*dhammena*, in Pali idiom), That Who, as was then taught, he is: "*Tat tvam asi.*" The word "man" in these two places would appeal somewhat in this stronger, Indian way both to the Many on whose behalf the utterance was thought out, and also to the chosen few, who had been looking to hear it in the will to work with the speaker among the Many.

The actual word for "man" which the speaker will have used was in all probability the Prakrit forms *purisa*, *pulisha*, both corruptions of the earlier *puruṣa* (Vedic). It was the last named which, in the greater Upanishads is, in passages innumerable, used to identify immanent deity with the man: "he saw this very man (*puruṣa*) as veriest Brahman."[2] "In the beginning this world was *ātman* alone in the form of the man (*puruṣa*)[3] . . . that bright immortal man incorporated in the body, he is the same as that Self, that Brahman, that All,"[4] and so on. It is to weaken the specific nature of the Indian conception to translate *puruṣa* here as is constantly done by "person", when *in any other connection* the translator would have rendered it by "man". That it is not the present vogue with us is no real excuse. Before this century is over we may see, even here, the "man" come into his own, who now is disinherited, and we may then be seeing a kinship with this early fetch of Indian thought, and no more value the wording that helped to keep him aloof.

There is another word for "man" in Pali, which in the Pali Pitakas has an interesting if unwritten history, and that is *puggālā* (Sanskrit *pudgala*), or "male". In the Sayings or Suttas, it has practically ousted the word *purisa* as signifying the human individual or self or soul. *Purisa* was still used in the records, but merely in the sense of the man as a useful machine, such as a messenger, a policeman, or again as meaning male in a context as complementary to female. But there is one very notable exception (not to mention others of less significance), and this is that when, at passing from earth, the human being is, at the tribunal of his deva-fellowmen, brought to book for his earthly career, the judge addresses him, not as *puggala*, but as *purisa*! It is possible that we have here in the Sutta (of which more later on) a true early Sakyan record. There was the further word *manussa*, but this is never used in an individual personal

[1] See p. 62.
[2] *Aitareyya Up.*, iii, 13.
[3] *Bṛhad. Up.*, i, 4, 1.
[4] *Ib.*, ii, 5, 1 ff.

way, only as "men", "human beings", in opposition to beings not termed human, and we can here disregard it.

It remains for me a strong presumption, that as monastic Sakya came to set itself against the ultimate reality of the man as entity, the words *manussa* and *pulisha*, *purisa*, with very positive, real associations, with superman implication, were dropped, and the less lofty word *puggala*, the centre of later ecclesiastical dispute, was substituted. We see the Sakya admitting the having adapted Brahmanic terms to a new meaning: *tevijja*, *brāhmaṇa*, etc. It is not unreasonable therefore to conclude that they had effected a complementary rewording where ejection seemed desirable.

But we are now in an older day than this of Sakya monks editing with changed values. We are trying to reconstruct a day when a new idea here, a new idea there, was struggling to become articulate in a world pre-empted by set ways of articulate thought. To be understood at all, the new idea would have to be expounded with all the swathing draperies of the words of the day of its birth. And hence it is that I am insisting so strongly that, even when we have got rid of the more obvious "plasterings" in the original matter (if aught indeed be left) of the first Utterance, we have yet to read the meanings current at its birthday, and which have dropped out, into the essential words, instead of insetting words bearing either the later Sakyan values, or our own modern values. And thus I would suggest, that not only would the speaker have used the word *purisa* (or *pulisha*), but that for his hearers the word would have, in such a talk or schema, the meaning I have tried to show. In such a connection "man" meant very much what a similar utterance here and now would mean by "soul"—but *more than soul*.

I have spoken of many meanings of the word *dhamma* or *dharma*. I have suggested in which of these it will have been implied in the first utterance, nay, must have been implied, if the words, as we have them, were to have any driving power at all. It will not have always been left unsaid in the first Sakyan teaching. In fact, it became of such central importance as to stand for the teaching itself. "What is that 'dhamma'"—it might be more literally rendered "What kind of *dhamma* is that (*ko nāma so dhammo*)—which your disciples when trained therein, finding comfort, confess as their choice and the beginning of the Godlife (*ādi-Brahmacariyaŋ*)?"[1] Unfortunately it was not suffered to be left in this meaning of "basic principle of holy living", a term by which we might very truly define conscience. It came to mean the principle made articulate, the inner guide

[1] *Digha*, iii, 39.

brought outside, in formulated teachings, in sayings, rules, sermons, discourses, and what not. So that, in reply to such a question as that quoted, the usual reply is, that the Dhamma is in nine parts, enumerated somewhat like the above. We even find the Founder himself made to describe Dhamma as a thing of these nine parts which the monk learns! (*Majjhima*, Sutta 22). No such scholastic schedule mars the reply to the question quoted above, and that, as far as it goes, points to a possibly more genuine Saying.

Externalized though *dhamma* came to be in what we might call its church meaning, it ever remained that which *implied* a teaching of the "things that ought to be done". And so meaning, the word, for which we have nothing equally rich in import to render it by, is better translated by "law" or "norm" than by "doctrine". Doctrine is true only of the much later Buddhism, the Buddhism of the monasteries, of the schoolmen. But even law and norm are not clean equivalents; law, if not perhaps for St. Paul, is for us either too statutory, or too scientific; norm is too much the "good average". Neither term has in it that secret of the Way, the "coming-to-be", the stage by stage further than we were before, which calls through early Sakya. *Dhamma* was in it that which *ought to be* as above and beyond that which *is*. It transforms the nature of the early records sometimes, if we read this meaning into *dhamma*. Take the passage in the unique (Vinaya) account of the beginnings of the movement, where the word occurs, I think, for the first time. The Founder is, like Jesus, sending his early disciples out two by two from the first settlement at Rājagaha for the day's missionizing. He is no longer leaving *dhamma* implicit in what they have to say. "Fare in a round that may be for the good of the many . . . teach *dhamma* beneficent in the beginning, in the middle, in the end . . ." This description recurs often in a famous formula in praise of the triad, Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, and we may some of us have vaguely imagined it referred to periods in formulated doctrines, much as we refer to periods in a man's, a poet's, a composer's work. But it cannot here have meant a system of doctrine, when for the first missioners there was not yet any set form of words. When we take *dhamma* as the working of the Antarayāmin, the inner controller, we get a thing true for all time and for every man at every stage in his life, we get that which is present to guide for his good the man *as child, as adult, as aged*. We have the very spring of the holy life. Yet no Buddhist, no writer on Buddhism, so far as I have seen, has noticed this. They do not even translate the passage as if they had. The usual rendering is inapt. It is not "*dhamma* which is beneficent" or "good" or

"lovely"—*kalyāṇa* may be rendered by any one of these—but it is "*dhamma* (doctrine) which is glorious", which is not the meaning at all!

Still less suitable is "doctrine", or "the Dhamma" suitable in the case of the very first five converts, who were, we read, after the Utterance of the Message, instructed and admonished in *dhamma*. The right way to read this is surely to see in it a very ancient link between the Way as the message to be taught to the many and *dhamma* or the inner guide in choice of Way, by which alone, urging him, a man would know how to choose aright.

V

MAN'S WILL IN SAKYA

I come to the second vital implication in the First Utterance: Man must himself will the better, the best, and choose to follow after it.

This is not there given utterance, any more than is *dhamma*. None the less, to make that brief Utterance worth while, to give it any weight at all as a World-Word in the New and the True, both of these things must be taken as implied. But they must not be taken as they are taken in most that has been written on this subject. *They should not be left latent.* We see what a lamed word those writings have been made in consequence of acquiescence in this latency. Namely, no two writers are at one on what is the central conception of Buddhism. Writers have been too content to take the explicit at its face-value; they have too little brought the inlying burden of the message to the surface. And so we get emphasis laid mainly on the over-neat explicitness of the appendage called the Four Truths, and on the over-elaborate explicitness of the modes in the Way. These jump to the eye. And just because of that, we had done well to have been less content, and to have suspected work of aftermen in those categories, of the men who had themselves, before us, lost sight of the real heart of the Utterance, that great, but halting, poorly worded feeling-out-after a mandate in the New for all men, and had reduced it to a mere message for "the man who had gone forth", the recluse, the *samaṇa*, the monk. Rightly to understand the Utterance we should wholly shift our emphasis; we should ignore the neat categories, eightfold and fourfold; we should listen to the undertones in the opening sentences.

So listening, it may then be that we shall hear, we, the very soul that we are will hear the call that came: "you *will* the better in this way, in that way; the way you feel you *ought to go*: you 'thus-gone' will go towards the highest weal, the end of all ill. Choose that way. *You* must will. *You* must choose."

Long after these days it is to be seen in the rock edicts of a layman addressing laymen, how for Asoka this will, this choice in conduct, was worded as the gift of *dhamma* from man to man: "should tell him, that 'this is good', 'that ought to be done'; this will

bring benefit now, happiness hereafter." It is the very refrain of the edicts.

Why was this left so largely implicit? Why was it not better worded?

Some reasons for this I have already suggested: the fact that the Utterer was telling to friends a schema or outline only (he is recorded as engaged immediately after on the subject of *dhamma*, miscalled "the Dhamma"). He was not a gifted speaker. He was still in travail with the new, the unusual, the greatness of what he willed to do. All this leaves yet untouched these other two reasons, why the two matters before us have been left implicit. Firstly, there may have been that in the Utterance which *became implicit* when, in editorial hands, first as spoken, then as written, first in one tongue, then in another, the Record of it took its present shape. Secondly, there may have been that in the Utterance which *had to be left implicit* for want of a fit word.

About the former reason I shall have more to say in a later chapter. About the latter reason I have already said much elsewhere. But whereas I hold it to be both true and important, it is not yet accepted as such by fellow-writers. Hence I must once more deal with it.

We are slow as yet, so far at least as some of us have put words about this matter on paper, to bring out the striking difference between the wording of the will in the Christian scriptures and those of other religions. In the first, words for the will are there ready for use, in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek. And those words, or that word, is often used, often in ways where no other word of approximate meaning would have expressed the agent as forcefully as does "will". It takes two and a half quarto columns in the Biblical Concordance to exhaust the references to will, and its derivatives. In contrast to this, the references to Will in Dr. Winternitz's Index to the fifty volumes of the Sacred Books of the East occupy eight lines, Volition one and a half, and Saṅkalpa, Sankappa, five lines. And of these, it should be noted, *only one reference* is to Buddhist books. The other references are to Taoist, Pahlavi, and Vedântist texts. The articles, I may add, on Desire and the peculiarly Buddhist word (I doubt if it came into early Sakyan teaching) *Taṇhā* (thirst, craving) are almost equally meagre. Again, other indexes to recent works on Indian philosophy, Indian religion, are even more meagre, or wholly silent. Deussen, historian, philosopher and translator, was in strong sympathy with Indian concepts. His works contain excellent indexes of, as he says, noteworthy ideas. In not one of these indexes is there a

single reference to the mention of will in any original. There is a little article on "freedom of the will" in one of the works (omitted from the index), but it might as fitly have been called "freedom without will". In the histories of Messrs. Das Gupta, O. Strauss, Radhakrishna we find the same silence, the same blank.

Now the Indian mind is very introspective, and very fond of definitions. The Indian, the Hindu liked from of old to ponder over and talk about the powers, the needs, the limitations of man. He began early to study man and his body, and then man as distinguishable from his mind. He believed in learning, in knowledge. He honoured the teacher, the man who talked about the man, exceedingly. He studied the way of impression and idea. He grew early to be deeply concerned with the taming and training of the "self", with right choice at the parting of the ways, with the innate upward trend of effort towards the better. The more curious then is his failure to develop his own strong Aryan root for "will", *var* (the bifurcate, it would seem, of the Western Aryan *val*), or to find an equally strong equivalent to express that in man which is so vital throughout all religion, all life. To discern that in man, by and in which man, having an inward monitor, turns to a Better, words it as such: I ought to walk in this way! and tries to walk in it, seem to call for more than "dharma", seem to call for both "will", and also for "willer".

Yet when we try to express the man so acting in Indian idiom, we have no words. *Vara* is there, but it is restricted to (*a*) the *result* of an act of will, (*b*) to the *negative aspect* of will, namely, to repression to what a man should not do, should will not to do. As (*a*), in "better", or excellent", it expresses the chosen, the selected. When, I repeat, in the *svayaṃ-varaṃ*, or personal choice of bridegroom by a maiden, she wills this man and not those, she says, not "I will", or "I choose", but "I take him". *Kāma* was there, and *kratu*: both strong, excellent words for will. But *kāma* was suffered to become depreciated currency, as sex-, or sensuous-desire only; and *kratu* was suffered to die out. *Vasi* was there, but used for the having willed, not for the putting forth will. *Saṃkalpa*, a compound at best, when a strong simple term was the only fit one, was used for aim or purpose. But never was it felt, never was it worded, that in it we have a radical factor in man's nature. Students are warned by a teacher, as I have said, that they should not, in the processes of *thinking* and the like, lose sight of the *thinker* and the like, but there is no inclusion of man as aimer, or purposer (*saṃkalpetar* is a no-word).

Then there is *cetanā*. Now it is overstressing the will-coefficient

to see in *cetanā*, as do Burmese Pali-ists, the equivalent of volition. It is called action in one Sutta, but then all mind-work was action (*mano-kamma*). *Cetanā* does literally mean thinking. It is the verbal noun of *cetas*. The word in the Vedic appears to have a volitional implication: thinking in relation to action, intention. And in the Nikāyas it occurs in contexts where it seems reasonable to translate it by will. Thus it occurs (1) as if in apposition to *patthana* (wishing) and *paṇidhi* (intent, aim)[1]; again (2) in a mid-position between these two and *vitakka, saññā, diṭṭhi*,[2] words of purely cognitive meaning; again (3) as *ceteti*, as if in apposition to *pakappeti*[3] (intends to do, plans); again (4) Gotama, in a Sutta describing his early austerities, is made to say: he bethought him of restraining *citta* by *cetas* (*cetasā cittaŋ abhiniggaṇheyyaŋ*).[4]

But when we look about us for passages to test the apparent will-force in the meaning, as actually explicit, in either *cetas* or *cetanā*, we find no support. On the last instance (4) the Commentary gives us none; it paraphrases with: "that I might make evil thought energy-crushed by good thought," thus curiously inverting matters, and placing the more volitional energy (*viriya*) in the *citta* rather than in the *cetas*. Again, when terms of energy are defined, *cetanā* is never brought in to help; nor is *cetanā* ever defined by any such. It is not used to define *chanda*, where in *later* books we do come across one really good equivalent of will, *kattu-kamyatā* desire to do.[5] And I am fain, after seven years, to record here my regret that I suffered Burmese Buddhist influence to cause the change in my revised translation of Dhammasangaṇi, from "thinking" to "volition".

It would indeed be truer to say that Sakyan, like other Indian teaching, in so far as it recognized what we call will in man at all, took it up into mind or cognition, than that it anywhere thought of mind as distinctly volitional. It must never be forgotten that it adopted the very significant view of mind as action, no less than deed and speech as action. But it limited this position to its teaching in what we may call world-worth, or rather inter-world-worth. Man's worth as a wayfarer through the worlds is determined by his actions, including therein his thoughts, his purposes. But when it is a question of his nature and his life on earth, and of the training and growth of him there, we hear very much less of mind-action. There and then it is only the *manas*, the *citta*, the *viññāṇa*, that is made to represent the inner self-expressing world of man, and when

[1] *Saṃyutta*, ii, 99. [2] *Ibid.*, 154. [3] *Ibid.*, 65.
[4] *Majjhima*, i, 242. [5] *Vibhanga*, 208.

these are defined they are invariably defined as the man contemplating, the man receiving impressions, never as the man radiating, the man efferent, the man reaching out after, the man becoming, willing. We are no better, after all, in our term "consciousness".

Is it not now seen to be a very possible thing that a man who had a mandate in the New, the unwonted, for the India of an early day, a mandate calling on man to arise and use by and for himself, not a new set of ideas about life, not a way in which to contemplate life, but a way in which he might will, might desire to walk in living, a way in which he had himself to decide as to the better, and not have it decided for him, a way which he had himself to "make become"—that such a man would have not a little difficulty in finding fit words?

Take such a man and place him in the time and world of Jesus. Jesus could stretch forth his hand and say "I WILL! be thou clean!" That other man's tongue would not suffer him to say this. He could only have said: "Be thou clean!" (*suddho*, or *arogī hohi*). The "I will" would have been left *implicit*, shown, not by word, but by the act of beneficent psychic power. He might, it is true, have put into words his "wish", his "desire", that the healing should come about. But the synergy in the "I will", the *savena*, the Aramaic equivalent of the late Greek *thelō*, would be lacking. We can see how the Jesus-word would be weakened by such a substitute. And the very message in the legend acclaiming his advent to earth is in terms which no Vedic or Prakrit message could have used: "and on earth peace among men of good will, or, in another version, good will towards men". Here the Greek equivalent of the original is weak, and Greek is almost in this matter as weak as Indian idiom; it is the Latin recensions which give the adequate word: *bonae voluntatis, benevolentis*. But neither here could Indian devas have sung a fit equivalent. When, as we shall see later, an Indian teacher taught a gospel of man willing good will to fellow-man, he had no fit word; he had to say (I quote the older wording) "make become a mind accompanied by amity".[1] Had Jesus so taught, he had the fit word. "The poor ye have with you always, and *when you will* (*ōtan thelete*[2]) you can do them good . . ." In the case of the Indian teacher, the will to be exerted by the benevolent willer had to be left as implicit. And no attempt is made to use any substitute of more dynamic, more kinetic force then "mind" (*citta*). There

[1] See below, Chapter XI. [2] Mark xiv, 7.

is no use even of a Prakrit equivalent for that *kinesis*,[1] which was all Plato had to work withal.

I hold that this was a real difficulty which that teacher and Gotama himself were up against. For that matter, for all that we have, in the word "will", a treasure, a vantage-point India had not, and for all the earthquake of Schopenhauer's hurling it into European philosophy, we do not yet appraise rightly what we have in it. Nor do we see in will but the way of *the man who wills*. It is almost forced to speak of the "willer" in English, as I have ventured to do, but when turning it into French there was literally nothing for it but *celui qui veut*. And is any European tongue as to this better off than the French? How do we not, as the French would say, *gaspiller*, trifle with, fritter away, our noble heritage, unworthy that we are! How will not the future wonder at us! India was not ready for such words. The world was not ready for such words. But we are scarcely yet ready for will and for willer. If we were, we should hold the one word in proper worth and "make-to-become" the other. But like the Indian, we merge will in the inevitably more static conception of mind. Unlike the Indian, and yet like the later Sakyan, like the Buddhist of South Asia, we merge also the willer in the mind. We aim at greater efficiency of body and mind, and we judge that therewith all has been said. At the most we profess, besides, an interest in what we are pleased to call "character", which is but the outcome to be looked for in our mental and bodily activity. We forget that character is but the "impress" that the willer will show in that activity. Him and that activity as fundamentally will: this we leave implicit. We do not see that the radical need, the test, the hall-mark and the end of growing efficiency is the willer growing in will.

Hence we have failed to see this feature of great moment in Buddhism: that whereas, in the teaching set on foot by Gotama and his men, we get a very gospel of will, and becoming in and through will—the evoking of will, the training and taming of will, self-salvation by will, good will—we get this without any explicit grasp of the fact, the nature, the importance of will, and without any distinctive word for it. Jesus, having the fit word, worked in a world which had come to feel and therefore to word itself in this. It was the easier for him to develop that awareness, and this he did, making his mandate appear as a very harmony between will in man and will of the Highest—that "kingdom of God" which is "within you". But for that older Indian world it was not so easy.

[1] I am much indebted to Miss M. H. Wood's fine study, *Plato's Psychology in its bearing on the development of Will* (1907).

I have often spoken of this curious and most interesting anomaly in Buddhism, in Sakya, early and late. It was the first vivid general impression I experienced from a study of psychological data in the Piṭakas,[1] a study suggested to me by Rhys Davids now nearly forty years ago. I found scriptures teaching religion very emphatically as a matter of training the will, when there was in them no word we could quite honestly translate as "will" (let alone willer). I referred, I remember, to Matthew Arnold's remark about the people of Soli uttering solecisms, and knowing no such term for them. There seemed to me a curious dumbness in wording the very key-note, around which those scriptures played so closely. There were terms in which will was implicit, but when these were defined, one of two things was evident. Either (*a*) the thing defined was to be stopped, put away, got rid of; or (*b*) it was the mode of it, not will itself, which was made explicit.

(*a*) Thus man's will to become was, in the four truths, given the bad name of *taṇhā*, and called, not the very basis and spring of man's advance—as it surely is—but the cause of ill and of that alone. Desire, too, *chanda*, was treated very stepmotherly, the getting rid of it was called the aim of the holy life, and only here and there was it admitted as possibly of an ideal kind (*dhamma-chanda*). *Kāma*, too, the very nature of man according to one Upanishad,[2] was utterly deprecated; *āsā*, longing, no less so; and the fine *kratu* was never used. *Sankappa* was only tolerated in an occasional half-hearted way, felt perhaps to be a weak word.

On the other hand, when (*b*) the mode and intensity of what *we* are able to call "man exerting will" was to be defined, the definition is generously carried out as to mode, as to intensity; but that the man exerting will in such ways is the one main point to keep in view is left out. Thus: "What is then the faculty of effort or energy or endeavour (*viriya, vāyāma*)? The inception (*ārambho*) of *viriya* (or *vāyāma*) which there then is, the striving and the onward effort, the exertion and endeavour, the zeal and ardour, the vigour and fortitude, the state of unfaltering effort, the state of sustained desire, the state of unflinching endurance and solid grip of the burden . . . this is the *viriya* that there then is."[3] This is quite a notable collection of terms to describe the ways in which the man puts forth will,

[1] *Bud. Psychology*, 1923; "Will in Early Buddhism," *JRAS*, Jan. 1898; "Will in Early Buddhist Scriptures, *I.H.R.*; "Man as Willer," *Bulletin, Sch. of Oriental Studies*, 1926; "Kindred Sayings on Buddhism," *Calcutta Review*, 1927–8, re-issued by the Calcutta University Press, 1930; *Gotama the Man*, 1928, etc.

[2] *Bṛhad. Up.*, iv, 4, 5.

[3] *Dhammasangaṇi*, §§ 13, 22, 26.

but the willer and will are out of the picture *save as implicit.* And what man values, what he comtemplates as object, he does not as a rule leave implicit. In conversation maybe he does, but not when he is teaching what he holds most worth while, in the way he holds most worth while. Now in the First Utterance the thing held most worth while has come down to us as implicit. And one of the reasons I am suggesting is that a gospel in the New, meaning what is there implied, had then and there no fit words.

Let me once more note other (implicit) will-points in the teaching. With the one exception of the perfected man, the arahan, it conceives the "man" in nature, in life, as no finished being, good or bad, but as capable of changing, nay, as inevitably in a process of changing. In ways of mind especially, the man is infinitely capable of being worked, of being made to become better or worse.[1] Man may ripen from life to life, or worsen; it is in his power (will) to do, to become either. Mind is conceived as action (the carrying out of will, *manokammaṃ*), no less than are speech and deeds action (*vacī, kāya*).[2] In moral weight, nay, in power over matter, his mind-action takes precedence over the deed that follows the mind's activity.[3] Desire[4] may dominate him for good or ill. The willed entry on the Way is a process of "desire, zeal, weighing, earnestness"[5]—all dynamic concepts. When in the Way he is fighting evil thoughts, he is putting forth "desire, effort, endeavour".[6] There is "nothing like stirred up energy for making good to become, and for the waning of evil".[7] Any psychic power he may develop is work of will, lit. effort (*padhāna*) with effecting (*iddhi*).[8] The training in will under the four heads called the Four Great Struggles or Assays (*samma-ppadhānāni*), namely, for the not arising of any bad states (*dhammā*), for the getting rid of risen bad states, for the arising of good states, and for their persistence, growth, further becoming—is reckoned-in among the last injunctions of the Founder.[9] To a young noble asking how long it would take to graduate in his teaching, Gotama is made to say that, as with the art of riding, it depended on five conditions, which are worded as so many factors in endeavour.[10] The 19th and 20th Suttas of the *Majjhima* are interesting discourses on thinking as "willing", the former of the two being of great interest as depicting the maturing of the Way-gospel in the preceding meditations of Gotama—a Sutta which, unless it be pure invention, must be based on memories of

[1] *Anguttara*, i, 5. [2] *Ibid.*, iii, 4, 15, etc. [3] *Majjhima*, , 373 f.
[4] *Chanda.* [5] *Majjhima*, i, 480. [6] *Ibid.*, i, 119; ii, 11.
[7] *Ibid.*, i, 480. [8] See below, Ch. XII. [9] *Dīgha*, ii, 120.
[10] *Majjhima*, No. 65.

what he will himself have told. And there is a graphic formula, occurring more than once and specially associated with him, which runs: "Verily may skin, nerves, bones, flesh and blood dry up and wither, or ever I stay my energy (*viriya*), so long as I have not attained whatsoever by human endurance, energy and effort (*thāma, viriya, parakkama*) is attainable."[1] Lastly a word, attributed to Sāriputta, shows us yet another aspect of will worded in a way which conceivably might have served for "will": the word *vasī*. The man is commended whose mind is under his own will (*vasippatta*).[2]

Finally, three chief points in the teaching can only be understood of will and a willer: (1) man is the heir of deeds he has done and willed to do; (2) man as wayfarer of the worlds goes as he wishes, according to those deeds; (3) man is in a becoming (*bhava*), and "makes to become" what he was not before: a process of will.

It is conceivable that, with such a teaching reverberating through the scriptures as it does, the Sakyans, in spite of the monastic damning of the very spring in man's nature whence his "effort" came, might have grasped the fact of that spring, and found a name for it—as we do when we grasp facts in which we are really interested—had they not, in theory—they did not do so in practice—eliminated the willer in eliminating the very man. They anticipated our own psychological limitations in this, without, however, for all that, getting beyond the first steps in psychological analysis. The call upon man's will to save himself, coupled with the faith in the capacity of that self to be trained, might, with a sound conviction as to the self, have taken them far.

And yet perhaps hardly so. There was always dominating Indian thought (and Greek thought too) the old-world conception of man the spectator, man the recipient. For this conception of himself those lands had found names in plenty. Man was the beholder, the appraiser, the contemplator. He was "speaker, seer, hearer, smeller, taster, feeler", and he touched. In all of these phases forthputting of will was essential, but in the messages received in them he overlooked what he gave out to get them. He also did, acted, worked (using one word where we have three). But he could do so little to make or mar his world, that he found that little not so much worth wording as what he took in as spectator. Mainly he let, or had to let his world come to him, and like Adam he named what he saw so come. He did now and then go to find his new world, when perhaps hunger drave. That, by sea or by land, was a tremendous business; all his world had to come along. And

[1] *Ibid.*, i, 480 (cf. *Jātaka*, i, 71). [2] *Ibid.*, No. 32; cf. *Saṃyutta*, v. 71.

it may be that for some sections of him thus wandering, overcoming many and great difficulties, he found, in the adventure for the "making-to-become" a new world, the pregnant word "will", *uelle*, *uolo*, *wollen*, *well*, *weal*, *wealth*. For other sections this result did not follow. Little could man do, as worker, as willer, in proportion to the wealth of the messages that sense, especially sight, brought to him as recipient, as beholder. Hence he went on speaking of himself in names of receiving and beholding. He *stood amongst* things: "understanding," "intelligent." He *accepted*: perceiving, conceiving, apprehending. He *watched*: contemplating, meditating. *He measured*: minding, weighing, comparing, reasoning. He *moved*, but not much. He *chose*, but the world of things choosable was very little.

The Greek set out betimes to learn more of this world and life that were so interesting. Death was to him not interesting; it was as the blind spot in his vision. The seen man, the seen world, the nature of these was his study, the form of man his will's delight. His self-expression was individualistic. He founded modern science; he opened the way to our realizing to-day, through science, that in us which is the spiritual analogue of world-movement: radiant will. But he saw man as intelligent rather than as willing. He did not, in his very little world, *will together*. There was a noble exception to this, one brief day, when Persian conquest threatened, but it passed unrepeated, not followed up.

The Sakya started with a far wider, far longer conception of life than the narrower vision of the Greek. Death was no blind spot for him. The noble figure of the Way was a way of all the worlds: the Pārāyana, the Going-beyond, with his fellowmen dwelling in and awaiting him in each and any of them. But there was rising about him a vogue, on the one hand, of a way of life, on the other hand, of a mode of analytic thought, which half paralyzed before long the means of developing the pregnant strength of the fine will-data in his gospel. The latter influence paralyzed the grasp of the Way as will, by banishing the reality of the Wayfarer. The former influence paralyzed man's concerted efforts to will his welfare, by removing him from the world, that great laboratory of experiment in goodwill to men.

And so, for all its earnest teaching on Way and Act, on energy and becoming, Buddhism found no words worthy to name that which is the very spring and fount to make that teaching fruitful: the will of the willer seeking welfare, seeking the goal of the supremely well. Isolated from exercising that will among his fellows in all

human relations, the Buddhist scripture-compiler fell back again and again on negative words—on *nibbāna*, *nirodha*, *virāga*, *nibbidā*, *alobha*, and the like—and on ambiguous words and worsened words.

Whereas in Sakya we find a movement bringing to man's use a new attitude on life *as itself a religion*, a new earnestness as to conduct and the future as involved in conduct, on the possible potency in what we now call, or should call, will, we find that this teaching, when formulated, could not see just so much ahead of the old world as either to grasp a unifying principle of will, or of man as willer, and therein find a word for the same.

I may be reminded by readers without first-hand knowledge of the Pali records that they not infrequently meet in translations with the word will, with volition, with will-power and the like. I may again be rallied by translators themselves, that I am captious merely, and that there are here and there passages where the use of will is fully justified.

To both readers and translators I would say: then has once more the *tradduttore* proved himself or herself *traditore*. In will, they have used a word transcending in force and depth anything in the Vedic or Pali original. But it was convenient to do so, and so they (I too once) have read the West into the East, the newer into the older. Nor is there agreement among translators of the same material, when some see fit to use "will", neither with each other, nor always each with himself. Thus Deussen, when in one passage he translates *manas*, suggests *Wille* as an alternative to *Verstand*! And I borrow the following table from my article "Man as Willer",[1] which shows anything but agreement in the rendering of the word *samkalpa* (purpose, intent):—

	Samkalpa	Max Müller	Deussen	Tatya, Cowell, & Röer	Hume
1.	Ait. Up. 5, 2	conceiving	Vorstellung	determination	conception
2.	Kau. Up. 3, 2	conception	Erkenntniss	resolve	„
3.	Kena Up. 30	imagination	vorstellen	ascertained	„
4.	Chhā Up. vii, 4, 1	will	Entschluss	will	„
5.	„ viii, 2, 1	will	Wunsch	wishes	„
6.	Brh. Up. i, 5, 3	representation	Entscheidung	determination	imagination
7.	„ ii, 4, 11	percepts	Strebungen	„	intentions
8.	Śvet. Up. 5, 8	thoughts	Vorstellung	„	conception
9.	Katha Up. i, 10 (*śantaś-*)	pacified	beruhigten Gemüths	appeased in thought	intent appeased

[1] *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London, 1926.

Clearly here the word *samkalpa* gives out no definite unambiguous meaning. It is a weak makeshift of a culture which, in respect of something in man's inner world, had not grasped the work of values with true insight, had not lit upon the fit word for that something. We are in no better plight ourselves in other values. We have only to look at our makeshift terms in a matter which the relatively new interest in history evidentially considered has brought into our foremost values—the terms for the happening of something which shows a convergence-point in causes; such terms as the borrowed "conjuncture",[1] the borrowed and distorted "psychological moment", i.e. factor, or momentum; resultant. We have not yet here the right, the fit word.

Yet *sankappa* was the best word which Sakya found to hand, with which to treat of will much as now we treat of it in our manuals. These, when dealing with the radical factor in man of "reaching out after", do not (since Alexander Bain wrote) use will. They speak of conation, of other newer alien terms, *horme* and the like. In such contexts the Sakyan term is effort—"*viriya*," "*vāyāma*," usually. But when the context requires a term for what my teacher would have called "intellection with a co-efficient of conation and feeling", for what another teacher called "synergy", a term for the thoughtful man facing the need of action, then there is a use of *sankappa*. At least so it would seem to have been in the Upanishads, all old ones, quoted. But as a fact very little use, very little distinctive use of *sankappa* is made in the Pali records. The word is nearly always used as a variant of other general terms for "thought"—*vitakka*, *saññā*.[2] The only distinctive use I find is of volitional import: "his *sankappa's*"[3] are fulfilled; something he has wanted is satisfied. And the devoted aged disciple Pingiya is in the Pārāyana made to say: "Ever I follow him with a going by *sankappa*. So is my mind bound up with him."[4]

It is not till the day of "abhidhamma" development that *sankappa* acquires a distinctive definition as fixing, or (*we* might say) focussing of the mind, lifting it on to"; and even here it is given first the emphatically cognitive equivalents of *takka*, *vitakka*. We know too that "right *sankappa*" is the second *anga* or factor in the scholastic division of the Way (of the good mind, word and deed) into eight such. Also that there it precedes the factor of "effort", in which the attempt to give the more fundamental aspect

[1] German (also borrowed) *Konjunktur*.
[2] E.g. *Digha*, iii; *Saṃyutta*, ii, etc.
[3] *Majjhima*, i, 192, 200; iii, 276 f.
[4] Sutta-Nipāta, ver. 1144.

of will had to be expressed. We know finally that, stripped of that effort at cataloguing, the Way, as set forth in the surviving fraction of the ancient schema, as a new aspect of life, makes no reference either to *sankappa*, or to *viriya* (or *vāyāma*).

But then there was only one will-term which was actually needed in the schema. This was "choosing". The only word recorded is "not to be followed (*a-sevitabba*)". For the "will", the "choice", which resulted in a man following this or that turn in the way of life, I feel little doubt but that the fit word was not there. "Effort" was not adequate, for choosing is not distinctively effort as such. *Sankappa* was inadequate; perhaps it was no "mantra"-word, but a little too "learned". Will, choosing were left implicit.

That both the makeshift terms found much later very honourable inclusion in the Way made "eightfold" shows the tradition surviving of just that call on the individual will, as at once effort and purposive thinking, which was really implicit in the Sakyan mandate, and which was for the first teachers the point to make very explicit in Way-mission-work, so far as the words at their command suffered them to do so.

One of our eminent psychologists wrote, that in psychology words are things.[1] In a way this is true; in a way it is not true. They are the only visible results of our observation of man's inner immaterial world, and a jealous care in the seen use or misuse of them may seem mere captiousness to those who may not have undergone training in the ways of that world. On the other hand, so far are even psychological terms, for me, "things", as we usually reckon things, that I should gladly have hailed the *thing* I call "will" in any Pali *word*, could it have been shown as meaning what I hold is in man so vitally important. For me will is man's reaching out after, with or without awareness of, a better than he is or has. The learned have called it "conation", a worthy but weak Latin alien, without a verb to it—it of all things to have no verb! We need to make will our fundamental, as it is our crowning term for inner immaterial things. In religion it is the base; of salvation it is the supreme guarantee, and heaven is will made perfect.

Now in one Saying imputed to the aged veteran Ānanda, there is a notable approach to *chanda* as equating will. And yet it is exactly wherein *chanda* falls short of will thus adequately conceived, that we see how it actually amounts to no more than our "wish".

A Brahman[2] asks Ānanda what is the object of the God-life lived in his Gotama-Order? "It is for the getting rid of *chanda*."

[1] James Ward, *Principles of Psychology*.
[2] *Saṃyutta*, v. 272.

"That would surely be an unendingly impossible." "Well, had you not *chanda* when you sought me to-day and when you found me was not that (specific) *chanda* (wish) abated?" "It was." "Even so, in the monk who, as become arahan, has lived the life, done what was to do, laid down the burden, outworn the fetters of rebirth, is released by perfect insight, that *chanda* which he had, to win where he has won, is it not abated? If so, then is there possibility, then is there an end."

Here we have *chanda* meaning in the Brahman just a wish, a want, a desire of a worthy kind, terminable when satisfied. But in the man aiming at the Best as the Sakyan *had come* to conceive it—too limited a best for any world-religion—it meant the persistent will-to-the-Better, not satisfied till the man consummate was achieved. Nor, as will, ending then! And had it been consistently so used in the Piṭakas, I should have ranked *chanda* as, for the Buddhist at least, a worthy word for will.

This episode shows, in a very crucial way, the utterly unworthy conception of will which passed for such in the Sangha, when this possibly very posthumous Sutta was compiled as it stands. For look! will is only used to name something which it is the object of the God-life to get rid of! And this miserable negative aspiration is put into the mouth of the companion of the world-helper, who came to reveal a More in the life and power of the man to bring about: even the choosing by the man himself of the way, wherein wayfaring he would become the Most. But *could* the Most be That, the achieving of which involved the getting rid of that *whereby he had attained* to the More, to the yet More? Would not the Most prove to be a very perfecting of the will which had been the willer's *way of becoming fully That*? Could it be rightly conceived as the Ending of that will?

Verily is the Sakyan world shown herein to have been not ready to word will and willer! Nor, in spite of the way in which Jesus opened up these words, shall *we* be shown ready, unless and until we see the man as the willer who, in willing, is becoming, is coming to be.

VI

THE WAY AND BECOMING

I have now tried to show in some detail that which appears to me as two main implications, implicit, unworded in the First Utterance; two meanings which are necessary if we are to see in it the genuine worthy "message" of a world-religion. The one is, that it is through his will, to which the call makes appeal, that the man must choose the way for himself, of himself. The other is, that the man, the self, who wills, who chooses is not just the man as here and now understood, or as he came to be understood in "Buddhism", but the man as understood in that day, in that land: the man as at once human and divine; the man as human self and as immanently God-self; the man as Dhamma-bidden. I now wish to develop further all that I see implied in this figure of the Way. It is a figure not peculiar to Sakya alone. Its prominence in Taoism—"the Way of heaven"—may possibly have opened a "way" of least resistance for the propagation of Sakya among Chinese hearers. We are familiar with the "Way" in teachings ascribed to Jesus. And I have shown that, in the day of Sakyan origins, it had found or was finding place in newer Brahman teaching. But in no religion does it occupy the centre, as a figure for the centre, as it did in what I hold was the original Sakya.

What was that centre of which the Way was to serve as figure?

I believe it was a deeper meaning which was revealed to the Teacher and his men as they taught. At first we have the Way symbolizing man's life in the worlds towards the uttermost goal as a becoming better, more, further, as he willed, as he heeded the inner bidding. But there was more in it than this. It was, that *the man*, the very man, not body and mind only, the man-in-man, as wayfarer in the Way of the More, is by his very nature *becoming more*. He was not static "being" only; he was "becoming", evolving into That who in germ he as man ever was.

I do not for a moment anticipate that to make readers here see eye to eye with me is an easy task. With most I may fail. But that does not make it less worth while to try. No writer on Buddhism known to me puts becoming, *werden*, *devenir*, to the front, either in treatment, or in allusion, save now and then to "growth" in a

general way. And if I suggest, that the Sakya-muni himself came to realize, as he taught, meeting all sorts of inquiries, how great, how pregnant a figure there had come to him, before he began, in that symbol of travel-adventure, I shall be met by the Buddhist with the bar of orthodox creed: "He became first supremely enlightened; he knew everything; for him there was no more 'becoming'." But this does not bar me. If he could see with me in becoming, a fitter attribute of Deity than in being, he might transcend the heavy mortmain of both Buddhism and of Indian thought.

I would say this, before trying to see this expanding significance in the Way of Gotama. Sakya, in its later Pali dress and its Ceylon change of sky, underwent loss of features which in India lingered on. In the Milinda Questions, for example, we find the question of man's past and present activities treated in connection with both duration and becoming, as we nowhere find is the case in the Piṭakas.[1] That is, we have conversations taking place in the Panjab in Prakrit, in which the factor of "becoming" is dealt with as it is not in similar contexts in the Ceylonized Piṭakas in Pali. Again, we find Indian philosophy referring to the Saugatas (followers of the "Well-farer") and Bauddhas, as insisting on the reality of becoming (as virtually against the fact of previous "being").[2] This probably indicated a surviving emphasis, which in Ceylon has been lost to view.

This, then, I would say at the outset: We must not lose sight of the necessity, in our research, of holding before us (*a*) a vanishing Sakya in India, and (*b*) a growing, much modified, very monastic "Buddhism" in Ceylon (both of these during the same period). There is thus the likelihood that in (*a*) we may have the main theme of the original Sakya yet visible, and more so than in (*b*).

This one thing more I would also say, harping on it, it may be, for there can be no understanding of Sakya if it be lost to view: Let the Western reader shed his traditional view of the very man, soul, spirit, self, and don that of India. In that, the man is never the "mere" man, adopted in redemption, in mercy, in grace by Deity Who he himself is not. In that the man is "He", in his very nature; he has but to will to make It become within him. As he becomes "more", there is waking in him the Highest, who he is in germ.

But for India of Sakya's day, this awakening was a coming to

[1] Cf. my *Milinda Questions*, 1930, p. 80 f.

[2] *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, ed. Cowell and Gough, p. 224; *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, Commentary on Sūtra, ix.

know, a realizing *in idea*. And hence for the Many it had no grip on the life. For the Sakyámuni it was no mental concept of being such and such; it was an unfolding of the very man, a coming to be. But for the Indian, becoming was of the perishable; only Being was divine. And so over this point, Sakya which sought to fulfil, was thwarted, and eventually declined on a lesser ideal. Now "becoming" (*bhava, bhavya*), as noun or as verb, is not in the First Utterance, the Way-mantra. Does this rule out that for which I am here contending? I think not; but the reader must dig with me.

He will, if he do so, notice that in a group of Suttas, to wit Section 5 of the Collection on Origin (Nidāna) of the Saṃyutta-Nikāya, the identical words are used in which the Way, in the First Utterance, is led up to: "The man-so-gone, not having gone after either of these extremes, has understood"—here the verb is "teaches you *dhamma* (thus). . . ."

There then follows a formula which, on the face of it, gives no rational solution. Had the solution been stated as "The man-so-gone is becoming", or as we should now say, is in process of becoming, the reply would be rational. I give here the least unknown of these Suttas (No. 48): that called Lokâyatika, the Natural Philosopher, for the ancient world-lore of the day, existing doubtless from pre-historic time, and "becoming" doubtless in its own way, was termed Lokâyata.

A Brahman lokâyatika puts to Gotama the queries, whether he thinks that (*a*) everything is, (*b*) that nothing is, (*c*) that everything is a unity, (*d*) that everything is a plurality. The reply is so far significant, that it advocates a "middle (way)". It then breaks down into mere formula. The formula is the conditioned arising of "ill" (*dukkha*).[1]

The fairly clear inference is, that the man neither is (*sat*), nor is not, but is becoming (*bhava, bhavya*). But since this word stood also for rebirth, which the monk had vetoed, the formula of applied causation is substituted, showing *bhava* as a mere factor in ill. The man, *Gotama* will have answered, is "he who becomes".

In the other Suttas of the bunch, the "two extremes" propounded by inquirers are, "Is the doer and the experiencer of the deed's results the same, or different?" Again, in Section 1 are similar Suttas, with the problems of the section cited first, somewhat differently worded, but of identical import. Always, *yet only here*, we have the words of the First Utterance introducing the solution,

[1] Known as Paṭicca-samuppāda, or causal genesis.

with the exception I have given, and further, the term Middle does service for Mid-Way, or Course. And here again we have the one rational reply absent: Man is not being, nor not being; he is becoming. Man, the doer, in becoming, becomes the experiencer. And everywhere the formula describing the serial causes of Ill is the reply.

Eight years ago I suggested, in this connection, that the live word of the Sakya-muni had here fallen out.[1] I went no further than to suggest: the reply might have been in terms of his general statement of causation: Given this, that comes to be, etc. I knew then as much and as little of Hegel as I do now. I knew that for him "the new and higher concept of Werden (devenir, becoming) reconciled the opposites of being and not-being". And had Hegel been more human with his pen, had he not been submerged in the stupid flood of "words, words, words" imposed by his time and country on a thinker's expression, he might have made the world of plain men wiser, and I might have been met here by helpful suggestions. However that be, since the translation I cite from appeared, no word of comment from Buddhist or non-Buddhist has reached me, and I must here and now be my own commentator.

Thus: It seems to me of the very highest significance that we have here (1) a hiatus (misfilled by a formula of later origin; monastic; not fit for a world religion), where the rational reply would be: Man neither is, nor is not; he is becoming. Again, the man who did and the man who experiences the consequences is not an unchangingly identical person, but is the doer who has become and is becoming when experiencing the consequences. And (2) that this hiatus has been led up to by the wording which is only to be found, elsewhere, in the first Mantra of holy repute: the Mantra of the Way. The man to whom such a conjuncture tells nothing must be somewhat deaf. I was deaf, but now I hear.

As to the alleged reply, apparently so formal and here so unintelligent, it will seem to the reader, who has not gone carefully into the whole problem of editing in the Piṭakas (editing both oral and then written), an arbitrary thing to see here a deliberate insertion of a formula, even if it gives no solution to the nature either of man, or of things in general, but only states a process in the happening of Ill. If he will read this book to the end, he may in part at least absolve me. Let him here consider, *why that formula* was inserted. Inserted, I add, very possibly not at some important revision, but previously here and there by teachers, and only selected and

[1] *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, 1922, Introduction, p. viii.

confirmed by revisers in council, from possibly various repeated versions.

That formula, called the Paṭicca-samuppāda, and beginning "Conditioned by ignorance (arise) activities", or sometimes "Conditioned by name-and-form (arises) mind" . . . is (*a*) concerned with a certain coming-to-be), (*b*) contains the word "becoming" (*bhava*). This is redundant, coming between the "substrate of birth" or "grasping, attachment (*upādāna*)" and birth; and has puzzled writers. Now *bhava*, by itself, meant for the monk rebirth; not an opportunity for becoming better, but rather an occasion for further ill. But as used in a sanctioned formula, *bhava* was correct and in place.

Before the critic puts this judgment aside, let him dispassionately consider the Suttas I have quoted, and ask himself if a wise and enlightened man of old India, or of anywhere would conceivably have replied to such deep-going questions in terms of a set wording, in which the queries were not candidly and directly met, and yet where the reaction on the inquirer would be of the enthusiastic nature recorded (though even this is in terms of formula). Let him imagine the very-live man Gotama answering in live terms: that the Way he taught was that of Everyman, not body, not mind—the very man-in-man—being he who, as having in him the germ of the Highest, Best, Most, was no mere "being" eternally the same, yet, as real, was in no way a not-being, but was a Becoming more, and yet more, as he wayfared toward perfecting, in himself, the Self, the very Most. Then verily, especially in India of that day, yea, everywhere it becomes conceivable, that the live Message would evoke the live, the grateful response.

More hereon when we deal with the subject of Cause. But this negative evidence is not all our digging brings up. There emerges the development of the discredited *bhava* into its causative form: *bhāva-*. *Bhava*, becoming, is as strong, as important a word in Indian word-treasure as it is in that of the Teuton: *Werden*. Its English weakening, in the ambiguous "becoming", hampers the translator at every turn. Unworthy we to have dropped our own strong *weorthan*, *wairthan*! *Bhava* is of the ancient Aryan tongue. *Bhāvanā*, the causative "making to become", is of a much later growth. No Vedic book appears to use it; the epic Mahābhārata (a work of many dates) appears to use it but once. If we accept the Piṭakas as evidence of any worth whatever for words of Gotama's date, the word was there for the using, and that in such venerable poems as the Sutta Nipāta. We find it in the Four Nikāyas, or

books of Sayings, doing service for meanings where the word "will" is wanted. It is for instance contrasted with phrases for purely thought-procedure: "What is to be put away by vision" with "what is to be put away by *making-to-become*"[1]; "what is to be *made to become*"[2] with "what is to be well known"; "what is to be *brought to pass*"[3] with computation;" the Way as "made to become",[4] as other than "understanding, realizing, etc." In each case *bhāvanā* is the contrasting "dynamic" complement. It is not an unwarranted step to suggest that the early influence of Sakya, and of Jain too—the Jain books have *bhāvanā*—promoted the use of this word in Indian culture, a use in which it is just possible —I go no further—that early Yoga teaching pioneered. For Yoga needed the word for its characteristic rite or attitude, just as Sakya needed it for Jhāna—and used it.[5]

But the strong distinctive meaning of the word *bhāvanā*, albeit worthily treated in the classic Sanskrit Dictionary, and clearly defined in the newer Pali Dictionary, is *not as a rule rightly rendered* by Sanskrit or Pali translators. Their favourite renderings are "meditation", "reflection", "pondering"; for these the texts have plenty of fit terms in the proper place. "Cultivation" is sometimes given a turn, and this is much better, for cultivation without an implicit resultant "coming to be" is as nought. Now in the Buddhist Commentarial tradition there was no question that *bhāvanā* meant this, rather than meditation. Buddhaghosa thus defines it: "*Bhāveti* means beget, causes to arise, causes to grow; that is what it means here (in Jhāna). Elsewhere the meaning is modified by prefixes."[6] Yet so little, for all this clear description, do the scriptures themselves bring to the front the vital connection between *magga*: the figure of man the wayfarer—and *bhava*, *bhavanīya*:—the man as growing, as becoming, as bound to become —that it was no more evident to me, or even suspected by me than it is yet for either Buddhist, or writer on Buddhism.

Then, nearly a generation ago, I had to find a good translation for the phrase: *Yasmiŋ samaye rūpūpapattiyā maggaŋ bhāveti*: "at the time when he makes to become a way of access to (the world of) the Seen"[7] . . . and it was then that the seed—not more—of the term's full significance was sown. A decade perhaps passed— and then Sāriputta came to help foster the seedling. He is called

1 *Bhāvanāya.* 2 *Bhāvitabba.* 3 *Bhāvanā.*
4 *Bhāvito.* 5 See below, Chap. IX on "Musing."
6 *Expositor* (on *Dhammasangaṇi*, p. 217, on § 160.
7 I.e. Brahmaworld, *Dhammasangaṇi, ib.*

in one Sutta the parent, the mother (*janetti*); for me he took over the office there assigned to Moggallāna: he was the *jātassa uppādetar*: rearer of what is born.[1] It was in a possibly very old Sutta: the Greater Miscellany, where two leading disciples are (according to the Commentary) coaching each other in playing the pupil and teacher. "Is there any difference between *viññāṇa* (mind, or cognizing) and *paññā* (the divine mind in the 'man')?" "Yes, this:" is Sāriputta's reply, "*paññā* is to be made to become; *viññāṇa* is to be thoroughly known: that is all the difference." And I saw another saying of Buddhaghosa's on *paññā*: *paññā* having striven wins manifestation of the Way."[2] I was then compiling a Buddhist psychology, and the placing of *paññā* in the ragged garden of the four *skandhas* (i.e. mind) was an old difficulty. That *paññā* stood in the old Upanishads for immanent Deity: that I knew and I said so.[3] That *paññā* had this force also for Sāriputta's world (though no longer for that of Buddhaghosa) I did not then allow for. That *paññā* was the "man", willing the new, the not yet become, the good, the better, the Best, the man making himself come to be what he was not before; well, I was not so grown up as to see that. None the less those two notable personages had shown me a truer thing than our own psychology books do: that to come to know is an active process of making to become. There can be no true study in the way of the spirit where this is not kept well in front.

For want possibly of a better opportunity I halt yet a moment longer over the word *paññā*, taken in a context of solemn emphasis in which it very often occurs. The context is "known, or considered, or seen) as it really has come to be, by right *paññā*—*yathābhūtaŋ sammappaññāya*, with now this or that verb of the meaning given above. I have traced this phrase in upwards of 224 contexts in the Four Nikāyas, in ascending frequency from the First to the Fourth. It is not a phrase easily to be rendered in such few Western tongues as I know. The German *der Wahrheit gemäss* of Neumann is tidier than my rendering, and for *yathābhūtaŋ* it is to be conceded that possibly *bhūtaŋ*: "become" had come to mean just "fact". On the other hand, we have to note this: there were other words to hand: *saccato, ṭhetato*, etc., which might have served the speaker's purpose, but in these there was not, nor is in the German idiom, any hint of "becoming". Next, the word *yathābhūtaŋ* never

1 *Majjhima-Nikāya*, iii, 248.
2 *Visuddhi-Magga*, chap. xiv, p. 437 (or, risen up: *ussuk-* or *ussak-*).
3 "Paññā and the Khandha Doctrine," Congress of History of Religion, Oxford, 1910.

appears to occur in early Vedic literature. I have seen one reference only to a line in the Mahābhārata,[1] a work of various dates. And the Vedic Concordance gives me one reference only, to the Atharva-Veda, a work long posterior to both early Sakya and also to the Nikāyas, where never more than Three Vedas are mentioned. But the passage in the Atharva-Veda shows the word as meaning not "really", or "truly", but "as become": "As that which is become and as that which is to become, do thou fear not." (*yathā-bhūtam ca yathā-bhavyam ca.*) Lastly, whereas the Jains may also have developed the use of the word in asseverating, as the Sakyans certainly did, I have not found them using it in contexts where the Sakyan usage leads us to expect it, e.g. . . . he knows! he sees! But here I speak with reserve, having access to but very few of the Jain Angas.

As to Pali contexts I speak naturally with a little more confidence, and although the views, put forward some eighteen years ago in my little *Buddhism*, I have in many respects outgrown and put aside, I would still endorse what I there wrote on this term *yathābhūtaŋ*. Utterly rejecting the virtual support there given to the scholastic denial of the self as fundamental in Sakya, I would repeat with more confidence what I there put forward tentatively[2]: that *yatha-bhūtaŋ*, for early Sakya, did not mean in a merely idiomatic way "according to truth" or "to fact", but that it was closely bound up with the teaching of becoming as more true than being. Listen!

"See you, Sāriputta, that this has become (*bhūtam-idan-ti passasi*)? See you, Sāriputta, that this has become? Yes, sir, one sees it by right *prajña* as become (*yathā bhūtaŋ*)."

The association is repeated in another context.[3]

Here we have something tangible to rest upon. This is, that in *yathābhūtaŋ* we have a word laid hold of and developed by Sakya, at some not very late period, as expressing something they were out to stress very strongly, in a way which had not been done before. And further, that the *bhūta* in this word had probably not become as meaningless to them as is, say, the "doing" in the word "fact" to us. So far may the word have been from a mere expletive of "truly", that as late as the Atharva-Veda we see the force in the "*bhūta* . . . *-bhavya*" as very significant.

Now let us apply this significance to the word *paññā*. As to

[1] See Böhtl. and Roth, *s.v.* (?).

[2] P. 224 ff. Cf. above with Katha Up. 2. 14.

[3] *Saṃyutta*, ii, 48, and *Majjhima*, i, 260 The contexts are too much worsened by monastic editing to be worth quoting at greater length.

paññā, I am not saying that even in Sakya's earliest days, it may not have had a varying meaning, much as has for instance the French *esprit*. And I certainly think that the word underwent a worsening down the centuries, and was, long after Buddhaghosa's time, practically ejected from religious manuals, like the standard Abhidhammattha-sangaha, *vipassanā*, i.e. insight, having replaced it. But when Sakya began, *paññā* was capable of bearing the high import to which I have tried to do justice.

We cannot equate it by our own psychical terms, because we have never frankly recognized, in our man-nature, that fundamental divinity which the Indian did recognize. Thus it is wide of the mark to render *paññā* by intellectual terms when we are on religious ground. We can do that when we are on secular, or worldly ground. We can then see in our mind, that is, in our "mindings", our ways of meeting outward circumstances, foreseeing, handling, reflecting upon them. And we know very well, that like the body, the mind is a very limited instrument, train we it never so well, and that we are limited by it from effecting all that we would, even while by it we effect what we can.

Now as the mind (that is *citta-mano-viññāṇa*) is to the man when he confronts his worldly business, so was *paññā* to the man when viewed as being one with the Highest. It was the Divine Way of him at work. And the early Sakyan—so far as we can trust the many repetitions to be giving us a true record—called this the *paññā* of his highest values: the "right wisdom", *sammā paññā*. It was the working of the Very Self in man. But he was persuading men to listen to a new conception of that Self, namely, that It was not being so much as becoming. In proportion as a man realized the need of "making-to-become" in him this holiest manhood, "so far was become" (*yathā-bhūtam*) in him by divine growth a More, ultimately to become Most, Perfect, Highest.

There need be no implication here that to have become That, was to revert to a Being, a ceasing from Becoming. Rather should That be conceived as perfection attained as and in becoming.

India, neither then nor since, has been able to grasp this. Still is Deity, for her, *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*: being, thought, bliss. And the high value of becoming, in Sakya, sank away. We have indeed nothing beyond a few remains in word and phrase, and in the jibe of later Indian writers, to betray her early effort to transform that barrier to Becoming which was Being. India, between philosopher and monk, threw away the given opportunity, which I hold that

Gotama tried to expand. And the Sakyan monks transferred the "making-to-become", the while it banished the becoming (*bhava*) as evil, to the mind, instead of the self.

We are to-day getting ready to see, indeed we are backward if we do not see, more in the meaning of *bhāvanā* than did any Indian cult of the past, whether it was Buddhist or another. The Sakyan saw a little more in it than did any other. He will have forgotten, or dropped out in his records—for reasons I shall show—many sayings of the founders, in which they will have shown the close bond between the Way and Becoming, between man the wayfarer and man as grower, as progressive, as coming to be, as "making to arise" (*uppādeti*). These things will happen—do we not see it has happened elsewhere?—when the followers have not been big enough to rise to the level of the Messenger of their gospel and of his true helpers? But the tradition of the early teaching flickered on in the life of the Order, and here and there we come, shifting the metaphor, to an outcrop of it. Very slight they are, yet they need to be accounted for.

To the allusions given above I will quote a reply ascribed to Visākhā, charming lady and distinguished, wealthy lay-disciple, well known to the Founder. The reply bears traces of scholastic editing; but her use of *bhāvanā* is where those traces are not. It is in the Vinaya,[1] and the translation (Rhys Davids's contributions) is not very apt, albeit there are thoughtful footnotes. Visākhā is pleading the benefit she will herself reap, if she is permitted to extend her generosity to the Order. She speaks of the joy, content and peace she will feel (so much has been put into a Piṭaka formula); she goes on: "and that will be to me a becoming (or causing to become) in moral sense, in moral strength, in wisdom." (The last three phrases are in ecclesiastical terms.) Now "becoming" has been translated "an exercise"; but Visākhā is clearly speaking of effect, of fruit, of the *result* of exercise. No one of the laity made better response to the teaching than she, and it is for me possible, that she was reacting to the stress Gotama will have laid on the very man, the self (not mind or body) as he who becomes. She says: "There will be *in* (or 'of') *me* a becoming."

Once more: very noteworthy is in the Pali books the choice, and the persisting choice of the verb *bhāveti*, when a word is needed to express, as express we alas! cannot, such an effort of will as Maudsley called synergy, and I have once or twice ventured to call "more-will". (I do not like such hybrids as plus-will, hyper-will.)

[1] *Mahāvagga*, viii, 15.

In other words, when the man who is seeking to exercise will in a new, or an unwanted, or an abnormal way, the word *bhāveti*, "he makes to become," is used.

In the exercise of "musing" (Jhāna) it was access, in this earthlife the Sakyan strove to "make-become", to the next or other worlds. *Bhāveti* invariably goes with "musing". And in the development of "psychic sense" called Iddhipāda, he was "making to become", strenuous and ardent, those other-sense reactions of which he happened to have found himself capable: the "deva-sight", or the "deva-hearing", or levitation, or thought-reading, or the like. Once more we find, in the Sutta-Nipāta, the man who, while "bearing his human burden" is out for fruition, "making-to-become that joy-bringing occasion" (ver. 256); and further, that the willed state in another, called "the Mood of Amity" (with which I have to deal in a separate chapter) is worded as the "making mind to become" (*cittaṃ bhāvayaṃ*, ver. 507).

In such expressions the use of the strong causative verb, by those lucky enough to have it to hand, is in no way forced. But we also meet with the verb in conjunction with the idea of road or way, used, not so much as "means" only, but as a parable of life wayfared toward its goal. Here the less forced verb would have been "proceeding" (*paṭipanna*), as we find it in records of tours in mission-work,[1] also used here and there as a figure.[2] Actually however we find here too, and emphatically the word "make-to-become" used, when the Way or the First Utterance is the subject. Thus in the solemn mantra of the four truths, appended to the First Utterance, the Founder is made to say: "'The first truth 'ill', as a matter to be understood, I have understood; the second truth, as 'origin (of ill)', as a matter to be got rid of, I have got rid of; the third truth 'stopping (of ill)', as a matter to be realized, I have realized; the fourth truth, 'Way' *as a matter to make-to-become*, I have made to become." The forced use here of *bhāveti* may be seen in the translation (*SBE.*), where "realize", the exact rendering of the Pali *sacchikaroti*, is replaced by "see face to face", and is made to serve for *bhāveti*.

This forced use should not thus be slid past. It should be well weighed and given its full weight and significance. I contend, it is true, that the mantra of the truths was not in the original talk to the few friends. Indeed it is for me an indefinitely later gloss, in which

[1] E.g. *Dīgha*, i, 1.

[2] E.g. the Sangha formula, *Saṃyutta*, i, 220, etc., and cf. Comy. on *Dhammasangaṇi*, § 160.

the venerable traditional verbal yoking of this noun and this verb are mixed with obviously scholastic phrases as "the three modifications and the twelve constituent parts".

The yoking of Way with Becoming we see again in the old Pārâyana of the Sutta-Nipāta:

> Making the way incomparable to become.
> (*bhāvayaṃ maggam uttamaṃ* (ver. 1130)).

How are we to account for this curious presentation of wayfaring as a road made to become, and not as a road proceeded along, travelled along (which is all that Buddhists unversed in their texts see in it), or not as "becoming in the Way" or in "Wayfaring"? We do not meet with it in travel-stories, nor in references to religious touring. I suggest this:—

For the founders of Sakya, the mandate they brought to men was a call to each man to develop, to make become the Man-soul, the Divine Man who he really was. It was a call to the "more-will" in him to become more, by heeding *dhamma*, the divine sense of right, of the ought-to-be, within him. The becoming more was to lie in the better life he led; living better he became better; he was progressing thereby in a Way-of-the-worlds.

Now there was no good word for this will, this "mea sponte" of his choice. But there was the word *bhava, bhāveti*: becoming, making to become. And there was the figure, the parable of wayfaring towards a goal. Incidentally be it said, there was also no word for Wayfarer. Yet did concentration on the great figure wring out the needed words: "the man thus-gone", "the man well-gone" (*tathāgata, sugata*): words cramped by coming to be used for the Way-shower only. And I believe, that it was because the mandate of Becoming (the word was there) and the figure of a Way (the word was there) were closely linked together in that early teaching, with the idea of the Wayfarer as *choosing* (the word was not there), that Sakya has come down the ages to us in just this idiom: "making the Way to become."

So much then at least—and I am not pretending to have exhausted the traces—remains in the Pali books of a teaching on becoming which dates for me from very early days. And I hold that it belongs to the full and the true conception of what the Way of the first utterance implied and involved. For I would say it once more, so has it been overlooked:—Way means progress, unfolding, coming to be, the very "man"-in-the-More. This is the old Sakyan emphasis, more than any *external* goal of fulfilment, any consummation

externally conceived. For Dhamma is not anywhere, as Nirvana is not anywhere. The Divine is "within" the man. But the fully becoming That is a long, long process. "Way" means this also: the fully becoming That, for that is the End of the way. To be in a wayfaring to which no way's end is held up is alien to world-religions; they may have conceived it in their formulated doctrines diversely, but it is there. To see in the Way a figure of the "man in-the-More" is to include in it a reference to the "man-in-the-Most". "In the Highest" is for us a more usual phraseology, but it is only that; it is more usual; it is not more apt.

Now here the First Utterance is not an implying only; it has explicit terms. And if I see, in the four terms for the Goal in the text, later ideas, a gloss, it is not because there has been insertion of the expressed where originally there was only the unexpressed. I think the four: "approach to calm, more-knowledge, thorough (or continuous or collective) enlightenment, going out (nirvana)"[1]—to translate them quite literally—are a later insertion for at least two reasons. If the reader will turn to the First Utterance, he will see that, in the clear wording of the two extremes, the "midway course", to agree with this wording, requires the use of the word *artha*. The midway can only here be shown as best, because it does belong, as they do not, to *artha*; it does lead to That. Now the best *artha*, the *summum bonum*, the Utterly Well was at some early time in Sakya's history expressed as "*paramartha*": highest or furthest *artha*. Thus in two venerable hymns of the Sutta-Nipāta we find it:—

> He who has stirred up effort for the winning of *paramattha* (verse 68),

and:

> Knowing the world, having vision of the *paramattha* (verse 219).

And again in the Nuns' Anthology (ver. 210):—

> Even the rune she spoke
> Fraught with its burden of sublimest good (*paramattha-saññitā*).

But somehow, used in this way, the compound would seem to have been current in poetical diction only, for we do not meet with it in the prose sayings. And it is just possible that for this reason it was not, where it seems eminently in place, uttered in the Talk of the mandate. Or—and this is for me the more plausible— it *was* current in the Prakrit (pre-Pali) prose, and *was* uttered in the mandate, but when the

[1] *Upasama, abhiññā, sambodhi, nibbāna.* See above, p. 55.

Sayings were finally revised in present form, *or* when they were written down in Ceylon, then a change had come into the meaning of the compound *paramattha*, such that it could no longer stand for the Goal of the Way, of man's life-consummation. Namely in that it had come to be used for "ultimate meaning". For this is the way in which it is used in the great debate-series on man's ultimate reality, in the book said to have been compiled expressly for the Patna Congress in king Asoka's reign: the Kathā-vatthu. (And in this sense, its use in the one Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, No. 22, is coupled with what appears from the Commentary to be certainly a gloss.) Anyway, if *paramartha* was not used, it is at least "*artha-saṃhita*", belonging to *artha*, that is wanted in the context.

Instead of such a clear, straightforward, consistent wording, we find these four compound terms, which do not, as they stand, *express the Way's End at all.* They are terms of the More, not of the Most or Highest or Best. They express a more than ordinary knowledge (*abhiññā*), the process of winning calm (*upasama*; *samatha* is calm); the advance or improvement in enlightenment (*sambodhi*: the Commentaries parse *sam* as is given above, in alternatives), and away-from-going, or out-going (*nib-bāna*). Now I would not dispute that these terms, placed to stand for the Goal to which the Way would lead, did mean, had come to mean, much for scholastic Sakya. For that matter each of them means much in the Pali books. But the much means, I repeat, *only the More.* Not one of them can be said to be free from ambiguity; the last of them least of all. It is still to-day very ambiguous among Buddhists themselves. Not one of them is an unambiguous term for *paramartha*: supreme Good or Goal. And this can only mean one thing: that in monastic values, the Way was no longer the worlds-journey from more to more, ending in the Most.

Somehow, in the teaching world of Sakya, the Way as a becoming (*bhava*) in each man's life had ceased to draw, to have value. The Way had been supplanted, for the layman, by a code of five moral ways, or habits, negatively worded, called *sīla*,[1] for the monk, by one of four statements about the woes of life, called true things (*saccāni*).

This is a historical event of deep interest. Will the reader bear with me if I go into it?

That man's life is a wayfaring—a *Magga*—is one of the great figures in human speech, because it is so close to world-truth. Even were there no greater way of the worlds, wherein Man-soul, the *purusha*, is in a sense more literally a wayfarer, the figure would

[1] The term in use to-day in "Southern" Buddhism: *pañ-sil*, is very late.

still be most apt. For, to repeat, way implies choice, brings growing fitness in wayfarer, way brings the new, the further view, way heads for a goal. For the young especially there is nothing which so brings at its close, in the return to the familiar, a sense of "having become"—and not in body or mind only but in the self, the very "man"—as does a lengthened bout of wayfaring. In the resumption of work and of play, even after disuse, there will be a little stronger, wiser grasp of things, which is not in skill of body or mind, but is felt as better vantage-point in view. It is growth in the very "man".

To the superficial reader the figure of the Way may seem to stress but little or not at all the individual Wayman; it seems to call up the many, the travelling host. And it would not be a figure of world-truth if it were not of all. But it is curious how empty of comment on its significance for the individual is the literature of and on Buddhism. I am not saying that a man's growth towards saintship as a "way", or that man's conquest over birth and death, as stages in a *Magga*, are not prominent teachings. But I do say that the doctrine of man as wayfarer in a way, taught as a figure full of meaning and attractiveness for the Everyman to whom, as intended, it will have been addressed, is lost sight of. And why? Because the Buddhist exponents, as monks, did not welcome all that wayfaring means; and again, because their cramped use of the great figure has put European exponents off the scent. I would justify both these assertions.

I have said that the figure *magga* for man's life as a whole to a consummation of life was, when Sakya began, not peculiar to Sakya; it was also a Brahman figure. The first group of Sayings in the venerable Dīgha Nikāya ends with the Tevijja, or Three-Veda Suttanta. In it two young Brahmans are shown disputing whether any of the Ways (*maggāni*, *sic*) taught by this and that Brahman teacher is right, that is, "the straight way, the thither-faring road leading to companionship with Brahmā (not Brahman, but a personalized conception of deity; in Sakyan teaching the ruler of this Brahma-world ranked as "higher" than the next world). The luminous reply ascribed to Gotama shows how, in his message, the Way was *so much more* than any course of prescribed teaching, which might be associated with his name. The Way, for him, was man's very life. And it was thus, and thus alone, that the Way would be a faring to the Highest, in that the wayfarer, conceiving the Highest as what he thought Best, would by persistently choosing to live at his best, be ever becoming more and more like that Best, more fit for the

divine *sahavyatā*, or companionship (see above, p. 37). Worthy in truth is a word like this to stand beside that of Hosea, prophet: "Then shall we know if we follow on to know"; beside that also of John the Elder: "Dearests, now are we sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that we shall be like . . ."

But the Way has come down to us so congealed in its rather unfortunate "eightfold" uniform of prescribed states of thought, word, and deed, that we have not seen its true significance. It is when we cut these shackles off, noting where and how Way and Wayfaring survive in the records, when it is unhampered by them, that something of its original strength and significance stand out. Notice, for instance, the context in the Pārāyana (Sutta-Nipāta, a portion old enough to be quoted in the Nikāyas), from which a line has been cited: here is no detail of Eight, no harping on "ill"; here it is the forward wayfaring and the Goal:—

> He who would practise as the Teacher taught,
> 'T is he may go from hence to the Beyond;
> Yea, hence to the Beyond 't is he may go,
> Making the Way-Incomparable to become;
> The Way this is for going to Beyond,
> And therefore is it Yonder-faring called.

Nor in our sampling be it overlooked what is the name by which some early Sakyan poet called his Founder: Satthavāha, "caravan-leader":

> Arise, thou, leader of the caravan, and tour the world![1]

a name which came, in two anthologies, to be applied also to former "Buddhas". And it should not be overlooked that in the amazing treasury of folklore in the Pali Canon, the Jātaka, the place of honour as the first two is given to two caravan tales, in which of course the Bodhisat, or future Buddha, is the caravan-leader. On the fascination which adventure by travel and knowledge by travel may have had for Gotama, both before and after he set out himself a-quest, I have written in the companion volume. Here I would not stress this feature of the Way. For the very pith of the figure was, that each wayfarer should himself be a *satthavāha* (a word meaning literally *sa-attha-vāha*, "cum-goods-bearer", the Good within him), choosing the Way. I bring it in here to show the lingering, dying tradition of the Way as once a great symbol of man's life, and not merely the ethical rune, which is *not truly ethical at that*, as which it is usually valued.

Such picturesque developments in Way-allegory may or may not

[1] *Dīgha*, ii, 39; *Majjhima*, i, 169; *Saṃyutta*, i, 137.

have been in the Founder's thought when the figure occurred to him or when he first put it into words. It is not a matter about which we need to come to any conclusion. When new will in the shape of a new idea stirs within us, we may not at first see all the scope and richness of it; we come to see that by degrees. We may at first have but a worded outline by which to express it. Now the First Utterance, I repeat, will have been just that, a schema, not a "sermon", as it is usually inaptly called, but a worded outline on which to build, out of which to draw, all that it rightly could be said to imply, for the purpose of bringing help and guidance to this man and that, who together constituted the Many for whom the word of new will was intended. We should not see, in the fact of its utterance, the genuine historical event we do, had it been more than a schema—had it been a floridly worded discourse, such as we see in Buddhist Sanskrit effusions.

And when, launched in his new career as missioner, Gotama spoke to this man and that woman of life as a "way", full of adventure, unknown, unpredictable, appealing to the young, and having a wonderful "beyond", it is then, and probably only then, that he would himself come to see what a rich and strong appeal lay in it. I see in it for him no mere "overture" to the music of his long career, but a Leitmotif, a leading theme ever recurring, brought to bear now thus, now thus. The very last man whose question he sought in dying weakness to answer, was told of the Way.[1] And what would we not give to have his very words and not the pædagogic version in the book! I can see nothing unreasonable in the surmise that the swift success (if swift it truly was) of his teaching among the many, the merchant and the land-tiller, the craftsman and the beast-tamer, the woman and child, the hunter and bandit, the cowherd and the flower-sweeper, was in part due to the fascinating and stimulating picture of man as wayfarer from the known to the unknown, of how welfare lay in getting further, of how getting further depended upon right wayfaring here and now. The figure as I have said, was not his monopoly; but his emphasis was new. And this was a bringing of life as travel, in Bacon's immortal words, "home to men's business and bosoms." Could the men who were the vehicle of the teaching have remained laymen, could we have had in Ganges valley a little world of John Bunyans, teaching the notion of the "pilgrim's progress" as the "way through the jungle", not so much with a load of sin to be discarded, as with an ever growing force of *artha*—the good, the needed, the better—to be carried along,

[1] *Dīgha*, ii, 151.

we should not now be seeing the Buddhist Dhamma so lamentably misrepresented as a gospel of "Ill", of world as good for nothing, of "not-man", of "becoming to be stopped" as in its records it came to be, as in its monasticism it has continued to be.

Laymen and monks, Buddhists have ever been keen and pious pilgrims. The sadder it is, and the stranger, to see how in the past they failed to value rightly the figure and the truth of the Greater Pilgrimage. The lure of the roadway, and of the seaway, and now of the airway calls to man, even though, when his ostensible purpose is that of pilgrim, he may have missed the true call of his religion. And I fail to find any grasp, in either Buddhist scriptures or Buddhists, of the Way as a parable of life for the man as a whole: the Way in and through the way: *magga* in *saṃsāra*, of the worlds.

Some will say I am forcing parable or figure of life on to what was a mere term of means or method only. If such a charge be seriously maintained it does but show how much monastic teachers and editors have so displaced the once central feature, so that we have to look hard for the hidden treasure. I will disclose three such out-of-the-way applications, and leave the reader to judge whether or not we have in them "means", "method," or a picture of the right life-as-a-whole itself.

In the canonical anthology called Verses of the Elders there is one poem, and one only, about the Way. It is claimed for one Migajāla, "Deer-snarer," and very eloquent it is. Here and there it shows real insight, yet not where it is most needed. In both respects it is well worth a brief consideration.

In the first place, full though it is of epithets for what the Way is judged to bring to the life and help of man, there is no word of reference beyond the one word "eightfold" (*aṭṭhangiko*) to the analysis so-called or to any of the parts. Emphasis on action (*kamma*) is the only approach to one of these, *kammanta*, and even that is in depreciation and not, as in the eight parts, an appreciation (of right conduct). I cannot conceive a (Hīnayāna) Buddhist of to-day composing a psalm to the Way with such an omission. We have at this time of day no idea how much later this (?) Prakrit poem was turned into Pali. But according to the Commentary Migajāla was a son of the lady Visākhā, contemporary of the Founder. As such he ranks among the older verse-composers. And had there been in his day the eightfold division, on which I find Buddhists of to-day much busier than they are on the real teaching of the Way *quâ* Way, it would surely have found mention in his verses.

In the next place he implies that the Way is not *saṃsāra*; he sees

in it "chosen advance", and not "whirling round". This is in the epithet *sabba-vaṭṭa-vināsano*. I have rendered this "all rolling on is razed away". It should have been "rolling *round*" ("rolling *on*" would be *pavattana, anuvattana*). To roll *on* is that of the wayfarer in the way, which he rightly goes on to call *niyyāniko*: "it leadeth on and out" (the word means both). This is the true movement of the "wheel of dhamma". It is the wheel in the air that merely whirls *round*, and it was a very worthless perversion of the figure when Buddhaghosa, of himself, or with his tradition, calls life in the worlds a wheel of becoming (*bhavacakka*), as if it were a wheel of Ixion. How with such a simile was not the worth in the Way become changed for the worse! For Migajāla the Wheel of Dhamma in its progress crushes out the miserable figure of the wayless whirling wheel. Yet are we in the poem almost at once dragged back into the nightmare of rebirth as a thing to be dreaded. Whom are we to see at work here? Migajāla or his editors?

For in the monkish doctrine of Ill, *saṃsāra*, which in Gotama's day had come to be used for the flowing *on* of life from world to world, came, after his day, to be conceived as a round, an eddy, *āvaṭṭa*, *dukkhavaṭṭa*, with no maintenance of *parakkama*, going forward, but rather of *niyyānika*, faring out of, away from. Negatively then Migajāla has got the idea of progress. The Buddhist idea came to be to get out of *saṃsāra* into *magga*. The sounder idea would be thus: *in saṃsāra*, in the life-faring, choose the *magga*, the right faring. But then the world-despairing idea of the monk was to bring life in worlds to an end. Life in worlds as the true, the only way of self-fulfilment was not accepted.

The poem also speaks of act and cause in the Way, and rightly. The Way was conduct; it was man in his conduct becoming the cause of his progress, only Migajāla didn't see this.

> Action as such it knoweth, and the fruit as fruit,
> True world-view of all things as risen causally.

But he adds, ending on a noble note:

> *Mahākhemangamo santo pariyosānabhaddako.*
> Yea, to the mighty Haven doth it wend,
> Holy (the faring), well (for thee) the End.

Where then does he miss wording with true insight? Herein:—There is nothing to show the very essence of the Way, there is nothing to keep the hearer off from the idea, that here is a road along which

mankind, like sheep, were being shepherded by "Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha" to salvation, there is nothing to show the hearer, that the Way means a man's so living as to be and to do his best, *as himself the "caravan-leader"*. Yet it is this, just this, and the End well kept in view that make of the First Utterance, not a mere good-compelling mantra, not a mere code of good thought, word and deed, but a very gospel, an inspired Call to the "man" from That Who is both Source and End.

Nor is there anything in the verses to show an awareness, that wayfaring in the Way meant in the wayfarer a continual progress, becoming, growth. Words, I have shown, were not lacking here. Besides *bhāveti*, "making to become," "developing," there was *vaḍḍhi* or *vuddhi*, growth, a word which peeps out just here and there like an unsubmerged rock in an engulfing sea. Thus we come across praise of "Ariyan growth" in a good woman,[1] and the nun, mother of Vaddha, in her verses, plays on his name in inciting him to growth towards the Utterly well, or, as she negatively puts it, the making an end of ill, connecting her admonition with the Way (*magga*) and with the Goal (*param'attha*).[2] Survivals these just here and there, but very precious in dealing with records, in which the main theme has become Ill rather than Way to the Utterly Well, in which Becoming is the very thing that must be stopped. *Bhava-nirodho nibbānaṃ*: the stopping of becoming is Nirvana, and the effecting this is named among the chief aims of the holy life![3]

Quite a thrill it gives when, in the midst of these records with their Leitmotif of world-woe, we come on the passage where the bald wording in the First Utterance is changed to one of loftiest meaning; in a speech accredited to the Governor of the next world:[4] that the Way and the Goal flow one into the other, as flow Ganges and Jumna.

But perhaps for us the most interesting survivals, out of probably a very great number, are the two that remain showing the Utterer of the Way-figure himself applying it in his teaching. (I cannot recall meeting with any others.) The one is in the Saṃyutta Collection, the other in that called Majjhima. In the former he is represented as heartening up his cousin Tissa, bilious or certainly sick at heart, in a Way-parable telling him of difficulties met and surmounted in the way of the new and unwonted, till at length the view of way's end breaks upon vision. And then the healing

[1] *Saṃyutta*, iv, 250.
[2] *Theragāthā*, ver. 207–12.
[3] *Saṃyutta*, ii, 117.
[4] *Digha*, ii, 223.

is driven in with words like so many electric shocks, words so unlike in phrasing to the wonted Piṭakan flow, that we wonder if we have not here something very near what was actually said.[1]

It may be said, that in one respect the alleged implication in the essence of the Way-utterance is absent. Tissa, namely, *is told* which way now here, now there he is to take. It is true that the monitor in that is, in the Saying, interpreted as being not the "inward" *dhamma*, but "Tathāgata, Arahan, Fully Enlightened One". This does but show how externalized as the set Doctrine of a Person, and no more the inward divine urge of *dhamma*, the orthodox teaching had become. And after all, for all the guide's advice, Tissa had himself to choose to accept or reject it.

This, the wording of the man's own will is better shown in the other application of the Way-message. "Why," a brahman asks him, "with the End as real, and the Way to it as real, and with you to show it, do not all your men, as you yourself admit, win to the end?" (There is perhaps some corrupt wording crept in here; but on the other hand it had become, when the Suttas were compiled, correct to speak of a saint or "arahan" as one who had definitely won all there was in life to win, hence in a way, he had won Nirvana.)

"What think you, brahman?" is the stated answer, "Suppose a man asked you the way to Rājagaha, and you gave him detailed guidance, and he none the less went west where you had said east . . . what then?"

"What fault were there in me, Gotama? I only had shown the way."

"So I too only show the way . . ."[2]

Here in all but explicit words the choice is referred to the wayfarer. We have the "man" standing at a dividing of the ways, and willing to choose the best way, the way that is right or fit (*sammā*, *samyak*). But it is left to him to know, to "understand" which is best. "Yours," runs a verse, "is the arduous thing to be done; tathāgatas are (but) they who declare." (*Dhammapada*, ver. 276.)

I confess that for me these simple object-lessons in the far-reaching implications lying in the word of the Way, pointing to what it meant, not so obviously to "men" as to each "man", pointing also to the

[1] *Saṃyutta*, iii, 109.
[2] *Majjhima*, Sutta 107. Lord Chalmers' trans., "where is my responsibility?" is not inapt, but it is very free. The Pali has only: *Ettha kv'āham karomi?* "Here now what do I?" or "Here where do I come in?" according as we see in *kv'*, *ku* or *kva*.

manner in which we may, I think, believe that the great Teacher did use it as man to man, are worth more than all the wearisome reiterations of the Way as being Ariyan and Eightfold.

We may consider later with other scriptural sophistications this curious elaboration of man's way in conduct into eight dispositions, neither more nor less. To me it is more likely that the original wording in the Utterance was the much older, the Aryan, not "Ariyan" threefold division of right thought, word and deed. It is a division we often meet with in such portions of the Nikāyas as may have been earlier compiled. Moreover it occurs in a very striking way in the Jātaka book, a way which shows the Founder waiving aside a growing ecclesiastical complexity in the monks' teaching of novices. Now this I do not see monkish editors putting in as emendation of older versions. It is, we might say, a story told against themselves, and we are fortunate it has survived. It is true that the Jātaka Book, which is a great "Apocrypha" included in the Sutta Piṭaka, came —it is supposed—very late into written form for it is, practically all of it, Commentarial talk, for which the teaching monk was given a free hand. But it does not follow that the "episodes of the present", that is, which gave rise it was said, in the Founder's own day, to the old folklore story being told, do not contain very old survivals.

The episode—it is that of the Bar of Gold Jātaka—is that a lay convert, entering the Order, was so overwhelmed at the complexity in the various Moral Codes (forms of Sīla) taught by his tutor that he decided to return to the "Low Thing", as life in the laity was called. Brought before the Teacher, the "Bhagavā", the latter is made to say this: "Come, what use is for you a mass of moral rules? Will you be able to keep just three precepts?" "I shall be able, sir." "Well then, do you henceforth ward the Three Gates: the Gate of the Act, the Gate of the Word, the Gate of the Thought; do no evil action in act, word, or thought. Go . . . just ward these three."

This taken alone will not be held as very "evidential" in a theory as to a wording of the Way, in the First Utterance, older than the Eightfold schedule. On the other hand it is suggestive, and as yet it has not been brought to notice. It uses, as Bunyan showed us, a metaphor of the City, rather than of the Way, and I do not quote it for the figure. I quote it as showing the existence of a tradition, that the Sakyan Founder preferred the simpler Three Ways of conduct to a longer list, in which is an arbitrary, inadequate, inexhaustive distribution of those Three Ways. Such a list is the Eightfold. And as to the story giving us but a suggestion towards

reconstruction: well, we are digging for a buried city, and as with the archæologist, our inductions may have to rise out of a cumulative pile of suggestions.

Into the difficult criticism of editorial emendation I shall be going further in a later chapter. I have been charged here and there with upholding "ecclesiastical distortions" for which no sufficient motive is brought forward. Now it were not wise did I say: "That is prejudice and blindness on the critic-reader's part." I prefer to think that I have not made myself sufficiently clear, have not marshalled my reasons well. I hope before the curtain falls to convince him, that to speak of choosing one version among many as "authentic", because it best accords with the view of the chooser (the view that is of a later day), as distortion, is to miscall acts where the *motive* was very worthy. I hope also to show that from the editorial chooser's point of view there *was* such a motive, worthy and cogent.

So far let it suffice that I have tried to show in the First Utterance, as we have it, certain fragments which are all I judge to be original, and why I judge them to be so. And I have, I hope, made it clear that even had we the Utterance in its actually original wording, we should at best have "a talk disclosing a schema or outline" and not at all a "sermon", or even an impressive "heart to heart" talk to a given individual. We see the Sakya-Muni as a man who started his man-helping mission as no orator, with no confidence in his own powers of convincing hearers on what we should call philosophic lines, but with a great gift of going straight to the heart of some one man's need. Now as a far-reaching truth conveyed in a popular figure—the "man's" ultimate welfare in a long existence of coming to be, in accordance with his own inwardly guided decision in conduct pictured as the traveller's ways in wayfaring—he had thought out the brief sketch we have discussed. He had thought it out as a guide-code, not only for himself, but also for men he at once sought out, who would understand and be wanting to help with him.

In this little outline I have come to see two implications at least—Dhamma, Will—*without which* the Utterance (as we have it) falls out from such momentous words as may be rightly called messages of world-gospels or religions, and is reduced to an apologia for the monk's renunciation of life in the world, together with a rule for his own conduct in so far as this is deemed to be (*a*) right for his own mind-culture, (*b*) right in giving no offence to other men. But those two implications—dhamma, will—lift the outline at once to a different plane. They entitle it to be looked upon as a call to the man,

not to the recluse only. When read into the outline as belonging to its essential meaning, they reveal it as saying to the man, then regarded by the religious world as *God-Man immanent in earth-man*: Choose in your long life-way how to act in thought, word and deed, guided by *dhamma*, the urge which is in and of you (*ajjh'atta*). So will you in your wayfaring become. So will you in becoming reap the fruit, even to the uttermost Good (*artha*).

If we dare thus to reconstruct, if we dare, in the teeth of endless Buddhist reiteration down centuries of ecclesiastical routine, in the teeth of Western acquiescence in that reiteration, to lighten the caravan and drop from it the monk-diagnosis of the Four Truths about Ill, then shall we at least better understand, it may be, how in the ancient book of the Sutta-Nipāta, the man is linked, not so much with Ill, as with the Way to "Well": "way-liver," "way-victor," "way-teacher," "way-corrupter."[1] In the Majjhima it is the Founder only who is thus linked: "Way-shower," "Way-upraiser."[2] That each man, each woman was wayfarer, waymaker, waychooser, way worth-er: of any of this we find nothing remaining save in the Sutta-Nipāta. And it is only too consistent with the gradual dropping of the "man" from the caravan that went on, the Man-soul who is its leader, that in the Jātaka, in the Indian figure of life's chariot-driving,[3] whereas the usual feature of mind as charioteer is retained, the king no longer stands directing beside him.

And therewith the Way's End is virtually dropped also. Nirvana, it is true, that apex of ambiguity, is there. But I repeat, the word was a closing of the view, not a vista. It was as a shouting by the exiled wayfarer Not-land! when the innumerable laughter of the sea, and its home-suggestion broke on his view. We know that was not his cry. And it is significant that, in that other often used scheme of the Way, oddly divided as "four" ways and four "fruits", the culmination of it is no more called Nirvana, but "worthiness" which we try despairingly to render by "arahantship" I have no wish to do anything so myopic as to undervalue a conception of the Goal of the Way expressed as man consummate—for that is what *arahatta* comes to in meaning. But by the Buddhist it was, not by me, that the term became depreciated. For he used the word to express human consummation attainable on earth, and that can only be managed by holding a woefully cramped idea of what consummation

[1] Verses 84–9 continued. Of course we do not now accept the pioneer Fausböll when he sees here four sections of Samaṇas!

[2] iii, 6, 8, 15.

[3] No. 544.

is, and more, of what in finer, more than earthly states of life it may come to be. "Eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived . . ." Faintly the Sutta Nipāta anticipates that:

> Nowhere is measure for one gone to oblivion,
> That whereby we speak of him, that for him is not . . . (ver. 1075).

But herein again this book, albeit mainly a manual of the recluse, has so far the wider vision of the poet that it is now and again less cramped in idea than are the Suttas.

In the Fourfold Way Nirvana, it is true, is let go, but still it is the backward view that we find, the thinking of the sea as "not-land". The view of the Way as in stages of progress would seem to be the reverse of this. And this view was indeed a great opportunity for Sakya to have expressed its ideal in what we might call a Coué-istic fashion, namely by dwelling on the Better than had come to be, and was yet still more coming to be. But no! the opportunity was lost; life in the Four stages is measured, in *name*, not by the so much of effort accomplished or to be grappled with, but by the amount of Becoming got rid of:—"Once-(more) going-(back to earth)"; "Not-coming-(back)".[1] I hasten to contrast with these, the intermediate stages, the name for the First Stage: Streamwinning.[2] Here at least we have, albeit in oddly mixed metaphor, a strong positive word of Becoming. It is akin to similes, favoured in the Pali books of mountain streams reaching the river, of Gangā's tributaries blending with her, of Gangā's finding the sea. It may well have been, in early Sakya, a figure used parallel with the Way, for man's life as heading, as drawing irresistibly onward to the Ocean of its natural tendency. In its place in the Fourfold Way it is as a round peg in a square hole. It obviously does not belong there, and in the Suttas it is repeatedly treated as belonging to a separate scheme of salvation from the monks' scheme of desire stopped, of becoming quenched, and of Nirvana. It has its own triumph song, the song of happy rebirth.[3] It is part of a gospel not of the monk for the monk. It is the gospel for the Many, for Every man. It *is* Sakya.

I do not overlook that, when we get past the names in this Fourfold Way, we find the great idea of progress in holiness given utterance, such as the gradual reducing of the sensual nature to a minimum, etc.[4] Again, but only in the later Abhidhamma, we find a very noble utterance associated with the first stage, the disposition

[1] *Sakad-āgāmin*; *an-āgāmin*.

[2] *Sōt'āpatti*.

[3] *Saṃyutta*, ii, 67.

[4] *Digha*, i, 156.

named in the compound: "I-shall-come-to-know-the-unknown."[1] But only there. Men's names for things are a mirror of their values in things. And it is in the *names* of the Fourfold Way that we see the values. What values, what an outlook it is! Outlook of the timid, the burnt child, the shipwrecked on the sands of time, the man who has given up. It has been a great disutility to the real message of the Way. It has drained from that a fit wording of the Way's Goal (for to its credit this later way *is* a world-way with a goal). And the real Way, thus blooded, has shrivelled up to being practically a Way of this earthlife only. So much so, that I have heard Europeans asking whether Buddhism taught survival at all. And I have read young Ceylon saying in print that the Buddha taught, it was only this life that mattered and that the "other life" could take care of itself.

How have the founders of great religions been crucified anew times without number!

How do not the votaries of great religions cast aside treasures of great worth committed to them!

When the Christian knight set out on a journey he took of the cup of remembrance, the bread of compassionate sacrifice, took them with prayer. Symbols of "more-will" in becoming in his wayfaring were these:

> Wein und Brod des letzten Mahles
> Wandelt' einst der Herr des Grales
> Durch des Mitleids Liebesmacht
> In das Blut das Er vergoss,
> In den Leib den dar Er bracht . . .[2]

When two friends of mine and of Ceylon left the island, the kindly farewell ceremony given them by monks was the confession thrice of refuge in the Buddhist trinity, the five *sīlas*, the little Sutta about what is the highest luck.[3] Not a word about the Way, of which the journey was a fit symbol, not a word of wellwishing in the Making it to Become, not a word of "the love-might of compassion" to all men, which the very Man-in-the-Founder breathed forth, as did that other Founder, to the world!

[1] *Dhammasangaṇi*, §§ 277, 296, 362.
[2] The poem of Parsifal.
[3] "Memories of Ceylon," by W. Geiger, *JPTS.*, 1924–27.

VII

THE FIRST SONS OF THE SAKYA

Let me now return to the first of the three terms in the hypothesis of a new religion considered as a world-happening or -phenomenon. This is "they to whom the message comes". I considered this in a former chapter in a very general sense, as the particular "world", the world round about 600 B.C. in the middle Ganges valley, and I considered it, not in its ethnological or political aspects—others have done that—but mainly with respect to certain prevailing religious attitudes, and in particular with respect to certain changes in attitude which had come in and were coming in. I now wish to reconsider this subject in a more intimate and specific way, namely, in the persons of the first group of men to whom the new message is recorded to have come.

So slight and fragmentary is the ancient chronicle about them, that few subjects offer more difficulties to the reconstructive imagination. The men are named, to be almost immediately dismissed again, and with two exceptions without recall. Their appearance in legend and in bas-relief is of what I would call of the most hide-bound nature; they might be called fossilized figures. As such we see them in the Borobudur bas-reliefs; as such we see them (with one exception) in the unique Piṭaka record of them: the Mahā-vagga of the Vinaya Piṭaka; as such we see them in the Nidāna-kathā, or Introduction to the Jātaka. Yet is "fossilized" never applicable to ideas; the legend had in it elements of change. Thus in the Vinaya the first "five" appear, as hearers for the first time; in the Nidāna-kathā and Commentaries, one of them appears twenty-nine years before as Brahman augur at Gotama's birth. The legend I put aside; the Vinaya Commentary is not within reach, and I shall keep to the record in the canonical text. The narrative is always in very slight outline; much would seem either to have been forgotten or suppressed, as not relevant to the formal registering of some Vinaya statute, and why it came to be. We get the impression that we are reading about persons and places which, for the compilers, are just names, bound up it is clear with an ancient and venerated tradition, but not belonging to any actual memories either in their possession or even in their own preceding generations. The places named do not seem to be places known.